diff --git a/daemon/archive.go b/daemon/archive.go index 109376b4b5..9c7971b56e 100644 --- a/daemon/archive.go +++ b/daemon/archive.go @@ -31,19 +31,18 @@ type archiver interface { } // helper functions to extract or archive -func extractArchive(i interface{}, src io.Reader, dst string, opts *archive.TarOptions, root string) error { +func extractArchive(i interface{}, src io.Reader, dst string, opts *archive.TarOptions) error { if ea, ok := i.(extractor); ok { return ea.ExtractArchive(src, dst, opts) } - - return chrootarchive.UntarWithRoot(src, dst, opts, root) + return chrootarchive.Untar(src, dst, opts) } -func archivePath(i interface{}, src string, opts *archive.TarOptions, root string) (io.ReadCloser, error) { +func archivePath(i interface{}, src string, opts *archive.TarOptions) (io.ReadCloser, error) { if ap, ok := i.(archiver); ok { return ap.ArchivePath(src, opts) } - return chrootarchive.Tar(src, opts, root) + return archive.TarWithOptions(src, opts) } // ContainerCopy performs a deprecated operation of archiving the resource at @@ -239,7 +238,7 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) containerArchivePath(container *container.Container, path sourceDir, sourceBase := driver.Dir(resolvedPath), driver.Base(resolvedPath) opts := archive.TarResourceRebaseOpts(sourceBase, driver.Base(absPath)) - data, err := archivePath(driver, sourceDir, opts, container.BaseFS.Path()) + data, err := archivePath(driver, sourceDir, opts) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } @@ -368,7 +367,7 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) containerExtractToDir(container *container.Container, path } } - if err := extractArchive(driver, content, resolvedPath, options, container.BaseFS.Path()); err != nil { + if err := extractArchive(driver, content, resolvedPath, options); err != nil { return err } @@ -433,7 +432,7 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) containerCopy(container *container.Container, resource str archive, err := archivePath(driver, basePath, &archive.TarOptions{ Compression: archive.Uncompressed, IncludeFiles: filter, - }, container.BaseFS.Path()) + }) if err != nil { return nil, err } diff --git a/daemon/export.go b/daemon/export.go index 01593f4e8a..27bc35967d 100644 --- a/daemon/export.go +++ b/daemon/export.go @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func (daemon *Daemon) containerExport(container *container.Container) (arch io.R Compression: archive.Uncompressed, UIDMaps: daemon.idMapping.UIDs(), GIDMaps: daemon.idMapping.GIDs(), - }, basefs.Path()) + }) if err != nil { rwlayer.Unmount() return nil, err diff --git a/pkg/chrootarchive/archive.go b/pkg/chrootarchive/archive.go index 6ff61e6a76..2d9d662830 100644 --- a/pkg/chrootarchive/archive.go +++ b/pkg/chrootarchive/archive.go @@ -27,34 +27,18 @@ func NewArchiver(idMapping *idtools.IdentityMapping) *archive.Archiver { // The archive may be compressed with one of the following algorithms: // identity (uncompressed), gzip, bzip2, xz. func Untar(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions) error { - return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, true, dest) -} - -// UntarWithRoot is the same as `Untar`, but allows you to pass in a root directory -// The root directory is the directory that will be chrooted to. -// `dest` must be a path within `root`, if it is not an error will be returned. -// -// `root` should set to a directory which is not controlled by any potentially -// malicious process. -// -// This should be used to prevent a potential attacker from manipulating `dest` -// such that it would provide access to files outside of `dest` through things -// like symlinks. Normally `ResolveSymlinksInScope` would handle this, however -// sanitizing symlinks in this manner is inherrently racey: -// ref: CVE-2018-15664 -func UntarWithRoot(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions, root string) error { - return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, true, root) + return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, true) } // UntarUncompressed reads a stream of bytes from `archive`, parses it as a tar archive, // and unpacks it into the directory at `dest`. // The archive must be an uncompressed stream. func UntarUncompressed(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions) error { - return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, false, dest) + return untarHandler(tarArchive, dest, options, false) } // Handler for teasing out the automatic decompression -func untarHandler(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions, decompress bool, root string) error { +func untarHandler(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions, decompress bool) error { if tarArchive == nil { return fmt.Errorf("Empty archive") } @@ -85,13 +69,5 @@ func untarHandler(tarArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions r = decompressedArchive } - return invokeUnpack(r, dest, options, root) -} - -// Tar tars the requested path while chrooted to the specified root. -func Tar(srcPath string, options *archive.TarOptions, root string) (io.ReadCloser, error) { - if options == nil { - options = &archive.TarOptions{} - } - return invokePack(srcPath, options, root) + return invokeUnpack(r, dest, options) } diff --git a/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix.go b/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix.go index ea2879dc00..5df8afd662 100644 --- a/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix.go +++ b/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix.go @@ -10,13 +10,10 @@ import ( "io" "io/ioutil" "os" - "path/filepath" "runtime" - "strings" "github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive" "github.com/docker/docker/pkg/reexec" - "github.com/pkg/errors" ) // untar is the entry-point for docker-untar on re-exec. This is not used on @@ -26,28 +23,18 @@ func untar() { runtime.LockOSThread() flag.Parse() - var options archive.TarOptions + var options *archive.TarOptions //read the options from the pipe "ExtraFiles" if err := json.NewDecoder(os.NewFile(3, "options")).Decode(&options); err != nil { fatal(err) } - dst := flag.Arg(0) - var root string - if len(flag.Args()) > 1 { - root = flag.Arg(1) - } - - if root == "" { - root = dst - } - - if err := chroot(root); err != nil { + if err := chroot(flag.Arg(0)); err != nil { fatal(err) } - if err := archive.Unpack(os.Stdin, dst, &options); err != nil { + if err := archive.Unpack(os.Stdin, "/", options); err != nil { fatal(err) } // fully consume stdin in case it is zero padded @@ -58,10 +45,7 @@ func untar() { os.Exit(0) } -func invokeUnpack(decompressedArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions, root string) error { - if root == "" { - return errors.New("must specify a root to chroot to") - } +func invokeUnpack(decompressedArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.TarOptions) error { // We can't pass a potentially large exclude list directly via cmd line // because we easily overrun the kernel's max argument/environment size @@ -73,21 +57,7 @@ func invokeUnpack(decompressedArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.T return fmt.Errorf("Untar pipe failure: %v", err) } - if root != "" { - relDest, err := filepath.Rel(root, dest) - if err != nil { - return err - } - if relDest == "." { - relDest = "/" - } - if relDest[0] != '/' { - relDest = "/" + relDest - } - dest = relDest - } - - cmd := reexec.Command("docker-untar", dest, root) + cmd := reexec.Command("docker-untar", dest) cmd.Stdin = decompressedArchive cmd.ExtraFiles = append(cmd.ExtraFiles, r) @@ -99,7 +69,6 @@ func invokeUnpack(decompressedArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.T w.Close() return fmt.Errorf("Untar error on re-exec cmd: %v", err) } - //write the options to the pipe for the untar exec to read if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(options); err != nil { w.Close() @@ -117,92 +86,3 @@ func invokeUnpack(decompressedArchive io.Reader, dest string, options *archive.T } return nil } - -func tar() { - runtime.LockOSThread() - flag.Parse() - - src := flag.Arg(0) - var root string - if len(flag.Args()) > 1 { - root = flag.Arg(1) - } - - if root == "" { - root = src - } - - if err := realChroot(root); err != nil { - fatal(err) - } - - var options archive.TarOptions - if err := json.NewDecoder(os.Stdin).Decode(&options); err != nil { - fatal(err) - } - - rdr, err := archive.TarWithOptions(src, &options) - if err != nil { - fatal(err) - } - defer rdr.Close() - - if _, err := io.Copy(os.Stdout, rdr); err != nil { - fatal(err) - } - - os.Exit(0) -} - -func invokePack(srcPath string, options *archive.TarOptions, root string) (io.ReadCloser, error) { - if root == "" { - return nil, errors.New("root path must not be empty") - } - - relSrc, err := filepath.Rel(root, srcPath) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if relSrc == "." { - relSrc = "/" - } - if relSrc[0] != '/' { - relSrc = "/" + relSrc - } - - // make sure we didn't trim a trailing slash with the call to `Rel` - if strings.HasSuffix(srcPath, "/") && !strings.HasSuffix(relSrc, "/") { - relSrc += "/" - } - - cmd := reexec.Command("docker-tar", relSrc, root) - - errBuff := bytes.NewBuffer(nil) - cmd.Stderr = errBuff - - tarR, tarW := io.Pipe() - cmd.Stdout = tarW - - stdin, err := cmd.StdinPipe() - if err != nil { - return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error getting options pipe for tar process") - } - - if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil { - return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "tar error on re-exec cmd") - } - - go func() { - err := cmd.Wait() - err = errors.Wrapf(err, "error processing tar file: %s", errBuff) - tarW.CloseWithError(err) - }() - - if err := json.NewEncoder(stdin).Encode(options); err != nil { - stdin.Close() - return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "tar json encode to pipe failed") - } - stdin.Close() - - return tarR, nil -} diff --git a/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix_test.go b/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix_test.go deleted file mode 100644 index f39a88ad38..0000000000 --- a/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix_test.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,171 +0,0 @@ -// +build !windows - -package chrootarchive - -import ( - gotar "archive/tar" - "bytes" - "io" - "io/ioutil" - "os" - "path" - "path/filepath" - "strings" - "testing" - - "github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive" - "golang.org/x/sys/unix" - "gotest.tools/assert" -) - -// Test for CVE-2018-15664 -// Assures that in the case where an "attacker" controlled path is a symlink to -// some path outside of a container's rootfs that we do not copy data to a -// container path that will actually overwrite data on the host -func TestUntarWithMaliciousSymlinks(t *testing.T) { - dir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", t.Name()) - assert.NilError(t, err) - defer os.RemoveAll(dir) - - root := filepath.Join(dir, "root") - - err = os.MkdirAll(root, 0755) - assert.NilError(t, err) - - // Add a file into a directory above root - // Ensure that we can't access this file while tarring. - err = ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "host-file"), []byte("I am a host file"), 0644) - assert.NilError(t, err) - - // Create some data which which will be copied into the "container" root into - // the symlinked path. - // Before this change, the copy would overwrite the "host" content. - // With this change it should not. - data := filepath.Join(dir, "data") - err = os.MkdirAll(data, 0755) - assert.NilError(t, err) - err = ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(data, "local-file"), []byte("pwn3d"), 0644) - assert.NilError(t, err) - - safe := filepath.Join(root, "safe") - err = unix.Symlink(dir, safe) - assert.NilError(t, err) - - rdr, err := archive.TarWithOptions(data, &archive.TarOptions{IncludeFiles: []string{"local-file"}, RebaseNames: map[string]string{"local-file": "host-file"}}) - assert.NilError(t, err) - - // Use tee to test both the good case and the bad case w/o recreating the archive - bufRdr := bytes.NewBuffer(nil) - tee := io.TeeReader(rdr, bufRdr) - - err = UntarWithRoot(tee, safe, nil, root) - assert.Assert(t, err != nil) - assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "open /safe/host-file: no such file or directory") - - // Make sure the "host" file is still in tact - // Before the fix the host file would be overwritten - hostData, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "host-file")) - assert.NilError(t, err) - assert.Equal(t, string(hostData), "I am a host file") - - // Now test by chrooting to an attacker controlled path - // This should succeed as is and overwrite a "host" file - // Note that this would be a mis-use of this function. - err = UntarWithRoot(bufRdr, safe, nil, safe) - assert.NilError(t, err) - - hostData, err = ioutil.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "host-file")) - assert.NilError(t, err) - assert.Equal(t, string(hostData), "pwn3d") -} - -// Test for CVE-2018-15664 -// Assures that in the case where an "attacker" controlled path is a symlink to -// some path outside of a container's rootfs that we do not unwittingly leak -// host data into the archive. -func TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks(t *testing.T) { - dir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", t.Name()) - assert.NilError(t, err) - // defer os.RemoveAll(dir) - t.Log(dir) - - root := filepath.Join(dir, "root") - - err = os.MkdirAll(root, 0755) - assert.NilError(t, err) - - hostFileData := []byte("I am a host file") - - // Add a file into a directory above root - // Ensure that we can't access this file while tarring. - err = ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "host-file"), hostFileData, 0644) - assert.NilError(t, err) - - safe := filepath.Join(root, "safe") - err = unix.Symlink(dir, safe) - assert.NilError(t, err) - - data := filepath.Join(dir, "data") - err = os.MkdirAll(data, 0755) - assert.NilError(t, err) - - type testCase struct { - p string - includes []string - } - - cases := []testCase{ - {p: safe, includes: []string{"host-file"}}, - {p: safe + "/", includes: []string{"host-file"}}, - {p: safe, includes: nil}, - {p: safe + "/", includes: nil}, - {p: root, includes: []string{"safe/host-file"}}, - {p: root, includes: []string{"/safe/host-file"}}, - {p: root, includes: nil}, - } - - maxBytes := len(hostFileData) - - for _, tc := range cases { - t.Run(path.Join(tc.p+"_"+strings.Join(tc.includes, "_")), func(t *testing.T) { - // Here if we use archive.TarWithOptions directly or change the "root" parameter - // to be the same as "safe", data from the host will be leaked into the archive - var opts *archive.TarOptions - if tc.includes != nil { - opts = &archive.TarOptions{ - IncludeFiles: tc.includes, - } - } - rdr, err := Tar(tc.p, opts, root) - assert.NilError(t, err) - defer rdr.Close() - - tr := gotar.NewReader(rdr) - assert.Assert(t, !isDataInTar(t, tr, hostFileData, int64(maxBytes)), "host data leaked to archive") - }) - } -} - -func isDataInTar(t *testing.T, tr *gotar.Reader, compare []byte, maxBytes int64) bool { - for { - h, err := tr.Next() - if err == io.EOF { - break - } - assert.NilError(t, err) - - if h.Size == 0 { - continue - } - assert.Assert(t, h.Size <= maxBytes, "%s: file size exceeds max expected size %d: %d", h.Name, maxBytes, h.Size) - - data := make([]byte, int(h.Size)) - _, err = io.ReadFull(tr, data) - assert.NilError(t, err) - if bytes.Contains(data, compare) { - return true - } - } - - return false -} diff --git a/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_windows.go b/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_windows.go index de87113e95..f2973132a3 100644 --- a/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_windows.go +++ b/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_windows.go @@ -14,16 +14,9 @@ func chroot(path string) error { func invokeUnpack(decompressedArchive io.ReadCloser, dest string, - options *archive.TarOptions, root string) error { + options *archive.TarOptions) error { // Windows is different to Linux here because Windows does not support // chroot. Hence there is no point sandboxing a chrooted process to // do the unpack. We call inline instead within the daemon process. return archive.Unpack(decompressedArchive, longpath.AddPrefix(dest), options) } - -func invokePack(srcPath string, options *archive.TarOptions, root string) (io.ReadCloser, error) { - // Windows is different to Linux here because Windows does not support - // chroot. Hence there is no point sandboxing a chrooted process to - // do the pack. We call inline instead within the daemon process. - return archive.TarWithOptions(srcPath, options) -} diff --git a/pkg/chrootarchive/init_unix.go b/pkg/chrootarchive/init_unix.go index c24fea7d9c..a15e4bb83c 100644 --- a/pkg/chrootarchive/init_unix.go +++ b/pkg/chrootarchive/init_unix.go @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import ( func init() { reexec.Register("docker-applyLayer", applyLayer) reexec.Register("docker-untar", untar) - reexec.Register("docker-tar", tar) } func fatal(err error) {