kotovalexarian-likes-github
/
moby--moby
mirror of https://github.com/moby/moby.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Releases Activity

Merge pull request #27737 from justincormack/no-ambient-1.13 

Revert ambient capabilities for 1.13
This commit is contained in:
Michael Crosby 2016-11-04 12:52:21 -07:00 committed by GitHub
parent da499758b8 c5251f7116
commit cac13fc131
22 changed files with 1145 additions and 42 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

6
contrib/syscall-test/Dockerfile
View File

@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ WORKDIR /usr/src/
RUN gcc -g -Wall -static userns.c -o /usr/bin/userns-test \
&& gcc -g -Wall -static ns.c -o /usr/bin/ns-test \
&& gcc -g -Wall -static acct.c -o /usr/bin/acct-test
&& gcc -g -Wall -static acct.c -o /usr/bin/acct-test \
&& gcc -g -Wall -static setuid.c -o /usr/bin/setuid-test \
&& gcc -g -Wall -static setgid.c -o /usr/bin/setgid-test \
&& gcc -g -Wall -static socket.c -o /usr/bin/socket-test \
&& gcc -g -Wall -static raw.c -o /usr/bin/raw-test
RUN [ "$(uname -m)" = "x86_64" ] && gcc -s -m32 -nostdlib exit32.s -o /usr/bin/exit32-test || true

14
contrib/syscall-test/raw.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/udp.h>
int main() {
if (socket(PF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_UDP) == -1) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}

11
contrib/syscall-test/setgid.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main() {
if (setgid(1) == -1) {
perror("setgid");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}

11
contrib/syscall-test/setuid.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main() {
if (setuid(1) == -1) {
perror("setuid");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}

30
contrib/syscall-test/socket.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
int main() {
int s;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (s == -1) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
sin.sin_port = htons(80);
if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) == -1) {
perror("bind");
return 1;
}
close(s);
return 0;
}

5
hack/dockerfile/install-binaries.sh
View File

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ set -e
set -x
TOMLV_COMMIT=9baf8a8a9f2ed20a8e54160840c492f937eeaf9a
RUNC_COMMIT=02f8fa7863dd3f82909a73e2061897828460d52f
RUNC_COMMIT=ac031b5bf1cc92239461125f4c1ffb760522bbf2
CONTAINERD_COMMIT=52ef1ceb4b660c42cf4ea9013180a5663968d4c7
GRIMES_COMMIT=fe069a03affd2547fdb05e5b8b07202d2e41735b
LIBNETWORK_COMMIT=0f534354b813003a754606689722fe253101bc4e
@ -20,11 +20,12 @@ else
export GOPATH="$TMP_GOPATH"
fi
# Do not build with ambient capabilities support
RUNC_BUILDTAGS="${RUNC_BUILDTAGS:-"seccomp apparmor selinux"}"
install_runc() {
echo "Install runc version $RUNC_COMMIT"
git clone https://github.com/opencontainers/runc.git "$GOPATH/src/github.com/opencontainers/runc"
git clone https://github.com/docker/runc.git "$GOPATH/src/github.com/opencontainers/runc"
cd "$GOPATH/src/github.com/opencontainers/runc"
git checkout -q "$RUNC_COMMIT"
make BUILDTAGS="$RUNC_BUILDTAGS" $1

183
integration-cli/docker_cli_run_unix_test.go
View File

@ -1155,24 +1155,185 @@ func (s *DockerSuite) TestRunNoNewPrivSetuid(c *check.C) {
}
}
func (s *DockerSuite) TestRunAmbientCapabilities(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, DaemonIsLinux, ambientCapabilities)
func (s *DockerSuite) TestUserNoEffectiveCapabilitiesChown(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, DaemonIsLinux)
ensureSyscallTest(c)
// test that a non root user can gain capabilities
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--user", "1000", "--cap-add", "chown", "busybox", "chown", "100", "/tmp")
// test that a root user has default capability CAP_CHOWN
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "busybox", "chown", "100", "/tmp")
_, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// test that non root user has default capabilities
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--user", "1000", "busybox", "chown", "100", "/tmp")
_, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// test this fails without cap_chown
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--user", "1000", "--cap-drop", "chown", "busybox", "chown", "100", "/tmp")
// test that non root user does not have default capability CAP_CHOWN
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--user", "1000:1000", "busybox", "chown", "100", "/tmp")
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(strings.TrimSpace(out), checker.Equals, "chown: /tmp: Operation not permitted")
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
// test that root user can drop default capability CAP_CHOWN
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--cap-drop", "chown", "busybox", "chown", "100", "/tmp")
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
}
func (s *DockerSuite) TestUserNoEffectiveCapabilitiesDacOverride(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, DaemonIsLinux)
ensureSyscallTest(c)
// test that a root user has default capability CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "busybox", "sh", "-c", "echo test > /etc/passwd")
_, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// test that non root user does not have default capability CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--user", "1000:1000", "busybox", "sh", "-c", "echo test > /etc/passwd")
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Permission denied")
// TODO test that root user can drop default capability CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
}
func (s *DockerSuite) TestUserNoEffectiveCapabilitiesFowner(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, DaemonIsLinux)
ensureSyscallTest(c)
// test that a root user has default capability CAP_FOWNER
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "busybox", "chmod", "777", "/etc/passwd")
_, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// test that non root user does not have default capability CAP_FOWNER
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--user", "1000:1000", "busybox", "chmod", "777", "/etc/passwd")
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
// TODO test that root user can drop default capability CAP_FOWNER
}
// TODO CAP_KILL
func (s *DockerSuite) TestUserNoEffectiveCapabilitiesSetuid(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, DaemonIsLinux)
ensureSyscallTest(c)
// test that a root user has default capability CAP_SETUID
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "syscall-test", "setuid-test")
_, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// test that non root user does not have default capability CAP_SETUID
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--user", "1000:1000", "syscall-test", "setuid-test")
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
// test that root user can drop default capability CAP_SETUID
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--cap-drop", "setuid", "syscall-test", "setuid-test")
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
}
func (s *DockerSuite) TestUserNoEffectiveCapabilitiesSetgid(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, DaemonIsLinux)
ensureSyscallTest(c)
// test that a root user has default capability CAP_SETGID
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "syscall-test", "setgid-test")
_, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// test that non root user does not have default capability CAP_SETGID
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--user", "1000:1000", "syscall-test", "setgid-test")
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
// test that root user can drop default capability CAP_SETGID
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--cap-drop", "setgid", "syscall-test", "setgid-test")
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
}
// TODO CAP_SETPCAP
func (s *DockerSuite) TestUserNoEffectiveCapabilitiesNetBindService(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, DaemonIsLinux)
ensureSyscallTest(c)
// test that a root user has default capability CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "syscall-test", "socket-test")
_, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// test that non root user does not have default capability CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--user", "1000:1000", "syscall-test", "socket-test")
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Permission denied")
// test that root user can drop default capability CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--cap-drop", "net_bind_service", "syscall-test", "socket-test")
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Permission denied")
}
func (s *DockerSuite) TestUserNoEffectiveCapabilitiesNetRaw(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, DaemonIsLinux)
ensureSyscallTest(c)
// test that a root user has default capability CAP_NET_RAW
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "syscall-test", "raw-test")
_, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// test that non root user does not have default capability CAP_NET_RAW
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--user", "1000:1000", "syscall-test", "raw-test")
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
// test that root user can drop default capability CAP_NET_RAW
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--cap-drop", "net_raw", "syscall-test", "raw-test")
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
}
func (s *DockerSuite) TestUserNoEffectiveCapabilitiesChroot(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, DaemonIsLinux)
ensureSyscallTest(c)
// test that a root user has default capability CAP_SYS_CHROOT
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "busybox", "chroot", "/", "/bin/true")
_, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// test that non root user does not have default capability CAP_SYS_CHROOT
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--user", "1000:1000", "busybox", "chroot", "/", "/bin/true")
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
// test that root user can drop default capability CAP_SYS_CHROOT
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--cap-drop", "sys_chroot", "busybox", "chroot", "/", "/bin/true")
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
}
func (s *DockerSuite) TestUserNoEffectiveCapabilitiesMknod(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, DaemonIsLinux)
ensureSyscallTest(c)
// test that a root user has default capability CAP_MKNOD
runCmd := exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "busybox", "mknod", "/tmp/node", "b", "1", "2")
_, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, check.IsNil)
// test that non root user does not have default capability CAP_MKNOD
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--user", "1000:1000", "busybox", "mknod", "/tmp/node", "b", "1", "2")
out, _, err := runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
// test that root user can drop default capability CAP_MKNOD
runCmd = exec.Command(dockerBinary, "run", "--cap-drop", "mknod", "busybox", "mknod", "/tmp/node", "b", "1", "2")
out, _, err = runCommandWithOutput(runCmd)
c.Assert(err, checker.NotNil, check.Commentf(out))
c.Assert(out, checker.Contains, "Operation not permitted")
}
// TODO CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
// TODO CAP_SETFCAP
func (s *DockerSuite) TestRunApparmorProcDirectory(c *check.C) {
testRequires(c, SameHostDaemon, Apparmor)

14
integration-cli/fixtures_linux_daemon.go
View File

@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package main
import (
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"os/exec"
@ -53,15 +54,14 @@ func ensureSyscallTest(c *check.C) {
gcc, err := exec.LookPath("gcc")
c.Assert(err, checker.IsNil, check.Commentf("could not find gcc"))
out, err := exec.Command(gcc, "-g", "-Wall", "-static", "../contrib/syscall-test/userns.c", "-o", tmp+"/"+"userns-test").CombinedOutput()
c.Assert(err, checker.IsNil, check.Commentf(string(out)))
out, err = exec.Command(gcc, "-g", "-Wall", "-static", "../contrib/syscall-test/ns.c", "-o", tmp+"/"+"ns-test").CombinedOutput()
c.Assert(err, checker.IsNil, check.Commentf(string(out)))
out, err = exec.Command(gcc, "-g", "-Wall", "-static", "../contrib/syscall-test/acct.c", "-o", tmp+"/"+"acct-test").CombinedOutput()
c.Assert(err, checker.IsNil, check.Commentf(string(out)))
tests := []string{"userns", "ns", "acct", "setuid", "setgid", "socket", "raw"}
for _, test := range tests {
out, err := exec.Command(gcc, "-g", "-Wall", "-static", fmt.Sprintf("../contrib/syscall-test/%s.c", test), "-o", fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s-test", tmp, test)).CombinedOutput()
c.Assert(err, checker.IsNil, check.Commentf(string(out)))
}
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" && runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" {
out, err = exec.Command(gcc, "-s", "-m32", "-nostdlib", "../contrib/syscall-test/exit32.s", "-o", tmp+"/"+"exit32-test").CombinedOutput()
out, err := exec.Command(gcc, "-s", "-m32", "-nostdlib", "../contrib/syscall-test/exit32.s", "-o", tmp+"/"+"exit32-test").CombinedOutput()
c.Assert(err, checker.IsNil, check.Commentf(string(out)))
}

2
vendor.conf
View File

@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ github.com/miekg/pkcs11 df8ae6ca730422dba20c768ff38ef7d79077a59f
github.com/docker/go v1.5.1-1-1-gbaf439e
github.com/agl/ed25519 d2b94fd789ea21d12fac1a4443dd3a3f79cda72c
github.com/opencontainers/runc 02f8fa7863dd3f82909a73e2061897828460d52f # libcontainer
github.com/opencontainers/runc ac031b5bf1cc92239461125f4c1ffb760522bbf2 # libcontainer
github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec 1c7c27d043c2a5e513a44084d2b10d77d1402b8c # specs
github.com/seccomp/libseccomp-golang 32f571b70023028bd57d9288c20efbcb237f3ce0
# libcontainer deps (see src/github.com/opencontainers/runc/Godeps/Godeps.json)

4
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/cgroup_unix.go generated vendored
View File

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ type Cgroup struct {
// The path is assumed to be relative to the host system cgroup mountpoint.
Path string `json:"path"`
// ScopePrefix decribes prefix for the scope name
// ScopePrefix describes prefix for the scope name
ScopePrefix string `json:"scope_prefix"`
// Paths represent the absolute cgroups paths to join.
@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ type Resources struct {
// IO read rate limit per cgroup per device, bytes per second.
BlkioThrottleReadBpsDevice []*ThrottleDevice `json:"blkio_throttle_read_bps_device"`
// IO write rate limit per cgroup per divice, bytes per second.
// IO write rate limit per cgroup per device, bytes per second.
BlkioThrottleWriteBpsDevice []*ThrottleDevice `json:"blkio_throttle_write_bps_device"`
// IO read rate limit per cgroup per device, IO per second.

5
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/config.go generated vendored
View File

@ -85,11 +85,6 @@ type Config struct {
// that the parent process dies.
ParentDeathSignal int `json:"parent_death_signal"`
// PivotDir allows a custom directory inside the container's root filesystem to be used as pivot, when NoPivotRoot is not set.
// When a custom PivotDir not set, a temporary dir inside the root filesystem will be used. The pivot dir needs to be writeable.
// This is required when using read only root filesystems. In these cases, a read/writeable path can be (bind) mounted somewhere inside the root filesystem to act as pivot.
PivotDir string `json:"pivot_dir"`
// Path to a directory containing the container's root filesystem.
Rootfs string `json:"rootfs"`

9
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/mount.go generated vendored
View File

@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
package configs
const (
// EXT_COPYUP is a directive to copy up the contents of a directory when
// a tmpfs is mounted over it.
EXT_COPYUP = 1 << iota
)
type Mount struct {
// Source path for the mount.
Source string `json:"source"`
@ -22,6 +28,9 @@ type Mount struct {
// Relabel source if set, "z" indicates shared, "Z" indicates unshared.
Relabel string `json:"relabel"`
// Extensions are additional flags that are specific to runc.
Extensions int `json:"extensions"`
// Optional Command to be run before Source is mounted.
PremountCmds []Command `json:"premount_cmds"`

8
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/namespaces_unix.go generated vendored
View File

@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ var (
supportedNamespaces = make(map[NamespaceType]bool)
)
// nsToFile converts the namespace type to its filename
func nsToFile(ns NamespaceType) string {
// NsName converts the namespace type to its filename
func NsName(ns NamespaceType) string {
switch ns {
case NEWNET:
return "net"
@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func IsNamespaceSupported(ns NamespaceType) bool {
if ok {
return supported
}
nsFile := nsToFile(ns)
nsFile := NsName(ns)
// if the namespace type is unknown, just return false
if nsFile == "" {
return false
@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func (n *Namespace) GetPath(pid int) string {
if n.Path != "" {
return n.Path
}
return fmt.Sprintf("/proc/%d/ns/%s", pid, nsToFile(n.Type))
return fmt.Sprintf("/proc/%d/ns/%s", pid, NsName(n.Type))
}
func (n *Namespaces) Remove(t NamespaceType) bool {

4
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/label/label.go generated vendored
View File

@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ func InitLabels(options []string) (string, string, error) {
return "", "", nil
}
func GetROMountLabel() string {
return ""
}
func GenLabels(options string) (string, string, error) {
return "", "", nil
}

22
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/label/label_selinux.go generated vendored
View File

@ -33,15 +33,19 @@ func InitLabels(options []string) (string, string, error) {
pcon := selinux.NewContext(processLabel)
mcon := selinux.NewContext(mountLabel)
for _, opt := range options {
if opt == "disable" {
val := strings.SplitN(opt, "=", 2)
if val[0] != "label" {
continue
}
if len(val) < 2 {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("bad label option %q, valid options 'disable' or \n'user, role, level, type' followed by ':' and a value", opt)
}
if val[1] == "disable" {
return "", "", nil
}
if i := strings.Index(opt, ":"); i == -1 {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("Bad label option %q, valid options 'disable' or \n'user, role, level, type' followed by ':' and a value", opt)
}
con := strings.SplitN(opt, ":", 2)
if !validOptions[con[0]] {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("Bad label option %q, valid options 'disable, user, role, level, type'", con[0])
con := strings.SplitN(val[1], ":", 2)
if len(con) < 2 || !validOptions[con[0]] {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("bad label option %q, valid options 'disable, user, role, level, type'", con[0])
}
pcon[con[0]] = con[1]
@ -55,6 +59,10 @@ func InitLabels(options []string) (string, string, error) {
return processLabel, mountLabel, nil
}
func GetROMountLabel() string {
return selinux.GetROFileLabel()
}
// DEPRECATED: The GenLabels function is only to be used during the transition to the official API.
func GenLabels(options string) (string, string, error) {
return InitLabels(strings.Fields(options))

32
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/nsenter/namespace.h generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
#ifndef NSENTER_NAMESPACE_H
#define NSENTER_NAMESPACE_H
#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
# define _GNU_SOURCE
#endif
#include <sched.h>
/* All of these are taken from include/uapi/linux/sched.h */
#ifndef CLONE_NEWNS
# define CLONE_NEWNS 0x00020000 /* New mount namespace group */
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWCGROUP
# define CLONE_NEWCGROUP 0x02000000 /* New cgroup namespace */
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWUTS
# define CLONE_NEWUTS 0x04000000 /* New utsname namespace */
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWIPC
# define CLONE_NEWIPC 0x08000000 /* New ipc namespace */
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWUSER
# define CLONE_NEWUSER 0x10000000 /* New user namespace */
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWPID
# define CLONE_NEWPID 0x20000000 /* New pid namespace */
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWNET
# define CLONE_NEWNET 0x40000000 /* New network namespace */
#endif
#endif /* NSENTER_NAMESPACE_H */

12
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/nsenter/nsenter.go generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
// +build linux,!gccgo
package nsenter
/*
#cgo CFLAGS: -Wall
extern void nsexec();
void __attribute__((constructor)) init(void) {
nsexec();
}
*/
import "C"

25
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/nsenter/nsenter_gccgo.go generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
// +build linux,gccgo
package nsenter
/*
#cgo CFLAGS: -Wall
extern void nsexec();
void __attribute__((constructor)) init(void) {
nsexec();
}
*/
import "C"
// AlwaysFalse is here to stay false
// (and be exported so the compiler doesn't optimize out its reference)
var AlwaysFalse bool
func init() {
if AlwaysFalse {
// by referencing this C init() in a noop test, it will ensure the compiler
// links in the C function.
// https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=65134
C.init()
}
}

5
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/nsenter/nsenter_unsupported.go generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
// +build !linux !cgo
package nsenter
import "C"

753
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,753 @@
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <endian.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <setjmp.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
/* Get all of the CLONE_NEW* flags. */
#include "namespace.h"
/* Synchronisation values. */
enum sync_t {
SYNC_USERMAP_PLS = 0x40, /* Request parent to map our users. */
SYNC_USERMAP_ACK = 0x41, /* Mapping finished by the parent. */
SYNC_RECVPID_PLS = 0x42, /* Tell parent we're sending the PID. */
SYNC_RECVPID_ACK = 0x43, /* PID was correctly received by parent. */
/* XXX: This doesn't help with segfaults and other such issues. */
SYNC_ERR = 0xFF, /* Fatal error, no turning back. The error code follows. */
};
/* longjmp() arguments. */
#define JUMP_PARENT 0x00
#define JUMP_CHILD 0xA0
#define JUMP_INIT 0xA1
/* JSON buffer. */
#define JSON_MAX 4096
/* Assume the stack grows down, so arguments should be above it. */
struct clone_t {
/*
* Reserve some space for clone() to locate arguments
* and retcode in this place
*/
char stack[4096] __attribute__ ((aligned(16)));
char stack_ptr[0];
/* There's two children. This is used to execute the different code. */
jmp_buf *env;
int jmpval;
};
struct nlconfig_t {
char *data;
uint32_t cloneflags;
char *uidmap;
size_t uidmap_len;
char *gidmap;
size_t gidmap_len;
char *namespaces;
size_t namespaces_len;
uint8_t is_setgroup;
int consolefd;
};
/*
* List of netlink message types sent to us as part of bootstrapping the init.
* These constants are defined in libcontainer/message_linux.go.
*/
#define INIT_MSG 62000
#define CLONE_FLAGS_ATTR 27281
#define CONSOLE_PATH_ATTR 27282
#define NS_PATHS_ATTR 27283
#define UIDMAP_ATTR 27284
#define GIDMAP_ATTR 27285
#define SETGROUP_ATTR 27286
/*
* Use the raw syscall for versions of glibc which don't include a function for
* it, namely (glibc 2.12).
*/
#if __GLIBC__ == 2 && __GLIBC_MINOR__ < 14
# define _GNU_SOURCE
# include "syscall.h"
# if !defined(SYS_setns) && defined(__NR_setns)
# define SYS_setns __NR_setns
# endif
#ifndef SYS_setns
# error "setns(2) syscall not supported by glibc version"
#endif
int setns(int fd, int nstype)
{
return syscall(SYS_setns, fd, nstype);
}
#endif
/* XXX: This is ugly. */
static int syncfd = -1;
/* TODO(cyphar): Fix this so it correctly deals with syncT. */
#define bail(fmt, ...) \
do { \
int ret = __COUNTER__ + 1; \
fprintf(stderr, "nsenter: " fmt ": %m\n", ##__VA_ARGS__); \
if (syncfd >= 0) { \
enum sync_t s = SYNC_ERR; \
if (write(syncfd, &s, sizeof(s)) != sizeof(s)) \
fprintf(stderr, "nsenter: failed: write(s)"); \
if (write(syncfd, &ret, sizeof(ret)) != sizeof(ret)) \
fprintf(stderr, "nsenter: failed: write(ret)"); \
} \
exit(ret); \
} while(0)
static int write_file(char *data, size_t data_len, char *pathfmt, ...)
{
int fd, len, ret = 0;
char path[PATH_MAX];
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, pathfmt);
len = vsnprintf(path, PATH_MAX, pathfmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (len < 0)
return -1;
fd = open(path, O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0) {
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
len = write(fd, data, data_len);
if (len != data_len) {
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
out:
close(fd);
return ret;
}
enum policy_t {
SETGROUPS_DEFAULT = 0,
SETGROUPS_ALLOW,
SETGROUPS_DENY,
};
/* This *must* be called before we touch gid_map. */
static void update_setgroups(int pid, enum policy_t setgroup)
{
char *policy;
switch (setgroup) {
case SETGROUPS_ALLOW:
policy = "allow";
break;
case SETGROUPS_DENY:
policy = "deny";
break;
case SETGROUPS_DEFAULT:
/* Nothing to do. */
return;
}
if (write_file(policy, strlen(policy), "/proc/%d/setgroups", pid) < 0) {
/*
* If the kernel is too old to support /proc/pid/setgroups,
* open(2) or write(2) will return ENOENT. This is fine.
*/
if (errno != ENOENT)
bail("failed to write '%s' to /proc/%d/setgroups", policy, pid);
}
}
static void update_uidmap(int pid, char *map, int map_len)
{
if (map == NULL || map_len <= 0)
return;
if (write_file(map, map_len, "/proc/%d/uid_map", pid) < 0)
bail("failed to update /proc/%d/uid_map", pid);
}
static void update_gidmap(int pid, char *map, int map_len)
{
if (map == NULL || map_len <= 0)
return;
if (write_file(map, map_len, "/proc/%d/gid_map", pid) < 0)
bail("failed to update /proc/%d/gid_map", pid);
}
/* A dummy function that just jumps to the given jumpval. */
static int child_func(void *arg) __attribute__ ((noinline));
static int child_func(void *arg)
{
struct clone_t *ca = (struct clone_t *)arg;
longjmp(*ca->env, ca->jmpval);
}
static int clone_parent(jmp_buf *env, int jmpval) __attribute__ ((noinline));
static int clone_parent(jmp_buf *env, int jmpval)
{
struct clone_t ca = {
.env = env,
.jmpval = jmpval,
};
return clone(child_func, ca.stack_ptr, CLONE_PARENT | SIGCHLD, &ca);
}
/*
* Gets the init pipe fd from the environment, which is used to read the
* bootstrap data and tell the parent what the new pid is after we finish
* setting up the environment.
*/
static int initpipe(void)
{
int pipenum;
char *initpipe, *endptr;
initpipe = getenv("_LIBCONTAINER_INITPIPE");
if (initpipe == NULL || *initpipe == '\0')
return -1;
pipenum = strtol(initpipe, &endptr, 10);
if (*endptr != '\0')
bail("unable to parse _LIBCONTAINER_INITPIPE");
return pipenum;
}
/* Returns the clone(2) flag for a namespace, given the name of a namespace. */
static int nsflag(char *name)
{
if (!strcmp(name, "cgroup"))
return CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
else if (!strcmp(name, "ipc"))
return CLONE_NEWIPC;
else if (!strcmp(name, "mnt"))
return CLONE_NEWNS;
else if (!strcmp(name, "net"))
return CLONE_NEWNET;
else if (!strcmp(name, "pid"))
return CLONE_NEWPID;
else if (!strcmp(name, "user"))
return CLONE_NEWUSER;
else if (!strcmp(name, "uts"))
return CLONE_NEWUTS;
/* If we don't recognise a name, fallback to 0. */
return 0;
}
static uint32_t readint32(char *buf)
{
return *(uint32_t *) buf;
}
static uint8_t readint8(char *buf)
{
return *(uint8_t *) buf;
}
static void nl_parse(int fd, struct nlconfig_t *config)
{
size_t len, size;
struct nlmsghdr hdr;
char *data, *current;
/* Retrieve the netlink header. */
len = read(fd, &hdr, NLMSG_HDRLEN);
if (len != NLMSG_HDRLEN)
bail("invalid netlink header length %lu", len);
if (hdr.nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR)
bail("failed to read netlink message");
if (hdr.nlmsg_type != INIT_MSG)
bail("unexpected msg type %d", hdr.nlmsg_type);
/* Retrieve data. */
size = NLMSG_PAYLOAD(&hdr, 0);
current = data = malloc(size);
if (!data)
bail("failed to allocate %zu bytes of memory for nl_payload", size);
len = read(fd, data, size);
if (len != size)
bail("failed to read netlink payload, %lu != %lu", len, size);
/* Parse the netlink payload. */
config->data = data;
config->consolefd = -1;
while (current < data + size) {
struct nlattr *nlattr = (struct nlattr *)current;
size_t payload_len = nlattr->nla_len - NLA_HDRLEN;
/* Advance to payload. */
current += NLA_HDRLEN;
/* Handle payload. */
switch (nlattr->nla_type) {
case CLONE_FLAGS_ATTR:
config->cloneflags = readint32(current);
break;
case CONSOLE_PATH_ATTR:
/*
* We open the console here because we currently evaluate console
* paths from the *host* namespaces.
*/
config->consolefd = open(current, O_RDWR);
if (config->consolefd < 0)
bail("failed to open console %s", current);
break;
case NS_PATHS_ATTR:
config->namespaces = current;
config->namespaces_len = payload_len;
break;
case UIDMAP_ATTR:
config->uidmap = current;
config->uidmap_len = payload_len;
break;
case GIDMAP_ATTR:
config->gidmap = current;
config->gidmap_len = payload_len;
break;
case SETGROUP_ATTR:
config->is_setgroup = readint8(current);
break;
default:
bail("unknown netlink message type %d", nlattr->nla_type);
}
current += NLA_ALIGN(payload_len);
}
}
void nl_free(struct nlconfig_t *config)
{
free(config->data);
}
void join_namespaces(char *nslist)
{
int num = 0, i;
char *saveptr = NULL;
char *namespace = strtok_r(nslist, ",", &saveptr);
struct namespace_t {
int fd;
int ns;
char type[PATH_MAX];
char path[PATH_MAX];
} *namespaces = NULL;
if (!namespace || !strlen(namespace) || !strlen(nslist))
bail("ns paths are empty");
/*
* We have to open the file descriptors first, since after
* we join the mnt namespace we might no longer be able to
* access the paths.
*/
do {
int fd;
char *path;
struct namespace_t *ns;
/* Resize the namespace array. */
namespaces = realloc(namespaces, ++num * sizeof(struct namespace_t));
if (!namespaces)
bail("failed to reallocate namespace array");
ns = &namespaces[num - 1];
/* Split 'ns:path'. */
path = strstr(namespace, ":");
if (!path)
bail("failed to parse %s", namespace);
*path++ = '\0';
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
bail("failed to open %s", namespace);
ns->fd = fd;
ns->ns = nsflag(namespace);
strncpy(ns->path, path, PATH_MAX);
} while ((namespace = strtok_r(NULL, ",", &saveptr)) != NULL);
/*
* The ordering in which we join namespaces is important. We should
* always join the user namespace *first*. This is all guaranteed
* from the container_linux.go side of this, so we're just going to
* follow the order given to us.
*/
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
struct namespace_t ns = namespaces[i];
if (setns(ns.fd, ns.ns) < 0)
bail("failed to setns to %s", ns.path);
close(ns.fd);
}
free(namespaces);
}
void nsexec(void)
{
int pipenum;
jmp_buf env;
int syncpipe[2];
struct nlconfig_t config = {0};
/*
* If we don't have an init pipe, just return to the go routine.
* We'll only get an init pipe for start or exec.
*/
pipenum = initpipe();
if (pipenum == -1)
return;
/* Parse all of the netlink configuration. */
nl_parse(pipenum, &config);
/* Pipe so we can tell the child when we've finished setting up. */
if (socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0, syncpipe) < 0)
bail("failed to setup sync pipe between parent and child");
/* TODO: Currently we aren't dealing with child deaths properly. */
/*
* Okay, so this is quite annoying.
*
* In order for this unsharing code to be more extensible we need to split
* up unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) and clone() in various ways. The ideal case
* would be if we did clone(CLONE_NEWUSER) and the other namespaces
* separately, but because of SELinux issues we cannot really do that. But
* we cannot just dump the namespace flags into clone(...) because several
* usecases (such as rootless containers) require more granularity around
* the namespace setup. In addition, some older kernels had issues where
* CLONE_NEWUSER wasn't handled before other namespaces (but we cannot
* handle this while also dealing with SELinux so we choose SELinux support
* over broken kernel support).
*
* However, if we unshare(2) the user namespace *before* we clone(2), then
* all hell breaks loose.
*
* The parent no longer has permissions to do many things (unshare(2) drops
* all capabilities in your old namespace), and the container cannot be set
* up to have more than one {uid,gid} mapping. This is obviously less than
* ideal. In order to fix this, we have to first clone(2) and then unshare.
*
* Unfortunately, it's not as simple as that. We have to fork to enter the
* PID namespace (the PID namespace only applies to children). Since we'll
* have to double-fork, this clone_parent() call won't be able to get the
* PID of the _actual_ init process (without doing more synchronisation than
* I can deal with at the moment). So we'll just get the parent to send it
* for us, the only job of this process is to update
* /proc/pid/{setgroups,uid_map,gid_map}.
*
* And as a result of the above, we also need to setns(2) in the first child
* because if we join a PID namespace in the topmost parent then our child
* will be in that namespace (and it will not be able to give us a PID value
* that makes sense without resorting to sending things with cmsg).
*
* This also deals with an older issue caused by dumping cloneflags into
* clone(2): On old kernels, CLONE_PARENT didn't work with CLONE_NEWPID, so
* we have to unshare(2) before clone(2) in order to do this. This was fixed
* in upstream commit 1f7f4dde5c945f41a7abc2285be43d918029ecc5, and was
* introduced by 40a0d32d1eaffe6aac7324ca92604b6b3977eb0e. As far as we're
* aware, the last mainline kernel which had this bug was Linux 3.12.
* However, we cannot comment on which kernels the broken patch was
* backported to.
*
* -- Aleksa "what has my life come to?" Sarai
*/
switch (setjmp(env)) {
/*
* Stage 0: We're in the parent. Our job is just to create a new child
* (stage 1: JUMP_CHILD) process and write its uid_map and
* gid_map. That process will go on to create a new process, then
* it will send us its PID which we will send to the bootstrap
* process.
*/
case JUMP_PARENT: {
int len;
pid_t child;
char buf[JSON_MAX];
/* For debugging. */
prctl(PR_SET_NAME, (unsigned long) "runc:[0:PARENT]", 0, 0, 0);
/* Start the process of getting a container. */
child = clone_parent(&env, JUMP_CHILD);
if (child < 0)
bail("unable to fork: child_func");
/* State machine for synchronisation with the children. */
while (true) {
enum sync_t s;
/* This doesn't need to be global, we're in the parent. */
int syncfd = syncpipe[1];
if (read(syncfd, &s, sizeof(s)) != sizeof(s))
bail("failed to sync with child: next state");
switch (s) {
case SYNC_ERR: {
/* We have to mirror the error code of the child. */
int ret;
if (read(syncfd, &ret, sizeof(ret)) != sizeof(ret))
bail("failed to sync with child: read(error code)");
exit(ret);
}
break;
case SYNC_USERMAP_PLS:
/* Enable setgroups(2) if we've been asked to. */
if (config.is_setgroup)
update_setgroups(child, SETGROUPS_ALLOW);
/* Set up mappings. */
update_uidmap(child, config.uidmap, config.uidmap_len);
update_gidmap(child, config.gidmap, config.gidmap_len);
s = SYNC_USERMAP_ACK;
if (write(syncfd, &s, sizeof(s)) != sizeof(s)) {
kill(child, SIGKILL);
bail("failed to sync with child: write(SYNC_USERMAP_ACK)");
}
break;
case SYNC_USERMAP_ACK:
/* We should _never_ receive acks. */
kill(child, SIGKILL);
bail("failed to sync with child: unexpected SYNC_USERMAP_ACK");
break;
case SYNC_RECVPID_PLS: {
pid_t old = child;
/* Get the init_func pid. */
if (read(syncfd, &child, sizeof(child)) != sizeof(child)) {
kill(old, SIGKILL);
bail("failed to sync with child: read(childpid)");
}
/* Send ACK. */
s = SYNC_RECVPID_ACK;
if (write(syncfd, &s, sizeof(s)) != sizeof(s)) {
kill(old, SIGKILL);
kill(child, SIGKILL);
bail("failed to sync with child: write(SYNC_RECVPID_ACK)");
}
}
/* Leave the loop. */
goto out;
case SYNC_RECVPID_ACK:
/* We should _never_ receive acks. */
kill(child, SIGKILL);
bail("failed to sync with child: unexpected SYNC_RECVPID_ACK");
break;
}
}
out:
/* Send the init_func pid back to our parent. */
len = snprintf(buf, JSON_MAX, "{\"pid\": %d}\n", child);
if (len < 0) {
kill(child, SIGKILL);
bail("unable to generate JSON for child pid");
}
if (write(pipenum, buf, len) != len) {
kill(child, SIGKILL);
bail("unable to send child pid to bootstrapper");
}
exit(0);
}
/*
* Stage 1: We're in the first child process. Our job is to join any
* provided user namespaces in the netlink payload. If we've been
* asked to CLONE_NEWUSER, we will unshare the user namespace and
* ask our parent (stage 0) to set up our user mappings for us.
* Then, we unshare the rest of the requested namespaces and
* create a new child (stage 2: JUMP_INIT). We then send the
* child's PID to our parent (stage 0).
*/
case JUMP_CHILD: {
pid_t child;
enum sync_t s;
/* We're in a child and thus need to tell the parent if we die. */
syncfd = syncpipe[0];
/* For debugging. */
prctl(PR_SET_NAME, (unsigned long) "runc:[1:CHILD]", 0, 0, 0);
/*
* We need to setns first. We cannot do this earlier (in stage 0)
* because of the fact that we forked to get here (the PID of
* [stage 2: JUMP_INIT]) would be meaningless). We could send it
* using cmsg(3) but that's just annoying.
*/
if (config.namespaces)
join_namespaces(config.namespaces);
/*
* Unshare all of the namespaces. Now, it should be noted that this
* ordering might break in the future (especially with rootless
* containers). But for now, it's not possible to split this into
* CLONE_NEWUSER + [the rest] because of some RHEL SELinux issues.
*
* Note that we don't merge this with clone() because there were
* some old kernel versions where clone(CLONE_PARENT | CLONE_NEWPID)
* was broken, so we'll just do it the long way anyway.
*/
if (unshare(config.cloneflags) < 0)
bail("failed to unshare namespaces");
/*
* Deal with user namespaces first. They are quite special, as they
* affect our ability to unshare other namespaces and are used as
* context for privilege checks.
*/
if (config.cloneflags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
/*
* We don't have the privileges to do any mapping here (see the
* clone_parent rant). So signal our parent to hook us up.
*/
s = SYNC_USERMAP_PLS;
if (write(syncfd, &s, sizeof(s)) != sizeof(s))
bail("failed to sync with parent: write(SYNC_USERMAP_PLS)");
/* ... wait for mapping ... */
if (read(syncfd, &s, sizeof(s)) != sizeof(s))
bail("failed to sync with parent: read(SYNC_USERMAP_ACK)");
if (s != SYNC_USERMAP_ACK)
bail("failed to sync with parent: SYNC_USERMAP_ACK: got %u", s);
}
/* TODO: What about non-namespace clone flags that we're dropping here? */
child = clone_parent(&env, JUMP_INIT);
if (child < 0)
bail("unable to fork: init_func");
/* Send the child to our parent, which knows what it's doing. */
s = SYNC_RECVPID_PLS;
if (write(syncfd, &s, sizeof(s)) != sizeof(s)) {
kill(child, SIGKILL);
bail("failed to sync with parent: write(SYNC_RECVPID_PLS)");
}
if (write(syncfd, &child, sizeof(child)) != sizeof(child)) {
kill(child, SIGKILL);
bail("failed to sync with parent: write(childpid)");
}
/* ... wait for parent to get the pid ... */
if (read(syncfd, &s, sizeof(s)) != sizeof(s)) {
kill(child, SIGKILL);
bail("failed to sync with parent: read(SYNC_RECVPID_ACK)");
}
if (s != SYNC_RECVPID_ACK) {
kill(child, SIGKILL);
bail("failed to sync with parent: SYNC_RECVPID_ACK: got %u", s);
}
/* Our work is done. [Stage 2: JUMP_INIT] is doing the rest of the work. */
exit(0);
}
/*
* Stage 2: We're the final child process, and the only process that will
* actually return to the Go runtime. Our job is to just do the
* final cleanup steps and then return to the Go runtime to allow
* init_linux.go to run.
*/
case JUMP_INIT: {
/*
* We're inside the child now, having jumped from the
* start_child() code after forking in the parent.
*/
int consolefd = config.consolefd;
/* We're in a child and thus need to tell the parent if we die. */
syncfd = syncpipe[0];
/* For debugging. */
prctl(PR_SET_NAME, (unsigned long) "runc:[2:INIT]", 0, 0, 0);
if (setsid() < 0)
bail("setsid failed");
if (setuid(0) < 0)
bail("setuid failed");
if (setgid(0) < 0)
bail("setgid failed");
if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
bail("setgroups failed");
if (consolefd != -1) {
if (ioctl(consolefd, TIOCSCTTY, 0) < 0)
bail("ioctl TIOCSCTTY failed");
if (dup3(consolefd, STDIN_FILENO, 0) != STDIN_FILENO)
bail("failed to dup stdin");
if (dup3(consolefd, STDOUT_FILENO, 0) != STDOUT_FILENO)
bail("failed to dup stdout");
if (dup3(consolefd, STDERR_FILENO, 0) != STDERR_FILENO)
bail("failed to dup stderr");
}
/* Close sync pipes. */
close(syncpipe[0]);
close(syncpipe[1]);
/* Free netlink data. */
nl_free(&config);
/* Finish executing, let the Go runtime take over. */
return;
}
default:
bail("unexpected jump value");
break;
}
/* Should never be reached. */
bail("should never be reached");
}

12
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/selinux/selinux.go generated vendored
View File

@ -355,6 +355,12 @@ func FreeLxcContexts(scon string) {
}
}
var roFileLabel string
func GetROFileLabel() (fileLabel string) {
return roFileLabel
}
func GetLxcContexts() (processLabel string, fileLabel string) {
var (
val, key string
@ -399,6 +405,9 @@ func GetLxcContexts() (processLabel string, fileLabel string) {
if key == "file" {
fileLabel = strings.Trim(val, "\"")
}
if key == "ro_file" {
roFileLabel = strings.Trim(val, "\"")
}
}
}
@ -406,6 +415,9 @@ func GetLxcContexts() (processLabel string, fileLabel string) {
return "", ""
}
if roFileLabel == "" {
roFileLabel = fileLabel
}
exit:
// mcs := IntToMcs(os.Getpid(), 1024)
mcs := uniqMcs(1024)

20
vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/system/proc.go generated vendored
View File

@ -14,8 +14,10 @@ func GetProcessStartTime(pid int) (string, error) {
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return parseStartTime(string(data))
}
parts := strings.Split(string(data), " ")
func parseStartTime(stat string) (string, error) {
// the starttime is located at pos 22
// from the man page
//
@ -23,5 +25,19 @@ func GetProcessStartTime(pid int) (string, error) {
// (22) The time the process started after system boot. In kernels before Linux 2.6, this
// value was expressed in jiffies. Since Linux 2.6, the value is expressed in clock ticks
// (divide by sysconf(_SC_CLK_TCK)).
return parts[22-1], nil // starts at 1
//
// NOTE:
// pos 2 could contain space and is inside `(` and `)`:
// (2) comm %s
// The filename of the executable, in parentheses.
// This is visible whether or not the executable is
// swapped out.
//
// the following is an example:
// 89653 (gunicorn: maste) S 89630 89653 89653 0 -1 4194560 29689 28896 0 3 146 32 76 19 20 0 1 0 2971844 52965376 3920 18446744073709551615 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 16781312 137447943 0 0 0 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
// get parts after last `)`:
s := strings.Split(stat, ")")
parts := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(s[len(s)-1]), " ")
return parts[22-3], nil // starts at 3 (after the filename pos `2`)
}