Fix unusual line terminators [ci skip]

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Chirag Shah 2020-07-31 02:42:49 +05:30 committed by GitHub
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@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ Intranet and Admin Security
Intranet and administration interfaces are popular attack targets, because they allow privileged access. Although this would require several extra-security measures, the opposite is the case in the real world.
In 2007 there was the first tailor-made trojan which stole information from an Intranet, namely the "Monster for employers" web site of Monster.com, an online recruitment web application. Tailor-made Trojans are very rare, so far, and the risk is quite low, but it is certainly a possibility and an example of how the security of the client host is important, too. However, the highest threat to Intranet and Admin applications are XSS and CSRF.
In 2007 there was the first tailor-made trojan which stole information from an Intranet, namely the "Monster for employers" web site of Monster.com, an online recruitment web application. Tailor-made Trojans are very rare, so far, and the risk is quite low, but it is certainly a possibility and an example of how the security of the client host is important, too. However, the highest threat to Intranet and Admin applications are XSS and CSRF.
**XSS** If your application re-displays malicious user input from the extranet, the application will be vulnerable to XSS. User names, comments, spam reports, order addresses are just a few uncommon examples, where there can be XSS.
@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ Refer to the Injection section for countermeasures against XSS.
A real-world example is a [router reconfiguration by CSRF](http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Symantec-reports-first-active-attack-on-a-DSL-router-735883.html). The attackers sent a malicious e-mail, with CSRF in it, to Mexican users. The e-mail claimed there was an e-card waiting for the user, but it also contained an image tag that resulted in an HTTP-GET request to reconfigure the user's router (which is a popular model in Mexico). The request changed the DNS-settings so that requests to a Mexico-based banking site would be mapped to the attacker's site. Everyone who accessed the banking site through that router saw the attacker's fake web site and had their credentials stolen.
Another example changed Google Adsense's e-mail address and password. If the victim was logged into Google Adsense, the administration interface for Google advertisement campaigns, an attacker could change the credentials of the victim.
Another example changed Google Adsense's e-mail address and password. If the victim was logged into Google Adsense, the administration interface for Google advertisement campaigns, an attacker could change the credentials of the victim.
Another popular attack is to spam your web application, your blog, or forum to propagate malicious XSS. Of course, the attacker has to know the URL structure, but most Rails URLs are quite straightforward or they will be easy to find out, if it is an open-source application's admin interface. The attacker may even do 1,000 lucky guesses by just including malicious IMG-tags which try every possible combination.
@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ alert(eval('document.body.inne' + 'rHTML'));
The next problem was MySpace filtering the word `"javascript"`, so the author used `"java<NEWLINE>script"` to get around this:
```html
<div id="mycode" expr="alert('hah!')" style="background:url('java↵script:eval(document.all.mycode.expr)')">
<div id="mycode" expr="alert('hah!')" style="background:url('java↵script:eval(document.all.mycode.expr)')">
```
Another problem for the worm's author was the [CSRF security tokens](#cross-site-request-forgery-csrf). Without them he couldn't send a friend request over POST. He got around it by sending a GET to the page right before adding a user and parsing the result for the CSRF token.
@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ If Header Injection was possible, Response Splitting might be, too. In HTTP, the
```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found [First standard 302 response]
Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2005 22:09:07 GMT
Location:Content-Type: text/html
Location:Content-Type: text/html
HTTP/1.1 200 OK [Second New response created by attacker begins]