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moby--moby/pkg/chrootarchive/archive_unix_test.go
Brian Goff 3029e765e2 Add chroot for tar packing operations
Previously only unpack operations were supported with chroot.
This adds chroot support for packing operations.
This prevents potential breakouts when copying data from a container.

Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
2019-06-03 09:45:29 -07:00

171 lines
4.9 KiB
Go

// +build !windows
package chrootarchive
import (
gotar "archive/tar"
"bytes"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"path"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/archive"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"gotest.tools/assert"
)
// Test for CVE-2018-15664
// Assures that in the case where an "attacker" controlled path is a symlink to
// some path outside of a container's rootfs that we do not copy data to a
// container path that will actually overwrite data on the host
func TestUntarWithMaliciousSymlinks(t *testing.T) {
dir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", t.Name())
assert.NilError(t, err)
defer os.RemoveAll(dir)
root := filepath.Join(dir, "root")
err = os.MkdirAll(root, 0755)
assert.NilError(t, err)
// Add a file into a directory above root
// Ensure that we can't access this file while tarring.
err = ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "host-file"), []byte("I am a host file"), 0644)
assert.NilError(t, err)
// Create some data which which will be copied into the "container" root into
// the symlinked path.
// Before this change, the copy would overwrite the "host" content.
// With this change it should not.
data := filepath.Join(dir, "data")
err = os.MkdirAll(data, 0755)
assert.NilError(t, err)
err = ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(data, "local-file"), []byte("pwn3d"), 0644)
assert.NilError(t, err)
safe := filepath.Join(root, "safe")
err = unix.Symlink(dir, safe)
assert.NilError(t, err)
rdr, err := archive.TarWithOptions(data, &archive.TarOptions{IncludeFiles: []string{"local-file"}, RebaseNames: map[string]string{"local-file": "host-file"}})
assert.NilError(t, err)
// Use tee to test both the good case and the bad case w/o recreating the archive
bufRdr := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
tee := io.TeeReader(rdr, bufRdr)
err = UntarWithRoot(tee, safe, nil, root)
assert.Assert(t, err != nil)
assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "open /safe/host-file: no such file or directory")
// Make sure the "host" file is still in tact
// Before the fix the host file would be overwritten
hostData, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "host-file"))
assert.NilError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, string(hostData), "I am a host file")
// Now test by chrooting to an attacker controlled path
// This should succeed as is and overwrite a "host" file
// Note that this would be a mis-use of this function.
err = UntarWithRoot(bufRdr, safe, nil, safe)
assert.NilError(t, err)
hostData, err = ioutil.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "host-file"))
assert.NilError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, string(hostData), "pwn3d")
}
// Test for CVE-2018-15664
// Assures that in the case where an "attacker" controlled path is a symlink to
// some path outside of a container's rootfs that we do not unwittingly leak
// host data into the archive.
func TestTarWithMaliciousSymlinks(t *testing.T) {
dir, err := ioutil.TempDir("", t.Name())
assert.NilError(t, err)
// defer os.RemoveAll(dir)
t.Log(dir)
root := filepath.Join(dir, "root")
err = os.MkdirAll(root, 0755)
assert.NilError(t, err)
hostFileData := []byte("I am a host file")
// Add a file into a directory above root
// Ensure that we can't access this file while tarring.
err = ioutil.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "host-file"), hostFileData, 0644)
assert.NilError(t, err)
safe := filepath.Join(root, "safe")
err = unix.Symlink(dir, safe)
assert.NilError(t, err)
data := filepath.Join(dir, "data")
err = os.MkdirAll(data, 0755)
assert.NilError(t, err)
type testCase struct {
p string
includes []string
}
cases := []testCase{
{p: safe, includes: []string{"host-file"}},
{p: safe + "/", includes: []string{"host-file"}},
{p: safe, includes: nil},
{p: safe + "/", includes: nil},
{p: root, includes: []string{"safe/host-file"}},
{p: root, includes: []string{"/safe/host-file"}},
{p: root, includes: nil},
}
maxBytes := len(hostFileData)
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(path.Join(tc.p+"_"+strings.Join(tc.includes, "_")), func(t *testing.T) {
// Here if we use archive.TarWithOptions directly or change the "root" parameter
// to be the same as "safe", data from the host will be leaked into the archive
var opts *archive.TarOptions
if tc.includes != nil {
opts = &archive.TarOptions{
IncludeFiles: tc.includes,
}
}
rdr, err := Tar(tc.p, opts, root)
assert.NilError(t, err)
defer rdr.Close()
tr := gotar.NewReader(rdr)
assert.Assert(t, !isDataInTar(t, tr, hostFileData, int64(maxBytes)), "host data leaked to archive")
})
}
}
func isDataInTar(t *testing.T, tr *gotar.Reader, compare []byte, maxBytes int64) bool {
for {
h, err := tr.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
assert.NilError(t, err)
if h.Size == 0 {
continue
}
assert.Assert(t, h.Size <= maxBytes, "%s: file size exceeds max expected size %d: %d", h.Name, maxBytes, h.Size)
data := make([]byte, int(h.Size))
_, err = io.ReadFull(tr, data)
assert.NilError(t, err)
if bytes.Contains(data, compare) {
return true
}
}
return false
}