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Merge pull request 'Added pledge(2) and unveil(2) system calls to improve security on OpenBSD.' (#13) from kvothe/molly-brown:master into master

Reviewed-on: https://tildegit.org/solderpunk/molly-brown/pulls/13
This commit is contained in:
Solderpunk 2023-02-08 17:54:29 +00:00
commit b16a8584a6
4 changed files with 89 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ Molly Brown only has a single dependency beyond the Go standard
library, which is [this TOML parsing
library](https://github.com/BurntSushi/toml).
The OpenBSD implementation also uses the [golang.org/x/sys/unix
package](https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/sys/unix) to provide the
[pledge(2)](https://man.openbsd.org/pledge.2) and
[unveil(2)](https://man.openbsd.org/unveil.2) system calls to provide
additional security features.
## Installation
The easiest way for now to install Molly Brown is to use the standard

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@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ func main() {
}
}()
// Restrict access to the files specified in config
enableSecurityRestrictions(config, errorLog)
// Infinite serve loop
for {
conn, err := listener.Accept()

14
security.go Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
// +build !openbsd
package main
import (
"log"
)
// Restrict access to the files specified in config in an OS-dependent way.
// This is intended to be called immediately prior to accepting client
// connections and may be used to establish a security "jail" for the molly
// brown executable.
func enableSecurityRestrictions(config Config, errorLog *log.Logger) {
}

66
security_openbsd.go Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
package main
import (
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"log"
"path/filepath"
)
// Restrict access to the files specified in config in an OS-dependent way.
// The OpenBSD implementation uses pledge(2) and unveil(2) to restrict the
// operations available to the molly brown executable. Please note that (S)CGI
// processes that molly brown spawns or communicates with are unrestricted
// and should pledge their own restrictions and unveil their own files.
func enableSecurityRestrictions(config Config, errorLog *log.Logger) {
// Unveil the configured document base as readable.
log.Println("Unveiling \"" + config.DocBase + "\" as readable.")
err := unix.Unveil(config.DocBase, "r")
if err != nil {
errorLog.Println("Could not unveil DocBase: " + err.Error())
log.Fatal(err)
}
// Unveil cgi path globs as executable.
for _, cgiPath := range config.CGIPaths {
cgiGlobbedPaths, err := filepath.Glob(cgiPath)
for _, cgiGlobbedPath := range cgiGlobbedPaths {
log.Println("Unveiling \"" + cgiGlobbedPath + "\" as executable.")
err = unix.Unveil(cgiGlobbedPath, "rx")
if err != nil {
errorLog.Println("Could not unveil CGIPaths: " + err.Error())
log.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
// Unveil scgi socket paths as readable and writeable.
for _, scgiSocket := range config.SCGIPaths {
log.Println("Unveiling \"" + scgiSocket + "\" as read/write.")
err = unix.Unveil(scgiSocket, "rw")
}
// Finalize the unveil list.
// Any files not whitelisted above won't be accessible to molly brown.
err = unix.UnveilBlock()
if err != nil {
errorLog.Println("Could not block unveil: " + err.Error())
log.Fatal(err)
}
// Pledge to only use stdio, inet, and rpath syscalls.
promises := "stdio inet rpath"
if len(config.CGIPaths) > 0 {
// If CGI paths have been specified, also allow exec syscalls.
promises += " exec proc"
}
if len(config.SCGIPaths) > 0 {
// If SCGI paths have been specified, also allow unix sockets.
promises += " unix"
}
err = unix.PledgePromises(promises)
if err != nil {
errorLog.Println("Could not pledge: " + err.Error())
log.Fatal(err)
}
}