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set default seccomp profile

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Signed-off-by: Jessica Frazelle <acidburn@docker.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jessica Frazelle 2015-12-18 10:01:58 -08:00
parent ad56c972b4
commit 947293a280
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GPG key ID: 18F3685C0022BFF3
5 changed files with 374 additions and 3 deletions
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5
daemon/execdriver/native/create.go
View file

@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ func (d *Driver) createContainer(c *execdriver.Command, hooks execdriver.Hooks)
if err := d.setCapabilities(container, c); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if c.SeccompProfile == "" {
container.Seccomp = getDefaultSeccompProfile()
}
}
// add CAP_ prefix to all caps for new libcontainer update to match
// the spec format.
@ -89,6 +93,7 @@ func (d *Driver) createContainer(c *execdriver.Command, hooks execdriver.Hooks)
return nil, err
}
}
if err := execdriver.SetupCgroups(container, c); err != nil {
return nil, err
}

4
daemon/execdriver/native/seccomp.go
View file

@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ import (
"github.com/opencontainers/specs"
)
func getDefaultSeccompProfile() *configs.Seccomp {
return defaultSeccompProfile
}
func loadSeccompProfile(path string) (*configs.Seccomp, error) {
f, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {

319
daemon/execdriver/native/seccomp_default.go Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
// +build linux
package native
import "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs"
var defaultSeccompProfile = &configs.Seccomp{
DefaultAction: configs.Allow,
Syscalls: []*configs.Syscall{
{
// Quota and Accounting syscalls which could let containers
// disable their own resource limits or process accounting
Name: "acct",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring,
// which is not namespaced
Name: "add_key",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Similar to clock_settime and settimeofday
// Time/Date is not namespaced
Name: "adjtimex",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Time/Date is not namespaced
Name: "clock_settime",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny cloning new namespaces
Name: "clone",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{
{
// flags from sched.h
// CLONE_NEWUTS 0x04000000
// CLONE_NEWIPC 0x08000000
// CLONE_NEWUSER 0x10000000
// CLONE_NEWPID 0x20000000
// CLONE_NEWNET 0x40000000
Index: 0,
Value: uint64(0x04000000),
Op: configs.GreaterThanOrEqualTo,
},
{
// flags from sched.h
// CLONE_NEWNS 0x00020000
Index: 0,
Value: uint64(0x00020000),
Op: configs.EqualTo,
},
},
},
{
// Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules.
Name: "create_module",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules.
Name: "delete_module",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny retrieval of exported kernel and module symbols
Name: "get_kernel_syms",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Terrifying syscalls that modify kernel memory and NUMA settings.
// They're gated by CAP_SYS_NICE,
// which we do not retain by default in containers.
Name: "get_mempolicy",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny getting the list of robust futexes
Name: "get_robust_list",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules.
Name: "init_module",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Prevent containers from modifying kernel I/O privilege levels.
// Already restricted as containers drop CAP_SYS_RAWIO by default.
Name: "ioperm",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Prevent containers from modifying kernel I/O privilege levels.
// Already restricted as containers drop CAP_SYS_RAWIO by default.
Name: "iopl",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Sister syscall of kexec_load that does the same thing,
// slightly different arguments
Name: "kexec_file_load",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny loading a new kernel for later execution
Name: "kexec_load",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring,
// which is not namespaced
Name: "keyctl",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Tracing/profiling syscalls,
// which could leak a lot of information on the host
Name: "lookup_dcookie",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Terrifying syscalls that modify kernel memory and NUMA settings.
// They're gated by CAP_SYS_NICE,
// which we do not retain by default in containers.
Name: "mbind",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Terrifying syscalls that modify kernel memory and NUMA settings.
// They're gated by CAP_SYS_NICE,
// which we do not retain by default in containers.
Name: "migrate_pages",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Old syscall only used in 16-bit code,
// and a potential information leak
Name: "modify_ldt",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny mount
Name: "mount",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Terrifying syscalls that modify kernel memory and NUMA settings.
// They're gated by CAP_SYS_NICE,
// which we do not retain by default in containers.
Name: "move_pages",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny interaction with the kernel nfs daemon
Name: "nfsservctl",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Cause of an old container breakout,
// might as well restrict it to be on the safe side
Name: "open_by_handle_at",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Tracing/profiling syscalls,
// which could leak a lot of information on the host
Name: "perf_event_open",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Prevent container from enabling BSD emulation.
// Not inherently dangerous, but poorly tested,
// potential for a lot of kernel vulns in this.
Name: "personality",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny pivot_root
Name: "pivot_root",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Already blocked by dropping CAP_PTRACE
Name: "ptrace",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny manipulation and functions on kernel modules.
Name: "query_module",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Quota and Accounting syscalls which could let containers
// disable their own resource limits or process accounting
Name: "quotactl",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Probably a bad idea to let containers reboot the host
Name: "reboot",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Probably a bad idea to let containers restart
Name: "restart_syscall",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Prevent containers from using the kernel keyring,
// which is not namespaced
Name: "request_key",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// meta, deny seccomp
Name: "seccomp",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Terrifying syscalls that modify kernel memory and NUMA settings.
// They're gated by CAP_SYS_NICE,
// which we do not retain by default in containers.
Name: "set_mempolicy",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// deny associating a thread with a namespace
Name: "setns",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny setting the list of robust futexes
Name: "set_robust_list",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Time/Date is not namespaced
Name: "settimeofday",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny start/stop swapping to file/device
Name: "swapon",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny start/stop swapping to file/device
Name: "swapoff",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny read/write system parameters
Name: "_sysctl",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Deny umount
Name: "umount2",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Same as clone
Name: "unshare",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
{
// Older syscall related to shared libraries, unused for a long time
Name: "uselib",
Action: configs.Errno,
Args: []*configs.Arg{},
},
},
}

13
integration-cli/docker_cli_run_test.go
View file

@ -2858,18 +2858,25 @@ func (s *DockerSuite) TestRunUnshareProc(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, Apparmor, DaemonIsLinux, NotUserNamespace)
name := "acidburn"
if out, _, err := dockerCmdWithError("run", "--name", name, "jess/unshare", "unshare", "-p", "-m", "-f", "-r", "--mount-proc=/proc", "mount"); err == nil || !strings.Contains(out, "Permission denied") {
out, _, err := dockerCmdWithError("run", "--name", name, "jess/unshare", "unshare", "-p", "-m", "-f", "-r", "--mount-proc=/proc", "mount")
if err == nil ||
!(strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(out), "permission denied") ||
strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(out), "operation not permitted")) {
c.Fatalf("unshare with --mount-proc should have failed with permission denied, got: %s, %v", out, err)
}
name = "cereal"
if out, _, err := dockerCmdWithError("run", "--name", name, "jess/unshare", "unshare", "-p", "-m", "-f", "-r", "mount", "-t", "proc", "none", "/proc"); err == nil || !strings.Contains(out, "Permission denied") {
out, _, err = dockerCmdWithError("run", "--name", name, "jess/unshare", "unshare", "-p", "-m", "-f", "-r", "mount", "-t", "proc", "none", "/proc")
if err == nil ||
!(strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(out), "permission denied") ||
strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(out), "operation not permitted")) {
c.Fatalf("unshare and mount of /proc should have failed with permission denied, got: %s, %v", out, err)
}
/* Ensure still fails if running privileged with the default policy */
name = "crashoverride"
if out, _, err := dockerCmdWithError("run", "--privileged", "--security-opt", "apparmor:docker-default", "--name", name, "jess/unshare", "unshare", "-p", "-m", "-f", "-r", "mount", "-t", "proc", "none", "/proc"); err == nil || !(strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(out), "permission denied") || strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(out), "operation not permitted")) {
out, _, err = dockerCmdWithError("run", "--privileged", "--security-opt", "apparmor:docker-default", "--name", name, "jess/unshare", "unshare", "-p", "-m", "-f", "-r", "mount", "-t", "proc", "none", "/proc")
if err == nil || !(strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(out), "permission denied") || strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(out), "operation not permitted")) {
c.Fatalf("privileged unshare with apparmor should have failed with permission denied, got: %s, %v", out, err)
}
}

36
integration-cli/docker_cli_run_unix_test.go
View file

@ -548,3 +548,39 @@ func (s *DockerSuite) TestRunSeccompProfileDenyChmod(c *check.C) {
c.Fatalf("expected chmod with seccomp profile denied to fail, got %s", out)
}
}
// TestRunSeccompProfileDenyUserns checks that 'docker run jess/unshare unshare --map-root-user --user sh -c whoami' exits with operation not permitted.
func (s *DockerSuite) TestRunSeccompProfileDenyUserns(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, SameHostDaemon, seccompEnabled)
// from sched.h
jsonData := fmt.Sprintf(`{
"defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
"syscalls": [
{
"name": "unshare",
"action": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
"args": [
{
"index": 0,
"value": %d,
"op": "SCMP_CMP_EQ"
}
]
}
]
}`, uint64(0x10000000))
tmpFile, err := ioutil.TempFile("", "profile.json")
defer tmpFile.Close()
if err != nil {
c.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := tmpFile.Write([]byte(jsonData)); err != nil {
c.Fatal(err)
}
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--security-opt", "seccomp:"+tmpFile.Name(), "jess/unshare", "unshare", "--map-root-user", "--user", "sh", "-c", "whoami")
out, _, _ := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
if !strings.Contains(out, "Operation not permitted") {
c.Fatalf("expected unshare userns with seccomp profile denied to fail, got %s", out)
}
}