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183 lines
8.4 KiB
Ruby
183 lines
8.4 KiB
Ruby
require 'ipaddr'
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module ActionDispatch
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# This middleware calculates the IP address of the remote client that is
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# making the request. It does this by checking various headers that could
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# contain the address, and then picking the last-set address that is not
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# on the list of trusted IPs. This follows the precedent set by e.g.
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# {the Tomcat server}[https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=50453],
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# with {reasoning explained at length}[http://blog.gingerlime.com/2012/rails-ip-spoofing-vulnerabilities-and-protection]
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# by @gingerlime. A more detailed explanation of the algorithm is given
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# at GetIp#calculate_ip.
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#
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# Some Rack servers concatenate repeated headers, like {HTTP RFC 2616}[http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec4.html#sec4.2]
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# requires. Some Rack servers simply drop preceding headers, and only report
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# the value that was {given in the last header}[http://andre.arko.net/2011/12/26/repeated-headers-and-ruby-web-servers].
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# If you are behind multiple proxy servers (like NGINX to HAProxy to Unicorn)
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# then you should test your Rack server to make sure your data is good.
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#
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# IF YOU DON'T USE A PROXY, THIS MAKES YOU VULNERABLE TO IP SPOOFING.
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# This middleware assumes that there is at least one proxy sitting around
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# and setting headers with the client's remote IP address. If you don't use
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# a proxy, because you are hosted on e.g. Heroku without SSL, any client can
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# claim to have any IP address by setting the X-Forwarded-For header. If you
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# care about that, then you need to explicitly drop or ignore those headers
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# sometime before this middleware runs.
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class RemoteIp
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class IpSpoofAttackError < StandardError; end
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# The default trusted IPs list simply includes IP addresses that are
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# guaranteed by the IP specification to be private addresses. Those will
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# not be the ultimate client IP in production, and so are discarded. See
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# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_network for details.
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TRUSTED_PROXIES = [
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"127.0.0.1", # localhost IPv4
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"::1", # localhost IPv6
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"fc00::/7", # private IPv6 range fc00::/7
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"10.0.0.0/8", # private IPv4 range 10.x.x.x
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"172.16.0.0/12", # private IPv4 range 172.16.0.0 .. 172.31.255.255
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"192.168.0.0/16", # private IPv4 range 192.168.x.x
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].map { |proxy| IPAddr.new(proxy) }
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attr_reader :check_ip, :proxies
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# Create a new +RemoteIp+ middleware instance.
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#
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# The +ip_spoofing_check+ option is on by default. When on, an exception
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# is raised if it looks like the client is trying to lie about its own IP
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# address. It makes sense to turn off this check on sites aimed at non-IP
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# clients (like WAP devices), or behind proxies that set headers in an
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# incorrect or confusing way (like AWS ELB).
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#
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# The +custom_proxies+ argument can take an Array of string, IPAddr, or
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# Regexp objects which will be used instead of +TRUSTED_PROXIES+. If a
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# single string, IPAddr, or Regexp object is provided, it will be used in
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# addition to +TRUSTED_PROXIES+. Any proxy setup will put the value you
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# want in the middle (or at the beginning) of the X-Forwarded-For list,
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# with your proxy servers after it. If your proxies aren't removed, pass
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# them in via the +custom_proxies+ parameter. That way, the middleware will
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# ignore those IP addresses, and return the one that you want.
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def initialize(app, ip_spoofing_check = true, custom_proxies = nil)
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@app = app
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@check_ip = ip_spoofing_check
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@proxies = if custom_proxies.blank?
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TRUSTED_PROXIES
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elsif custom_proxies.respond_to?(:any?)
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custom_proxies
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else
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Array(custom_proxies) + TRUSTED_PROXIES
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end
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end
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# Since the IP address may not be needed, we store the object here
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# without calculating the IP to keep from slowing down the majority of
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# requests. For those requests that do need to know the IP, the
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# GetIp#calculate_ip method will calculate the memoized client IP address.
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def call(env)
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req = ActionDispatch::Request.new env
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req.remote_ip = GetIp.new(req, check_ip, proxies)
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@app.call(req.env)
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end
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# The GetIp class exists as a way to defer processing of the request data
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# into an actual IP address. If the ActionDispatch::Request#remote_ip method
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# is called, this class will calculate the value and then memoize it.
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class GetIp
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def initialize(req, check_ip, proxies)
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@req = req
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@check_ip = check_ip
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@proxies = proxies
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end
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# Sort through the various IP address headers, looking for the IP most
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# likely to be the address of the actual remote client making this
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# request.
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#
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# REMOTE_ADDR will be correct if the request is made directly against the
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# Ruby process, on e.g. Heroku. When the request is proxied by another
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# server like HAProxy or NGINX, the IP address that made the original
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# request will be put in an X-Forwarded-For header. If there are multiple
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# proxies, that header may contain a list of IPs. Other proxy services
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# set the Client-Ip header instead, so we check that too.
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#
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# As discussed in {this post about Rails IP Spoofing}[http://blog.gingerlime.com/2012/rails-ip-spoofing-vulnerabilities-and-protection/],
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# while the first IP in the list is likely to be the "originating" IP,
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# it could also have been set by the client maliciously.
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#
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# In order to find the first address that is (probably) accurate, we
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# take the list of IPs, remove known and trusted proxies, and then take
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# the last address left, which was presumably set by one of those proxies.
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def calculate_ip
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# Set by the Rack web server, this is a single value.
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remote_addr = ips_from(@req.remote_addr).last
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# Could be a CSV list and/or repeated headers that were concatenated.
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client_ips = ips_from(@req.client_ip).reverse
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forwarded_ips = ips_from(@req.x_forwarded_for).reverse
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# +Client-Ip+ and +X-Forwarded-For+ should not, generally, both be set.
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# If they are both set, it means that either:
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#
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# 1) This request passed through two proxies with incompatible IP header
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# conventions.
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# 2) The client passed one of +Client-Ip+ or +X-Forwarded-For+
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# (whichever the proxy servers weren't using) themselves.
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#
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# Either way, there is no way for us to determine which header is the
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# right one after the fact. Since we have no idea, if we are concerned
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# about IP spoofing we need to give up and explode. (If you're not
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# concerned about IP spoofing you can turn the +ip_spoofing_check+
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# option off.)
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should_check_ip = @check_ip && client_ips.last && forwarded_ips.last
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if should_check_ip && !forwarded_ips.include?(client_ips.last)
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# We don't know which came from the proxy, and which from the user
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raise IpSpoofAttackError, "IP spoofing attack?! " +
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"HTTP_CLIENT_IP=#{@req.client_ip.inspect} " +
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"HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR=#{@req.x_forwarded_for.inspect}"
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end
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# We assume these things about the IP headers:
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#
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# - X-Forwarded-For will be a list of IPs, one per proxy, or blank
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# - Client-Ip is propagated from the outermost proxy, or is blank
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# - REMOTE_ADDR will be the IP that made the request to Rack
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ips = [forwarded_ips, client_ips, remote_addr].flatten.compact
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# If every single IP option is in the trusted list, just return REMOTE_ADDR
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filter_proxies(ips).first || remote_addr
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end
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# Memoizes the value returned by #calculate_ip and returns it for
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# ActionDispatch::Request to use.
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def to_s
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@ip ||= calculate_ip
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end
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protected
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def ips_from(header)
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return [] unless header
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# Split the comma-separated list into an array of strings
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ips = header.strip.split(/[,\s]+/)
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ips.select do |ip|
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begin
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# Only return IPs that are valid according to the IPAddr#new method
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range = IPAddr.new(ip).to_range
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# we want to make sure nobody is sneaking a netmask in
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range.begin == range.end
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rescue ArgumentError
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nil
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end
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end
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end
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def filter_proxies(ips)
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ips.reject do |ip|
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@proxies.any? { |proxy| proxy === ip }
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end
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end
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end
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end
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end
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