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* ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb: stricter hostname verification

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following RFC 6125. with the patch provided by Tony Arcieri and
  Hiroshi Nakamura [ruby-core:61545] [Bug #9644]
* test/openssl/test_ssl.rb: add tests for above.

git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@50292 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
This commit is contained in:
nagachika 2015-04-13 13:09:18 +00:00
parent cef3b0a890
commit 599bfa7233
3 changed files with 215 additions and 4 deletions
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7
ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
Mon Apr 13 21:20:20 2015 CHIKANAGA Tomoyuki <nagachika@ruby-lang.org>
* ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb: stricter hostname verification
following RFC 6125. with the patch provided by Tony Arcieri and
Hiroshi Nakamura [ruby-core:61545] [Bug #9644]
* test/openssl/test_ssl.rb: add tests for above.
Sun Apr 12 18:40:04 2015 SHIBATA Hiroshi <shibata.hiroshi@gmail.com>
* ext/json/json.gemspec: bump version to 1.8.2.

62
ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb
View file

@ -143,8 +143,7 @@ module OpenSSL
case san.tag
when 2 # dNSName in GeneralName (RFC5280)
should_verify_common_name = false
reg = Regexp.escape(san.value).gsub(/\\\*/, "[^.]+")
return true if /\A#{reg}\z/i =~ hostname
return true if verify_hostname(hostname, san.value)
when 7 # iPAddress in GeneralName (RFC5280)
should_verify_common_name = false
# follows GENERAL_NAME_print() in x509v3/v3_alt.c
@ -159,8 +158,7 @@ module OpenSSL
if should_verify_common_name
cert.subject.to_a.each{|oid, value|
if oid == "CN"
reg = Regexp.escape(value).gsub(/\\\*/, "[^.]+")
return true if /\A#{reg}\z/i =~ hostname
return true if verify_hostname(hostname, value)
end
}
end
@ -168,11 +166,67 @@ module OpenSSL
end
module_function :verify_certificate_identity
def verify_hostname(hostname, san) # :nodoc:
# RFC 5280, IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters
return false unless san.ascii_only?
return false unless hostname.ascii_only?
# See RFC 6125, section 6.4.1
# Matching is case-insensitive.
san_parts = san.downcase.split(".")
# TODO: this behavior should probably be more strict
return san == hostname if san_parts.size < 2
# Matching is case-insensitive.
host_parts = hostname.downcase.split(".")
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 2.
# If the wildcard character is the only character of the left-most
# label in the presented identifier, the client SHOULD NOT compare
# against anything but the left-most label of the reference
# identifier (e.g., *.example.com would match foo.example.com but
# not bar.foo.example.com or example.com).
return false unless san_parts.size == host_parts.size
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
# The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in
# which the wildcard character comprises a label other than the
# left-most label (e.g., do not match bar.*.example.net).
return false unless verify_wildcard(host_parts.shift, san_parts.shift)
san_parts.join(".") == host_parts.join(".")
end
module_function :verify_hostname
def verify_wildcard(domain_component, san_component) # :nodoc:
parts = san_component.split("*", -1)
return false if parts.size > 2
return san_component == domain_component if parts.size == 1
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
# The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
# where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
# U-label of an internationalized domain name.
return false if domain_component.start_with?("xn--") && san_component != "*"
parts[0].length + parts[1].length < domain_component.length &&
domain_component.start_with?(parts[0]) &&
domain_component.end_with?(parts[1])
end
module_function :verify_wildcard
class SSLSocket
include Buffering
include SocketForwarder
include Nonblock
##
# Perform hostname verification after an SSL connection is established
#
# This method MUST be called after calling #connect to ensure that the
# hostname of a remote peer has been verified.
def post_connection_check(hostname)
unless OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(peer_cert, hostname)
raise SSLError, "hostname \"#{hostname}\" does not match the server certificate"

150
test/openssl/test_ssl.rb
View file

@ -426,6 +426,156 @@ class OpenSSL::TestSSL < OpenSSL::SSLTestCase
end
end
def test_verify_hostname
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_hostname("www.example.com", "*.example.com"))
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_hostname("www.subdomain.example.com", "*.example.com"))
end
def test_verify_wildcard
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("foo", "x*"))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("foo", "foo"))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("foo", "f*"))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("foo", "*"))
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("abc*bcd", "abcd"))
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("xn--qdk4b9b", "x*"))
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("xn--qdk4b9b", "*--qdk4b9b"))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("xn--qdk4b9b", "xn--qdk4b9b"))
end
# Comments in this test is excerpted from http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#page-27
def test_post_connection_check_wildcard_san
# case-insensitive ASCII comparison
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.1
#
# "..matching of the reference identifier against the presented identifier
# is performed by comparing the set of domain name labels using a
# case-insensitive ASCII comparison, as clarified by [DNS-CASE] (e.g.,
# "WWW.Example.Com" would be lower-cased to "www.example.com" for
# comparison purposes)
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.example.com'), 'www.example.com'))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.Example.COM'), 'www.example.com'))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.example.com'), 'WWW.Example.COM'))
# 1. The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in
# which the wildcard character comprises a label other than the
# left-most label (e.g., do not match bar.*.example.net).
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:www.*.com'), 'www.example.com'))
# 2. If the wildcard character is the only character of the left-most
# label in the presented identifier, the client SHOULD NOT compare
# against anything but the left-most label of the reference
# identifier (e.g., *.example.com would match foo.example.com but
# not bar.foo.example.com or example.com).
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.example.com'), 'foo.example.com'))
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.example.com'), 'bar.foo.example.com'))
# 3. The client MAY match a presented identifier in which the wildcard
# character is not the only character of the label (e.g.,
# baz*.example.net and *baz.example.net and b*z.example.net would
# be taken to match baz1.example.net and foobaz.example.net and
# buzz.example.net, respectively). ...
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:baz*.example.com'), 'baz1.example.com'))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:*baz.example.com'), 'foobaz.example.com'))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:b*z.example.com'), 'buzz.example.com'))
# Section 6.4.3 of RFC6125 states that client should NOT match identifier
# where wildcard is other than left-most label.
#
# Also implicitly mentions the wildcard character only in singular form,
# and discourages matching against more than one wildcard.
#
# See RFC 6125, section 7.2, subitem 2.
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:*b*.example.com'), 'abc.example.com'))
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:*b*.example.com'), 'ab.example.com'))
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:*b*.example.com'), 'bc.example.com'))
# ... However, the client SHOULD NOT
# attempt to match a presented identifier where the wildcard
# character is embedded within an A-label or U-label [IDNA-DEFS] of
# an internationalized domain name [IDNA-PROTO].
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:xn*.example.com'), 'xn1ca.example.com'))
# part of A-label
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:xn--*.example.com'), 'xn--1ca.example.com'))
# part of U-label
# dNSName in RFC5280 is an IA5String so U-label should NOT be allowed
# regardless of wildcard.
#
# See Section 7.2 of RFC 5280:
# IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters.
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_san('DNS:á*.example.com'), 'á1.example.com'))
end
def test_post_connection_check_wildcard_cn
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('*.example.com'), 'www.example.com'))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('*.Example.COM'), 'www.example.com'))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('*.example.com'), 'WWW.Example.COM'))
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('www.*.com'), 'www.example.com'))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('*.example.com'), 'foo.example.com'))
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('*.example.com'), 'bar.foo.example.com'))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('baz*.example.com'), 'baz1.example.com'))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('*baz.example.com'), 'foobaz.example.com'))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('b*z.example.com'), 'buzz.example.com'))
# Section 6.4.3 of RFC6125 states that client should NOT match identifier
# where wildcard is other than left-most label.
#
# Also implicitly mentions the wildcard character only in singular form,
# and discourages matching against more than one wildcard.
#
# See RFC 6125, section 7.2, subitem 2.
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('*b*.example.com'), 'abc.example.com'))
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('*b*.example.com'), 'ab.example.com'))
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('*b*.example.com'), 'bc.example.com'))
assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('xn*.example.com'), 'xn1ca.example.com'))
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('xn--*.example.com'), 'xn--1ca.example.com'))
# part of U-label
# Subject in RFC5280 states case-insensitive ASCII comparison.
#
# See Section 7.2 of RFC 5280:
# IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters.
assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
create_cert_with_name('á*.example.com'), 'á1.example.com'))
end
def create_cert_with_san(san)
ef = OpenSSL::X509::ExtensionFactory.new
cert = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new
cert.subject = OpenSSL::X509::Name.parse("/DC=some/DC=site/CN=Some Site")
ext = ef.create_ext('subjectAltName', san)
cert.add_extension(ext)
cert
end
def create_cert_with_name(name)
cert = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new
cert.subject = OpenSSL::X509::Name.new([['DC', 'some'], ['DC', 'site'], ['CN', name]])
cert
end
# Create NULL byte SAN certificate
def create_null_byte_SAN_certificate(critical = false)
ef = OpenSSL::X509::ExtensionFactory.new