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* doc/security.rdoc: add regex, eval and drb sections
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@39072 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
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@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
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Tue Feb 5 18:48:00 2013 Charlie Somerville <charlie@charliesomerville.com>
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* doc/security.rdoc: add regex, eval and drb sections
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Tue Feb 5 17:24:02 2013 Eric Hodel <drbrain@segment7.net>
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* lib/rdoc/servlet.rb: Fixed root search paths, filesystem paths
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@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ capable of returning 'primitive' types such as strings, arrays, hashes, numbers
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and nil. If you need to deserialize other classes, you should handle this
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manually. Never deserialize to a user specified class.
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== +YAML+
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== YAML
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+YAML+ is a popular human readable data serialization format used by many Ruby
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YAML is a popular human readable data serialization format used by many Ruby
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programs for configuration and database persistance of Ruby object trees.
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Similar to +Marshal+, it is able to deserialize into arbitrary Ruby classes.
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@ -51,8 +51,28 @@ deserialized:
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!ruby/object:ERB
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src: puts `uname`
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Because of this, many of the security considerations applying to +Marshal+ are
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also applicable to +YAML+. Do not use +YAML+ to deserialize untrusted data.
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Because of this, many of the security considerations applying to Marshal are
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also applicable to YAML. Do not use YAML to deserialize untrusted data.
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== CSV
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Never use +CSV.load+ to parse untrusted CSV data. +CSV.load+ shares many of the
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same issues as YAML and Marshal in that it will deserialize to arbitrary
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classes:
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class,ERB
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@src
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puts `uname`
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However, CSV's +load+ method is significantly more dangerous than Marshal and
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YAML as it will call arbitrary methods with attacker controlled arguments in
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some cases:
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class,Object
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eval
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puts `uname`
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If you need to parse user supplied CSV data, use +CSV.parse+ instead.
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== Symbols
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@ -77,6 +97,30 @@ potential as direct conversion through +to_sym+/+intern+.
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The workaround to this is simple - don't convert user input to symbols. You
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should attempt to leave user input in string form instead.
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== Regular expressions
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Ruby's regular expression syntax has some minor differences when compared to
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other languages. In Ruby, the <code>^</code> and <code>$</code> anchors do not
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refer to the beginning and end of the string, rather the beginning and end of a
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*line*.
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This means that if you're using a regular expression like
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<code>/^[a-z]+$/</code> to restrict a string to only letters, an attacker can
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bypass this check by passing a string containing a letter, then a newline, then
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any string of their choosing.
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If you want to match the beginning and end of the entire string in Ruby, use
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the anchors +\A+ and +\z+.
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== +eval+
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Never pass untrusted or user controlled input to +eval+.
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Unless you are implementing a REPL like +irb+ or +pry+, +eval+ is almost
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certainly not what you want. Do not attempt to filter user input before passing
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it to +eval+ - this approach is fraught with danger and will most likely open
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your application up to a serious remote code execution vulnerability.
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== +send+
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'Global functions' in Ruby (+puts+, +exit+, etc.) are actually private instance
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@ -95,7 +139,8 @@ Doing so can introduce a denial of service vulnerability:
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If an attacker can control the first two arguments to +send+, remote code
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execution is possible:
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foo.send(params[:a], params[:b]) # params is { :a => "eval", :b => "...ruby code to be executed..." }
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# params is { :a => "eval", :b => "...ruby code to be executed..." }
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foo.send(params[:a], params[:b])
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When dispatching a method call based on user input, carefully verify that the
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method name. If possible, check it against a whitelist of safe method names.
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@ -104,3 +149,12 @@ Note that the use of +public_send+ is also dangerous, as +send+ itself is
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public:
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1.public_send("send", "eval", "...ruby code to be executed...")
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== DRb
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As DRb allows remote clients to invoke arbitrary methods, it is not suitable to
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expose to untrusted clients.
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When using DRb, try to avoid exposing it over the network if possible. If this
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isn't possible and you need to expose DRb to the world, you *must* configure an
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appropriate security policy with <code>DRb::ACL</code>.
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