Movified from 686be57d0a, and re-ran
gofmt again to address for files not present in 20.10 and vice-versa.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit 686be57d0a)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
daemon/graphdriver/fuse-overlayfs/fuseoverlayfs.go:101:63: SA9002: file mode '700' evaluates to 01274; did you mean '0700'? (staticcheck)
if err := idtools.MkdirAllAndChown(path.Join(home, linkDir), 700, currentID); err != nil {
^
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
(cherry picked from commit f9fb5d4f25)
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Do not use 0701 perms.
0701 dir perms allows anyone to traverse the docker dir.
It happens to allow any user to execute, as an example, suid binaries
from image rootfs dirs because it allows traversal AND critically
container users need to be able to do execute things.
0701 on lower directories also happens to allow any user to modify
things in, for instance, the overlay upper dir which neccessarily
has 0755 permissions.
This changes to use 0710 which allows users in the group to traverse.
In userns mode the UID owner is (real) root and the GID is the remapped
root's GID.
This prevents anyone but the remapped root to traverse our directories
(which is required for userns with runc).
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit ef7237442147441a7cadcda0600be1186d81ac73)
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
Various dirs in /var/lib/docker contain data that needs to be mounted
into a container. For this reason, these dirs are set to be owned by the
remapped root user, otherwise there can be permissions issues.
However, this uneccessarily exposes these dirs to an unprivileged user
on the host.
Instead, set the ownership of these dirs to the real root (or rather the
UID/GID of dockerd) with 0701 permissions, which allows the remapped
root to enter the directories but not read/write to them.
The remapped root needs to enter these dirs so the container's rootfs
can be configured... e.g. to mount /etc/resolve.conf.
This prevents an unprivileged user from having read/write access to
these dirs on the host.
The flip side of this is now any user can enter these directories.
Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
The implementation in libcontainer/system is quite complicated,
and we only use it to detect if user-namespaces are enabled.
In addition, the implementation in containerd uses a sync.Once,
so that detection (and reading/parsing `/proc/self/uid_map`) is
only performed once.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
Switch to moby/sys/mount and mountinfo. Keep the pkg/mount for potential
outside users.
This commit was generated by the following bash script:
```
set -e -u -o pipefail
for file in $(git grep -l 'docker/docker/pkg/mount"' | grep -v ^pkg/mount); do
sed -i -e 's#/docker/docker/pkg/mount"#/moby/sys/mount"#' \
-e 's#mount\.\(GetMounts\|Mounted\|Info\|[A-Za-z]*Filter\)#mountinfo.\1#g' \
$file
goimports -w $file
done
```
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
`fuse-overlayfs` provides rootless overlayfs functionality without depending
on any kernel patch.
Aside from rootless, `fuse-overlayfs` could be potentially used for eliminating
`chown()` calls that happen in userns-remap mode, because `fuse-overlayfs` also
provides shiftfs functionality.
System requirements:
* fuse-overlayfs needs to be installed. Tested with 0.7.6.
* kernel >= 4.18
Unit test: `go test -exec sudo -v ./daemon/graphdriver/fuse-overlayfs`
The implementation is based on Podman's `overlay` driver which supports
both kernel-mode overlayfs and fuse-overlayfs in the single driver instance:
https://github.com/containers/storage/blob/39a8d5ed/drivers/overlay/overlay.go
However, Moby's implementation aims to decouple `fuse-overlayfs` driver from the
kernel-mode driver (`overlay2`) for simplicity.
Fix#40218
Signed-off-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
Sebastiaan van Stijn