moby--moby/api/server/middleware/debug.go

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package middleware // import "github.com/docker/docker/api/server/middleware"
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/docker/docker/api/server/httputils"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/ioutils"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
// DebugRequestMiddleware dumps the request to logger
func DebugRequestMiddleware(handler func(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, vars map[string]string) error) func(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, vars map[string]string) error {
return func(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, vars map[string]string) error {
logrus.Debugf("Calling %s %s", r.Method, r.RequestURI)
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
return handler(ctx, w, r, vars)
}
if err := httputils.CheckForJSON(r); err != nil {
return handler(ctx, w, r, vars)
}
maxBodySize := 4096 // 4KB
if r.ContentLength > int64(maxBodySize) {
return handler(ctx, w, r, vars)
}
body := r.Body
bufReader := bufio.NewReaderSize(body, maxBodySize)
r.Body = ioutils.NewReadCloserWrapper(bufReader, func() error { return body.Close() })
b, err := bufReader.Peek(maxBodySize)
if err != io.EOF {
// either there was an error reading, or the buffer is full (in which case the request is too large)
return handler(ctx, w, r, vars)
}
var postForm map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &postForm); err == nil {
maskSecretKeys(postForm)
formStr, errMarshal := json.Marshal(postForm)
if errMarshal == nil {
logrus.Debugf("form data: %s", string(formStr))
} else {
logrus.Debugf("form data: %q", postForm)
}
}
return handler(ctx, w, r, vars)
}
}
func maskSecretKeys(inp interface{}) {
if arr, ok := inp.([]interface{}); ok {
for _, f := range arr {
maskSecretKeys(f)
}
return
}
if form, ok := inp.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
DebugRequestMiddleware: unconditionally scrub data field Commit 77b8465d7e68ca102d7aae839c7b3fe0ecd28398 added a secret update endpoint to allow updating labels on existing secrets. However, when implementing the endpoint, the DebugRequestMiddleware was not updated to scrub the Data field (as is being done when creating a secret). When updating a secret (to set labels), the Data field should be either `nil` (not set), or contain the same value as the existing secret. In situations where the Data field is set, and the `dockerd` daemon is running with debugging enabled / log-level debug, the base64-encoded value of the secret is printed to the daemon logs. The docker cli does not have a `docker secret update` command, but when using `docker stack deploy`, the docker cli sends the secret data both when _creating_ a stack, and when _updating_ a stack, thus leaking the secret data if the daemon runs with debug enabled: 1. Start the daemon in debug-mode dockerd --debug 2. Initialize swarm docker swarm init 3. Create a file containing a secret echo secret > my_secret.txt 4. Create a docker-compose file using that secret cat > docker-compose.yml <<'EOF' version: "3.3" services: web: image: nginx:alpine secrets: - my_secret secrets: my_secret: file: ./my_secret.txt EOF 5. Deploy the stack docker stack deploy -c docker-compose.yml test 6. Verify that the secret is scrubbed in the daemon logs DEBU[2019-07-01T22:36:08.170617400Z] Calling POST /v1.30/secrets/create DEBU[2019-07-01T22:36:08.171364900Z] form data: {"Data":"*****","Labels":{"com.docker.stack.namespace":"test"},"Name":"test_my_secret"} 7. Re-deploy the stack to trigger an "update" docker stack deploy -c docker-compose.yml test 8. Notice that this time, the Data field is not scrubbed, and the base64-encoded secret is logged DEBU[2019-07-01T22:37:35.828819400Z] Calling POST /v1.30/secrets/w3hgvwpzl8yooq5ctnyp71v52/update?version=34 DEBU[2019-07-01T22:37:35.829993700Z] form data: {"Data":"c2VjcmV0Cg==","Labels":{"com.docker.stack.namespace":"test"},"Name":"test_my_secret"} This patch modifies `maskSecretKeys` to unconditionally scrub `Data` fields. Currently, only the `secrets` and `configs` endpoints use a field with this name, and no other POST API endpoints use a data field, so scrubbing this field unconditionally will only scrub requests for those endpoints. If a new endpoint is added in future where this field should not be scrubbed, we can re-introduce more fine-grained (path-specific) handling. This patch introduces some change in behavior: - In addition to secrets, requests to create or update _configs_ will now have their `Data` field scrubbed. Generally, the actual data should not be interesting for debugging, so likely will not be problematic. In addition, scrubbing this data for configs may actually be desirable, because (even though they are not explicitely designed for this purpose) configs may contain sensitive data (credentials inside a configuration file, e.g.). - Requests that send key/value pairs as a "map" and that contain a key named "data", will see the value of that field scrubbed. This means that (e.g.) setting a `label` named `data` on a config, will scrub/mask the value of that label. - Note that this is already the case for any label named `jointoken`, `password`, `secret`, `signingcakey`, or `unlockkey`. Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl> (cherry picked from commit c7ce4be93ae8edd2da62a588e01c67313a4aba0c) Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <tibor@docker.com>
2019-07-02 12:21:03 +00:00
scrub := []string{
// Note: The Data field contains the base64-encoded secret in 'secret'
// and 'config' create and update requests. Currently, no other POST
// API endpoints use a data field, so we scrub this field unconditionally.
// Change this handling to be conditional if a new endpoint is added
// in future where this field should not be scrubbed.
"data",
"jointoken",
"password",
"secret",
"signingcakey",
"unlockkey",
}
loop0:
for k, v := range form {
DebugRequestMiddleware: unconditionally scrub data field Commit 77b8465d7e68ca102d7aae839c7b3fe0ecd28398 added a secret update endpoint to allow updating labels on existing secrets. However, when implementing the endpoint, the DebugRequestMiddleware was not updated to scrub the Data field (as is being done when creating a secret). When updating a secret (to set labels), the Data field should be either `nil` (not set), or contain the same value as the existing secret. In situations where the Data field is set, and the `dockerd` daemon is running with debugging enabled / log-level debug, the base64-encoded value of the secret is printed to the daemon logs. The docker cli does not have a `docker secret update` command, but when using `docker stack deploy`, the docker cli sends the secret data both when _creating_ a stack, and when _updating_ a stack, thus leaking the secret data if the daemon runs with debug enabled: 1. Start the daemon in debug-mode dockerd --debug 2. Initialize swarm docker swarm init 3. Create a file containing a secret echo secret > my_secret.txt 4. Create a docker-compose file using that secret cat > docker-compose.yml <<'EOF' version: "3.3" services: web: image: nginx:alpine secrets: - my_secret secrets: my_secret: file: ./my_secret.txt EOF 5. Deploy the stack docker stack deploy -c docker-compose.yml test 6. Verify that the secret is scrubbed in the daemon logs DEBU[2019-07-01T22:36:08.170617400Z] Calling POST /v1.30/secrets/create DEBU[2019-07-01T22:36:08.171364900Z] form data: {"Data":"*****","Labels":{"com.docker.stack.namespace":"test"},"Name":"test_my_secret"} 7. Re-deploy the stack to trigger an "update" docker stack deploy -c docker-compose.yml test 8. Notice that this time, the Data field is not scrubbed, and the base64-encoded secret is logged DEBU[2019-07-01T22:37:35.828819400Z] Calling POST /v1.30/secrets/w3hgvwpzl8yooq5ctnyp71v52/update?version=34 DEBU[2019-07-01T22:37:35.829993700Z] form data: {"Data":"c2VjcmV0Cg==","Labels":{"com.docker.stack.namespace":"test"},"Name":"test_my_secret"} This patch modifies `maskSecretKeys` to unconditionally scrub `Data` fields. Currently, only the `secrets` and `configs` endpoints use a field with this name, and no other POST API endpoints use a data field, so scrubbing this field unconditionally will only scrub requests for those endpoints. If a new endpoint is added in future where this field should not be scrubbed, we can re-introduce more fine-grained (path-specific) handling. This patch introduces some change in behavior: - In addition to secrets, requests to create or update _configs_ will now have their `Data` field scrubbed. Generally, the actual data should not be interesting for debugging, so likely will not be problematic. In addition, scrubbing this data for configs may actually be desirable, because (even though they are not explicitely designed for this purpose) configs may contain sensitive data (credentials inside a configuration file, e.g.). - Requests that send key/value pairs as a "map" and that contain a key named "data", will see the value of that field scrubbed. This means that (e.g.) setting a `label` named `data` on a config, will scrub/mask the value of that label. - Note that this is already the case for any label named `jointoken`, `password`, `secret`, `signingcakey`, or `unlockkey`. Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl> (cherry picked from commit c7ce4be93ae8edd2da62a588e01c67313a4aba0c) Signed-off-by: Tibor Vass <tibor@docker.com>
2019-07-02 12:21:03 +00:00
for _, m := range scrub {
if strings.EqualFold(m, k) {
form[k] = "*****"
continue loop0
}
}
maskSecretKeys(v)
}
}
}