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https://github.com/moby/moby.git
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cc8f358c23
These network operations really don't have anything to do with the container but rather are setting up the networking. Ideally these wouldn't get shoved into the daemon package, but doing something else (e.g. extract a network service into a new package) but there's a lot more work to do in that regard. In reality, this probably simplifies some of that work as it moves all the network operations to the same place. Signed-off-by: Brian Goff <cpuguy83@gmail.com>
408 lines
12 KiB
Go
408 lines
12 KiB
Go
package daemon // import "github.com/docker/docker/daemon"
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import (
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"fmt"
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"io/ioutil"
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"path/filepath"
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"runtime"
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"strings"
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containertypes "github.com/docker/docker/api/types/container"
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"github.com/docker/docker/container"
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"github.com/docker/docker/oci"
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"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/sysinfo"
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"github.com/docker/docker/pkg/system"
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"github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/specs-go"
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"github.com/pkg/errors"
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"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
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"golang.org/x/sys/windows/registry"
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)
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const (
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credentialSpecRegistryLocation = `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Virtualization\Containers\CredentialSpecs`
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credentialSpecFileLocation = "CredentialSpecs"
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)
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func (daemon *Daemon) createSpec(c *container.Container) (*specs.Spec, error) {
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img, err := daemon.imageService.GetImage(string(c.ImageID))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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s := oci.DefaultOSSpec(img.OS)
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linkedEnv, err := daemon.setupLinkedContainers(c)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// Note, unlike Unix, we do NOT call into SetupWorkingDirectory as
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// this is done in VMCompute. Further, we couldn't do it for Hyper-V
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// containers anyway.
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// In base spec
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s.Hostname = c.FullHostname()
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if err := daemon.setupSecretDir(c); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if err := daemon.setupConfigDir(c); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// In s.Mounts
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mounts, err := daemon.setupMounts(c)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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var isHyperV bool
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if c.HostConfig.Isolation.IsDefault() {
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// Container using default isolation, so take the default from the daemon configuration
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isHyperV = daemon.defaultIsolation.IsHyperV()
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} else {
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// Container may be requesting an explicit isolation mode.
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isHyperV = c.HostConfig.Isolation.IsHyperV()
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}
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if isHyperV {
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s.Windows.HyperV = &specs.WindowsHyperV{}
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}
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// If the container has not been started, and has configs or secrets
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// secrets, create symlinks to each config and secret. If it has been
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// started before, the symlinks should have already been created. Also, it
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// is important to not mount a Hyper-V container that has been started
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// before, to protect the host from the container; for example, from
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// malicious mutation of NTFS data structures.
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if !c.HasBeenStartedBefore && (len(c.SecretReferences) > 0 || len(c.ConfigReferences) > 0) {
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// The container file system is mounted before this function is called,
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// except for Hyper-V containers, so mount it here in that case.
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if isHyperV {
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if err := daemon.Mount(c); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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defer daemon.Unmount(c)
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}
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if err := c.CreateSecretSymlinks(); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if err := c.CreateConfigSymlinks(); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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}
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secretMounts, err := c.SecretMounts()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if secretMounts != nil {
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mounts = append(mounts, secretMounts...)
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}
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configMounts := c.ConfigMounts()
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if configMounts != nil {
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mounts = append(mounts, configMounts...)
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}
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for _, mount := range mounts {
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m := specs.Mount{
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Source: mount.Source,
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Destination: mount.Destination,
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}
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if !mount.Writable {
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m.Options = append(m.Options, "ro")
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}
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if img.OS != runtime.GOOS {
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m.Type = "bind"
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m.Options = append(m.Options, "rbind")
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m.Options = append(m.Options, fmt.Sprintf("uvmpath=/tmp/gcs/%s/binds", c.ID))
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}
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s.Mounts = append(s.Mounts, m)
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}
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// In s.Process
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s.Process.Args = append([]string{c.Path}, c.Args...)
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if !c.Config.ArgsEscaped && img.OS == "windows" {
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s.Process.Args = escapeArgs(s.Process.Args)
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}
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s.Process.Cwd = c.Config.WorkingDir
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s.Process.Env = c.CreateDaemonEnvironment(c.Config.Tty, linkedEnv)
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if c.Config.Tty {
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s.Process.Terminal = c.Config.Tty
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s.Process.ConsoleSize = &specs.Box{
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Height: c.HostConfig.ConsoleSize[0],
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Width: c.HostConfig.ConsoleSize[1],
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}
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}
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s.Process.User.Username = c.Config.User
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s.Windows.LayerFolders, err = daemon.imageService.GetLayerFolders(img, c.RWLayer)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "container %s", c.ID)
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}
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dnsSearch := daemon.getDNSSearchSettings(c)
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// Get endpoints for the libnetwork allocated networks to the container
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var epList []string
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AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery := false
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gwHNSID := ""
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if c.NetworkSettings != nil {
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for n := range c.NetworkSettings.Networks {
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sn, err := daemon.FindNetwork(n)
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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ep, err := getEndpointInNetwork(c.Name, sn)
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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data, err := ep.DriverInfo()
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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if data["GW_INFO"] != nil {
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gwInfo := data["GW_INFO"].(map[string]interface{})
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if gwInfo["hnsid"] != nil {
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gwHNSID = gwInfo["hnsid"].(string)
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}
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}
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if data["hnsid"] != nil {
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epList = append(epList, data["hnsid"].(string))
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}
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if data["AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery"] != nil {
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AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery = true
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}
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}
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}
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var networkSharedContainerID string
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if c.HostConfig.NetworkMode.IsContainer() {
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networkSharedContainerID = c.NetworkSharedContainerID
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for _, ep := range c.SharedEndpointList {
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epList = append(epList, ep)
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}
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}
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if gwHNSID != "" {
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epList = append(epList, gwHNSID)
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}
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s.Windows.Network = &specs.WindowsNetwork{
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AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery: AllowUnqualifiedDNSQuery,
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DNSSearchList: dnsSearch,
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EndpointList: epList,
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NetworkSharedContainerName: networkSharedContainerID,
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}
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switch img.OS {
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case "windows":
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if err := daemon.createSpecWindowsFields(c, &s, isHyperV); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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case "linux":
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if !system.LCOWSupported() {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("Linux containers on Windows are not supported")
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}
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daemon.createSpecLinuxFields(c, &s)
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("Unsupported platform %q", img.OS)
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}
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return (*specs.Spec)(&s), nil
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}
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// Sets the Windows-specific fields of the OCI spec
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func (daemon *Daemon) createSpecWindowsFields(c *container.Container, s *specs.Spec, isHyperV bool) error {
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if len(s.Process.Cwd) == 0 {
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// We default to C:\ to workaround the oddity of the case that the
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// default directory for cmd running as LocalSystem (or
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// ContainerAdministrator) is c:\windows\system32. Hence docker run
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// <image> cmd will by default end in c:\windows\system32, rather
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// than 'root' (/) on Linux. The oddity is that if you have a dockerfile
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// which has no WORKDIR and has a COPY file ., . will be interpreted
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// as c:\. Hence, setting it to default of c:\ makes for consistency.
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s.Process.Cwd = `C:\`
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}
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s.Root.Readonly = false // Windows does not support a read-only root filesystem
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if !isHyperV {
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if c.BaseFS == nil {
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return errors.New("createSpecWindowsFields: BaseFS of container " + c.ID + " is unexpectedly nil")
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}
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s.Root.Path = c.BaseFS.Path() // This is not set for Hyper-V containers
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if !strings.HasSuffix(s.Root.Path, `\`) {
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s.Root.Path = s.Root.Path + `\` // Ensure a correctly formatted volume GUID path \\?\Volume{GUID}\
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}
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}
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// First boot optimization
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s.Windows.IgnoreFlushesDuringBoot = !c.HasBeenStartedBefore
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// In s.Windows.Resources
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cpuShares := uint16(c.HostConfig.CPUShares)
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cpuMaximum := uint16(c.HostConfig.CPUPercent) * 100
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cpuCount := uint64(c.HostConfig.CPUCount)
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if c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs > 0 {
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if isHyperV {
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cpuCount = uint64(c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs / 1e9)
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leftoverNanoCPUs := c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs % 1e9
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if leftoverNanoCPUs != 0 {
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cpuCount++
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cpuMaximum = uint16(c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs / int64(cpuCount) / (1e9 / 10000))
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if cpuMaximum < 1 {
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// The requested NanoCPUs is so small that we rounded to 0, use 1 instead
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cpuMaximum = 1
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}
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}
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} else {
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cpuMaximum = uint16(c.HostConfig.NanoCPUs / int64(sysinfo.NumCPU()) / (1e9 / 10000))
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if cpuMaximum < 1 {
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// The requested NanoCPUs is so small that we rounded to 0, use 1 instead
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cpuMaximum = 1
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}
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}
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}
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memoryLimit := uint64(c.HostConfig.Memory)
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s.Windows.Resources = &specs.WindowsResources{
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CPU: &specs.WindowsCPUResources{
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Maximum: &cpuMaximum,
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Shares: &cpuShares,
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Count: &cpuCount,
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},
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Memory: &specs.WindowsMemoryResources{
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Limit: &memoryLimit,
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},
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Storage: &specs.WindowsStorageResources{
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Bps: &c.HostConfig.IOMaximumBandwidth,
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Iops: &c.HostConfig.IOMaximumIOps,
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},
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}
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// Read and add credentials from the security options if a credential spec has been provided.
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if c.HostConfig.SecurityOpt != nil {
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cs := ""
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for _, sOpt := range c.HostConfig.SecurityOpt {
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sOpt = strings.ToLower(sOpt)
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if !strings.Contains(sOpt, "=") {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid security option: no equals sign in supplied value %s", sOpt)
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}
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var splitsOpt []string
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splitsOpt = strings.SplitN(sOpt, "=", 2)
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if len(splitsOpt) != 2 {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid security option: %s", sOpt)
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}
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if splitsOpt[0] != "credentialspec" {
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return fmt.Errorf("security option not supported: %s", splitsOpt[0])
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}
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var (
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match bool
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csValue string
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err error
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)
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if match, csValue = getCredentialSpec("file://", splitsOpt[1]); match {
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if csValue == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("no value supplied for file:// credential spec security option")
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}
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if cs, err = readCredentialSpecFile(c.ID, daemon.root, filepath.Clean(csValue)); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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} else if match, csValue = getCredentialSpec("registry://", splitsOpt[1]); match {
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if csValue == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("no value supplied for registry:// credential spec security option")
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}
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if cs, err = readCredentialSpecRegistry(c.ID, csValue); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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} else {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid credential spec security option - value must be prefixed file:// or registry:// followed by a value")
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}
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}
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s.Windows.CredentialSpec = cs
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Sets the Linux-specific fields of the OCI spec
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// TODO: @jhowardmsft LCOW Support. We need to do a lot more pulling in what can
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// be pulled in from oci_linux.go.
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func (daemon *Daemon) createSpecLinuxFields(c *container.Container, s *specs.Spec) {
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if len(s.Process.Cwd) == 0 {
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s.Process.Cwd = `/`
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}
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s.Root.Path = "rootfs"
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s.Root.Readonly = c.HostConfig.ReadonlyRootfs
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}
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func escapeArgs(args []string) []string {
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escapedArgs := make([]string, len(args))
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for i, a := range args {
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escapedArgs[i] = windows.EscapeArg(a)
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}
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return escapedArgs
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}
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// mergeUlimits merge the Ulimits from HostConfig with daemon defaults, and update HostConfig
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// It will do nothing on non-Linux platform
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func (daemon *Daemon) mergeUlimits(c *containertypes.HostConfig) {
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return
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}
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// getCredentialSpec is a helper function to get the value of a credential spec supplied
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// on the CLI, stripping the prefix
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func getCredentialSpec(prefix, value string) (bool, string) {
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if strings.HasPrefix(value, prefix) {
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return true, strings.TrimPrefix(value, prefix)
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}
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return false, ""
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}
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// readCredentialSpecRegistry is a helper function to read a credential spec from
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// the registry. If not found, we return an empty string and warn in the log.
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// This allows for staging on machines which do not have the necessary components.
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func readCredentialSpecRegistry(id, name string) (string, error) {
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var (
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k registry.Key
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err error
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val string
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)
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if k, err = registry.OpenKey(registry.LOCAL_MACHINE, credentialSpecRegistryLocation, registry.QUERY_VALUE); err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("failed handling spec %q for container %s - %s could not be opened", name, id, credentialSpecRegistryLocation)
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}
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if val, _, err = k.GetStringValue(name); err != nil {
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if err == registry.ErrNotExist {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("credential spec %q for container %s as it was not found", name, id)
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}
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return "", fmt.Errorf("error %v reading credential spec %q from registry for container %s", err, name, id)
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}
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return val, nil
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}
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// readCredentialSpecFile is a helper function to read a credential spec from
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// a file. If not found, we return an empty string and warn in the log.
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// This allows for staging on machines which do not have the necessary components.
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func readCredentialSpecFile(id, root, location string) (string, error) {
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if filepath.IsAbs(location) {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid credential spec - file:// path cannot be absolute")
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}
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base := filepath.Join(root, credentialSpecFileLocation)
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full := filepath.Join(base, location)
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if !strings.HasPrefix(full, base) {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid credential spec - file:// path must be under %s", base)
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}
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bcontents, err := ioutil.ReadFile(full)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("credential spec '%s' for container %s as the file could not be read: %q", full, id, err)
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}
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return string(bcontents[:]), nil
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}
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