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cf3736dce8
This allows applications to safely upgrade to Rails 6.1 without breaking tokens while the deploy is still being rolled out.
498 lines
20 KiB
Ruby
498 lines
20 KiB
Ruby
# frozen_string_literal: true
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require "rack/session/abstract/id"
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require "action_controller/metal/exceptions"
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require "active_support/security_utils"
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module ActionController #:nodoc:
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class InvalidAuthenticityToken < ActionControllerError #:nodoc:
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end
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class InvalidCrossOriginRequest < ActionControllerError #:nodoc:
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end
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# Controller actions are protected from Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks
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# by including a token in the rendered HTML for your application. This token is
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# stored as a random string in the session, to which an attacker does not have
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# access. When a request reaches your application, \Rails verifies the received
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# token with the token in the session. All requests are checked except GET requests
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# as these should be idempotent. Keep in mind that all session-oriented requests
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# are CSRF protected by default, including JavaScript and HTML requests.
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#
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# Since HTML and JavaScript requests are typically made from the browser, we
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# need to ensure to verify request authenticity for the web browser. We can
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# use session-oriented authentication for these types of requests, by using
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# the <tt>protect_from_forgery</tt> method in our controllers.
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#
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# GET requests are not protected since they don't have side effects like writing
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# to the database and don't leak sensitive information. JavaScript requests are
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# an exception: a third-party site can use a <script> tag to reference a JavaScript
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# URL on your site. When your JavaScript response loads on their site, it executes.
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# With carefully crafted JavaScript on their end, sensitive data in your JavaScript
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# response may be extracted. To prevent this, only XmlHttpRequest (known as XHR or
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# Ajax) requests are allowed to make requests for JavaScript responses.
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#
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# Subclasses of <tt>ActionController::Base</tt> are protected by default with the
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# <tt>:exception</tt> strategy, which raises an
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# <tt>ActionController::InvalidAuthenticityToken</tt> error on unverified requests.
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#
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# APIs may want to disable this behavior since they are typically designed to be
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# state-less: that is, the request API client handles the session instead of Rails.
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# One way to achieve this is to use the <tt>:null_session</tt> strategy instead,
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# which allows unverified requests to be handled, but with an empty session:
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#
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# class ApplicationController < ActionController::Base
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# protect_from_forgery with: :null_session
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# end
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#
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# Note that API only applications don't include this module or a session middleware
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# by default, and so don't require CSRF protection to be configured.
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#
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# The token parameter is named <tt>authenticity_token</tt> by default. The name and
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# value of this token must be added to every layout that renders forms by including
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# <tt>csrf_meta_tags</tt> in the HTML +head+.
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#
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# Learn more about CSRF attacks and securing your application in the
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# {Ruby on Rails Security Guide}[https://guides.rubyonrails.org/security.html].
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module RequestForgeryProtection
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extend ActiveSupport::Concern
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include AbstractController::Helpers
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include AbstractController::Callbacks
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included do
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# Sets the token parameter name for RequestForgery. Calling +protect_from_forgery+
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# sets it to <tt>:authenticity_token</tt> by default.
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config_accessor :request_forgery_protection_token
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self.request_forgery_protection_token ||= :authenticity_token
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# Holds the class which implements the request forgery protection.
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config_accessor :forgery_protection_strategy
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self.forgery_protection_strategy = nil
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# Controls whether request forgery protection is turned on or not. Turned off by default only in test mode.
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config_accessor :allow_forgery_protection
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self.allow_forgery_protection = true if allow_forgery_protection.nil?
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# Controls whether a CSRF failure logs a warning. On by default.
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config_accessor :log_warning_on_csrf_failure
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self.log_warning_on_csrf_failure = true
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# Controls whether the Origin header is checked in addition to the CSRF token.
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config_accessor :forgery_protection_origin_check
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self.forgery_protection_origin_check = false
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# Controls whether form-action/method specific CSRF tokens are used.
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config_accessor :per_form_csrf_tokens
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self.per_form_csrf_tokens = false
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# Controls whether forgery protection is enabled by default.
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config_accessor :default_protect_from_forgery
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self.default_protect_from_forgery = false
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# Controls whether URL-safe CSRF tokens are generated.
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config_accessor :urlsafe_csrf_tokens, instance_writer: false
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self.urlsafe_csrf_tokens = false
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helper_method :form_authenticity_token
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helper_method :protect_against_forgery?
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end
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module ClassMethods
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# Turn on request forgery protection. Bear in mind that GET and HEAD requests are not checked.
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#
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# class ApplicationController < ActionController::Base
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# protect_from_forgery
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# end
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#
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# class FooController < ApplicationController
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# protect_from_forgery except: :index
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# end
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#
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# You can disable forgery protection on controller by skipping the verification before_action:
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#
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# skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token
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#
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# Valid Options:
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#
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# * <tt>:only/:except</tt> - Only apply forgery protection to a subset of actions. For example <tt>only: [ :create, :create_all ]</tt>.
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# * <tt>:if/:unless</tt> - Turn off the forgery protection entirely depending on the passed Proc or method reference.
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# * <tt>:prepend</tt> - By default, the verification of the authentication token will be added at the position of the
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# protect_from_forgery call in your application. This means any callbacks added before are run first. This is useful
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# when you want your forgery protection to depend on other callbacks, like authentication methods (Oauth vs Cookie auth).
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#
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# If you need to add verification to the beginning of the callback chain, use <tt>prepend: true</tt>.
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# * <tt>:with</tt> - Set the method to handle unverified request.
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#
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# Valid unverified request handling methods are:
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# * <tt>:exception</tt> - Raises ActionController::InvalidAuthenticityToken exception.
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# * <tt>:reset_session</tt> - Resets the session.
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# * <tt>:null_session</tt> - Provides an empty session during request but doesn't reset it completely. Used as default if <tt>:with</tt> option is not specified.
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def protect_from_forgery(options = {})
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options = options.reverse_merge(prepend: false)
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self.forgery_protection_strategy = protection_method_class(options[:with] || :null_session)
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self.request_forgery_protection_token ||= :authenticity_token
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before_action :verify_authenticity_token, options
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append_after_action :verify_same_origin_request
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end
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# Turn off request forgery protection. This is a wrapper for:
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#
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# skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token
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#
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# See +skip_before_action+ for allowed options.
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def skip_forgery_protection(options = {})
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skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token, options
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end
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private
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def protection_method_class(name)
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ActionController::RequestForgeryProtection::ProtectionMethods.const_get(name.to_s.classify)
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rescue NameError
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raise ArgumentError, "Invalid request forgery protection method, use :null_session, :exception, or :reset_session"
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end
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end
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module ProtectionMethods
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class NullSession
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def initialize(controller)
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@controller = controller
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end
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# This is the method that defines the application behavior when a request is found to be unverified.
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def handle_unverified_request
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request = @controller.request
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request.session = NullSessionHash.new(request)
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request.flash = nil
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request.session_options = { skip: true }
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request.cookie_jar = NullCookieJar.build(request, {})
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end
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private
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class NullSessionHash < Rack::Session::Abstract::SessionHash #:nodoc:
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def initialize(req)
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super(nil, req)
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@data = {}
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@loaded = true
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end
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# no-op
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def destroy; end
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def exists?
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true
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end
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end
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class NullCookieJar < ActionDispatch::Cookies::CookieJar #:nodoc:
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def write(*)
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# nothing
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end
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end
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end
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class ResetSession
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def initialize(controller)
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@controller = controller
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end
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def handle_unverified_request
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@controller.reset_session
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end
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end
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class Exception
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def initialize(controller)
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@controller = controller
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end
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def handle_unverified_request
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raise ActionController::InvalidAuthenticityToken
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end
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end
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end
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private
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# The actual before_action that is used to verify the CSRF token.
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# Don't override this directly. Provide your own forgery protection
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# strategy instead. If you override, you'll disable same-origin
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# <tt><script></tt> verification.
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#
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# Lean on the protect_from_forgery declaration to mark which actions are
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# due for same-origin request verification. If protect_from_forgery is
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# enabled on an action, this before_action flags its after_action to
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# verify that JavaScript responses are for XHR requests, ensuring they
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# follow the browser's same-origin policy.
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def verify_authenticity_token # :doc:
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mark_for_same_origin_verification!
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if !verified_request?
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if logger && log_warning_on_csrf_failure
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if valid_request_origin?
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logger.warn "Can't verify CSRF token authenticity."
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else
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logger.warn "HTTP Origin header (#{request.origin}) didn't match request.base_url (#{request.base_url})"
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end
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end
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handle_unverified_request
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end
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end
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def handle_unverified_request # :doc:
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forgery_protection_strategy.new(self).handle_unverified_request
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end
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#:nodoc:
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CROSS_ORIGIN_JAVASCRIPT_WARNING = "Security warning: an embedded " \
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"<script> tag on another site requested protected JavaScript. " \
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"If you know what you're doing, go ahead and disable forgery " \
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"protection on this action to permit cross-origin JavaScript embedding."
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private_constant :CROSS_ORIGIN_JAVASCRIPT_WARNING
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# :startdoc:
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# If +verify_authenticity_token+ was run (indicating that we have
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# forgery protection enabled for this request) then also verify that
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# we aren't serving an unauthorized cross-origin response.
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def verify_same_origin_request # :doc:
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if marked_for_same_origin_verification? && non_xhr_javascript_response?
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if logger && log_warning_on_csrf_failure
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logger.warn CROSS_ORIGIN_JAVASCRIPT_WARNING
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end
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raise ActionController::InvalidCrossOriginRequest, CROSS_ORIGIN_JAVASCRIPT_WARNING
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end
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end
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# GET requests are checked for cross-origin JavaScript after rendering.
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def mark_for_same_origin_verification! # :doc:
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@marked_for_same_origin_verification = request.get?
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end
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# If the +verify_authenticity_token+ before_action ran, verify that
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# JavaScript responses are only served to same-origin GET requests.
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def marked_for_same_origin_verification? # :doc:
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@marked_for_same_origin_verification ||= false
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end
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# Check for cross-origin JavaScript responses.
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def non_xhr_javascript_response? # :doc:
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%r(\A(?:text|application)/javascript).match?(media_type) && !request.xhr?
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end
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AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH = 32
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# Returns true or false if a request is verified. Checks:
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#
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# * Is it a GET or HEAD request? GETs should be safe and idempotent
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# * Does the form_authenticity_token match the given token value from the params?
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# * Does the X-CSRF-Token header match the form_authenticity_token?
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def verified_request? # :doc:
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!protect_against_forgery? || request.get? || request.head? ||
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(valid_request_origin? && any_authenticity_token_valid?)
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end
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# Checks if any of the authenticity tokens from the request are valid.
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def any_authenticity_token_valid? # :doc:
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request_authenticity_tokens.any? do |token|
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valid_authenticity_token?(session, token)
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end
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end
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# Possible authenticity tokens sent in the request.
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def request_authenticity_tokens # :doc:
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[form_authenticity_param, request.x_csrf_token]
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end
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# Sets the token value for the current session.
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def form_authenticity_token(form_options: {})
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masked_authenticity_token(session, form_options: form_options)
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end
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# Creates a masked version of the authenticity token that varies
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# on each request. The masking is used to mitigate SSL attacks
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# like BREACH.
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def masked_authenticity_token(session, form_options: {}) # :doc:
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action, method = form_options.values_at(:action, :method)
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raw_token = if per_form_csrf_tokens && action && method
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action_path = normalize_action_path(action)
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per_form_csrf_token(session, action_path, method)
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else
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global_csrf_token(session)
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end
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mask_token(raw_token)
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end
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# Checks the client's masked token to see if it matches the
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# session token. Essentially the inverse of
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# +masked_authenticity_token+.
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def valid_authenticity_token?(session, encoded_masked_token) # :doc:
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if encoded_masked_token.nil? || encoded_masked_token.empty? || !encoded_masked_token.is_a?(String)
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return false
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end
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begin
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masked_token = decode_csrf_token(encoded_masked_token)
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rescue ArgumentError # encoded_masked_token is invalid Base64
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return false
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end
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# See if it's actually a masked token or not. In order to
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# deploy this code, we should be able to handle any unmasked
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# tokens that we've issued without error.
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if masked_token.length == AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH
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# This is actually an unmasked token. This is expected if
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# you have just upgraded to masked tokens, but should stop
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# happening shortly after installing this gem.
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compare_with_real_token masked_token, session
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elsif masked_token.length == AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH * 2
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csrf_token = unmask_token(masked_token)
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compare_with_global_token(csrf_token, session) ||
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compare_with_real_token(csrf_token, session) ||
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valid_per_form_csrf_token?(csrf_token, session)
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else
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false # Token is malformed.
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end
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end
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def unmask_token(masked_token) # :doc:
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# Split the token into the one-time pad and the encrypted
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# value and decrypt it.
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one_time_pad = masked_token[0...AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH]
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encrypted_csrf_token = masked_token[AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH..-1]
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xor_byte_strings(one_time_pad, encrypted_csrf_token)
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end
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def mask_token(raw_token) # :doc:
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one_time_pad = SecureRandom.random_bytes(AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH)
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encrypted_csrf_token = xor_byte_strings(one_time_pad, raw_token)
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masked_token = one_time_pad + encrypted_csrf_token
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encode_csrf_token(masked_token)
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end
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def compare_with_real_token(token, session) # :doc:
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ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.fixed_length_secure_compare(token, real_csrf_token(session))
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end
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def compare_with_global_token(token, session) # :doc:
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ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.fixed_length_secure_compare(token, global_csrf_token(session))
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end
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def valid_per_form_csrf_token?(token, session) # :doc:
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if per_form_csrf_tokens
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correct_token = per_form_csrf_token(
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session,
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request.path.chomp("/"),
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request.request_method
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)
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ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.fixed_length_secure_compare(token, correct_token)
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else
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false
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end
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end
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def real_csrf_token(session) # :doc:
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session[:_csrf_token] ||= generate_csrf_token
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decode_csrf_token(session[:_csrf_token])
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end
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def per_form_csrf_token(session, action_path, method) # :doc:
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csrf_token_hmac(session, [action_path, method.downcase].join("#"))
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end
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GLOBAL_CSRF_TOKEN_IDENTIFIER = "!real_csrf_token"
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private_constant :GLOBAL_CSRF_TOKEN_IDENTIFIER
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def global_csrf_token(session) # :doc:
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csrf_token_hmac(session, GLOBAL_CSRF_TOKEN_IDENTIFIER)
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end
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def csrf_token_hmac(session, identifier) # :doc:
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OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(
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OpenSSL::Digest::SHA256.new,
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real_csrf_token(session),
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identifier
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)
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end
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def xor_byte_strings(s1, s2) # :doc:
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s2 = s2.dup
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size = s1.bytesize
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i = 0
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while i < size
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s2.setbyte(i, s1.getbyte(i) ^ s2.getbyte(i))
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i += 1
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end
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s2
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end
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# The form's authenticity parameter. Override to provide your own.
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def form_authenticity_param # :doc:
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params[request_forgery_protection_token]
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end
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# Checks if the controller allows forgery protection.
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def protect_against_forgery? # :doc:
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allow_forgery_protection
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end
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NULL_ORIGIN_MESSAGE = <<~MSG
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The browser returned a 'null' origin for a request with origin-based forgery protection turned on. This usually
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means you have the 'no-referrer' Referrer-Policy header enabled, or that the request came from a site that
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refused to give its origin. This makes it impossible for Rails to verify the source of the requests. Likely the
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best solution is to change your referrer policy to something less strict like same-origin or strict-origin.
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If you cannot change the referrer policy, you can disable origin checking with the
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Rails.application.config.action_controller.forgery_protection_origin_check setting.
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MSG
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# Checks if the request originated from the same origin by looking at the
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# Origin header.
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def valid_request_origin? # :doc:
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if forgery_protection_origin_check
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# We accept blank origin headers because some user agents don't send it.
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raise InvalidAuthenticityToken, NULL_ORIGIN_MESSAGE if request.origin == "null"
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request.origin.nil? || request.origin == request.base_url
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else
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true
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end
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end
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def normalize_action_path(action_path) # :doc:
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uri = URI.parse(action_path)
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uri.path.chomp("/")
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end
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def generate_csrf_token # :nodoc:
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if urlsafe_csrf_tokens
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SecureRandom.urlsafe_base64(AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH, padding: false)
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else
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SecureRandom.base64(AUTHENTICITY_TOKEN_LENGTH)
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end
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end
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def encode_csrf_token(csrf_token) # :nodoc:
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if urlsafe_csrf_tokens
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Base64.urlsafe_encode64(csrf_token, padding: false)
|
|
else
|
|
Base64.strict_encode64(csrf_token)
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
|
|
def decode_csrf_token(encoded_csrf_token) # :nodoc:
|
|
if urlsafe_csrf_tokens
|
|
Base64.urlsafe_decode64(encoded_csrf_token)
|
|
else
|
|
begin
|
|
Base64.strict_decode64(encoded_csrf_token)
|
|
rescue ArgumentError
|
|
Base64.urlsafe_decode64(encoded_csrf_token)
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
end
|
|
end
|