[20.10] Update to go 1.18.7 to address CVE-2022-2879, CVE-2022-2880, CVE-2022-41715

From the mailing list:

We have just released Go versions 1.19.2 and 1.18.7, minor point releases.

These minor releases include 3 security fixes following the security policy:

- archive/tar: unbounded memory consumption when reading headers

  Reader.Read did not set a limit on the maximum size of file headers.
  A maliciously crafted archive could cause Read to allocate unbounded
  amounts of memory, potentially causing resource exhaustion or panics.
  Reader.Read now limits the maximum size of header blocks to 1 MiB.

  Thanks to Adam Korczynski (ADA Logics) and OSS-Fuzz for reporting this issue.

  This is CVE-2022-2879 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/54853.

- net/http/httputil: ReverseProxy should not forward unparseable query parameters

  Requests forwarded by ReverseProxy included the raw query parameters from the
  inbound request, including unparseable parameters rejected by net/http. This
  could permit query parameter smuggling when a Go proxy forwards a parameter
  with an unparseable value.

  ReverseProxy will now sanitize the query parameters in the forwarded query
  when the outbound request's Form field is set after the ReverseProxy.Director
  function returns, indicating that the proxy has parsed the query parameters.
  Proxies which do not parse query parameters continue to forward the original
  query parameters unchanged.

  Thanks to Gal Goldstein (Security Researcher, Oxeye) and
  Daniel Abeles (Head of Research, Oxeye) for reporting this issue.

  This is CVE-2022-2880 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/54663.

- regexp/syntax: limit memory used by parsing regexps

  The parsed regexp representation is linear in the size of the input,
  but in some cases the constant factor can be as high as 40,000,
  making relatively small regexps consume much larger amounts of memory.

  Each regexp being parsed is now limited to a 256 MB memory footprint.
  Regular expressions whose representation would use more space than that
  are now rejected. Normal use of regular expressions is unaffected.

  Thanks to Adam Korczynski (ADA Logics) and OSS-Fuzz for reporting this issue.

  This is CVE-2022-41715 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/55949.

View the release notes for more information: https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.18.7

Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>

Dockerfile

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 ARG CROSS="false"
 ARG SYSTEMD="false"
 # IMPORTANT: When updating this please note that stdlib archive/tar pkg is vendored
-ARG GO_VERSION=1.18.6
+ARG GO_VERSION=1.18.7
 ARG DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
 ARG VPNKIT_VERSION=0.5.0
 ARG DOCKER_BUILDTAGS="apparmor seccomp"

Dockerfile.e2e

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-ARG GO_VERSION=1.18.6
+ARG GO_VERSION=1.18.7
 
 FROM golang:${GO_VERSION}-alpine AS base
 ENV GO111MODULE=off

Dockerfile.simple

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 
 # This represents the bare minimum required to build and test Docker.
 
-ARG GO_VERSION=1.18.6
+ARG GO_VERSION=1.18.7
 
 FROM golang:${GO_VERSION}-buster
 ENV GO111MODULE=off

Dockerfile.windows

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ FROM microsoft/windowsservercore
 # Use PowerShell as the default shell
 SHELL ["powershell", "-Command", "$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'; $ProgressPreference = 'SilentlyContinue';"]
 
-ARG GO_VERSION=1.18.6
+ARG GO_VERSION=1.18.7
 ARG GOTESTSUM_VERSION=v1.7.0
 
 # Environment variable notes:

vendor/archive/tar/format.go

@@ -143,6 +143,10 @@ const (
 	blockSize  = 512 // Size of each block in a tar stream
 	nameSize   = 100 // Max length of the name field in USTAR format
 	prefixSize = 155 // Max length of the prefix field in USTAR format
+
+	// Max length of a special file (PAX header, GNU long name or link).
+	// This matches the limit used by libarchive.
+	maxSpecialFileSize = 1 << 20
 )
 
 // blockPadding computes the number of bytes needed to pad offset up to the

vendor/archive/tar/reader.go

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ func (tr *Reader) next() (*Header, error) {
 			continue // This is a meta header affecting the next header
 		case TypeGNULongName, TypeGNULongLink:
 			format.mayOnlyBe(FormatGNU)
-			realname, err := io.ReadAll(tr)
+			realname, err := readSpecialFile(tr)
 			if err != nil {
 				return nil, err
 			}
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ func mergePAX(hdr *Header, paxHdrs map[string]string) (err error) {
 // parsePAX parses PAX headers.
 // If an extended header (type 'x') is invalid, ErrHeader is returned
 func parsePAX(r io.Reader) (map[string]string, error) {
-	buf, err := io.ReadAll(r)
+	buf, err := readSpecialFile(r)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -828,6 +828,16 @@ func tryReadFull(r io.Reader, b []byte) (n int, err error) {
 	return n, err
 }
 
+// readSpecialFile is like io.ReadAll except it returns
+// ErrFieldTooLong if more than maxSpecialFileSize is read.
+func readSpecialFile(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
+	buf, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r, maxSpecialFileSize+1))
+	if len(buf) > maxSpecialFileSize {
+		return nil, ErrFieldTooLong
+	}
+	return buf, err
+}
+
 // discard skips n bytes in r, reporting an error if unable to do so.
 func discard(r io.Reader, n int64) error {
 	// If possible, Seek to the last byte before the end of the data section.

vendor/archive/tar/reader_test.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package tar
 
 import (
 	"bytes"
+	"compress/bzip2"
 	"crypto/md5"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
@@ -243,6 +244,9 @@ func TestReader(t *testing.T) {
 	}, {
 		file: "testdata/pax-bad-hdr-file.tar",
 		err:  ErrHeader,
+	}, {
+		file: "testdata/pax-bad-hdr-large.tar.bz2",
+		err:  ErrFieldTooLong,
 	}, {
 		file: "testdata/pax-bad-mtime-file.tar",
 		err:  ErrHeader,
@@ -625,9 +629,14 @@ func TestReader(t *testing.T) {
 			}
 			defer f.Close()
 
+			var fr io.Reader = f
+			if strings.HasSuffix(v.file, ".bz2") {
+				fr = bzip2.NewReader(fr)
+			}
+
 			// Capture all headers and checksums.
 			var (
-				tr      = NewReader(f)
+				tr      = NewReader(fr)
 				hdrs    []*Header
 				chksums []string
 				rdbuf   = make([]byte, 8)

vendor/archive/tar/writer.go

@@ -199,6 +199,9 @@ func (tw *Writer) writePAXHeader(hdr *Header, paxHdrs map[string]string) error {
 			flag = TypeXHeader
 		}
 		data := buf.String()
+		if len(data) > maxSpecialFileSize {
+			return ErrFieldTooLong
+		}
 		if err := tw.writeRawFile(name, data, flag, FormatPAX); err != nil || isGlobal {
 			return err // Global headers return here
 		}

vendor/archive/tar/writer_test.go

@@ -1004,6 +1004,33 @@ func TestIssue12594(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestWriteLongHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, test := range []struct {
+		name string
+		h    *Header
+	}{{
+		name: "name too long",
+		h:    &Header{Name: strings.Repeat("a", maxSpecialFileSize)},
+	}, {
+		name: "linkname too long",
+		h:    &Header{Linkname: strings.Repeat("a", maxSpecialFileSize)},
+	}, {
+		name: "uname too long",
+		h:    &Header{Uname: strings.Repeat("a", maxSpecialFileSize)},
+	}, {
+		name: "gname too long",
+		h:    &Header{Gname: strings.Repeat("a", maxSpecialFileSize)},
+	}, {
+		name: "PAX header too long",
+		h:    &Header{PAXRecords: map[string]string{"GOLANG.x": strings.Repeat("a", maxSpecialFileSize)}},
+	}} {
+		w := NewWriter(io.Discard)
+		if err := w.WriteHeader(test.h); err != ErrFieldTooLong {
+			t.Errorf("%v: w.WriteHeader() = %v, want ErrFieldTooLong", test.name, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 // testNonEmptyWriter wraps an io.Writer and ensures that
 // Write is never called with an empty buffer.
 type testNonEmptyWriter struct{ io.Writer }