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Merge pull request #31653 from ydakuka/fix-typo-0801
Fix typos [ci skip]
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commit
5e8c79a6fa
5 changed files with 5 additions and 5 deletions
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@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ config.action_mailer.smtp_settings = {
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user_name: '<username>',
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password: '<password>',
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authentication: 'plain',
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enable_starttls_auto: true }
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enable_starttls_auto: true }
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```
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Note: As of July 15, 2014, Google increased [its security measures](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6010255) and now blocks attempts from apps it deems less secure.
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You can change your Gmail settings [here](https://www.google.com/settings/security/lesssecureapps) to allow the attempts. If your Gmail account has 2-factor authentication enabled,
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@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ should happen, an `Array` can be used. Moreover, you can apply both `:if` and
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```ruby
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class Computer < ApplicationRecord
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validates :mouse, presence: true,
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if: [Proc.new { |c| c.market.retail? }, :desktop?],
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if: [Proc.new { |c| c.market.retail? }, :desktop?],
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unless: Proc.new { |c| c.trackpad.present? }
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end
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```
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@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ The common admin interface works like this: it's located at www.example.com/admi
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* Does the admin really have to access the interface from everywhere in the world? Think about _limiting the login to a bunch of source IP addresses_. Examine request.remote_ip to find out about the user's IP address. This is not bullet-proof, but a great barrier. Remember that there might be a proxy in use, though.
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* _Put the admin interface to a special sub-domain_ such as admin.application.com and make it a separate application with its own user management. This makes stealing an admin cookie from the usual domain, www.application.com, impossible. This is because of the same origin policy in your browser: An injected (XSS) script on www.application.com may not read the cookie for admin.application.com and vice-versa.
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* _Put the admin interface to a special subdomain_ such as admin.application.com and make it a separate application with its own user management. This makes stealing an admin cookie from the usual domain, www.application.com, impossible. This is because of the same origin policy in your browser: An injected (XSS) script on www.application.com may not read the cookie for admin.application.com and vice-versa.
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User Management
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---------------
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@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ that promise is to put it as close as possible to the blocking call:
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Rails.application.executor.wrap do
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th = Thread.new do
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Rails.application.executor.wrap do
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User # inner thread can acquire the load lock,
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User # inner thread can acquire the 'load' lock,
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# load User, and continue
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end
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end
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@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ Example usage:
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```html
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document.body.addEventListener('ajax:success', function(event) {
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var detail = event.detail;
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var data = detail[0], status = detail[1], xhr = detail[2];
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var data = detail[0], status = detail[1], xhr = detail[2];
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})
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```
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