gitlab-org--gitlab-foss/lib/gitlab/git_access.rb

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# Check a user's access to perform a git action. All public methods in this
# class return an instance of `GitlabAccessStatus`
module Gitlab
class GitAccess
UnauthorizedError = Class.new(StandardError)
ERROR_MESSAGES = {
upload: 'You are not allowed to upload code for this project.',
download: 'You are not allowed to download code from this project.',
deploy_key_upload:
'This deploy key does not have write access to this project.',
no_repo: 'A repository for this project does not exist yet.'
}
DOWNLOAD_COMMANDS = %w{ git-upload-pack git-upload-archive }
PUSH_COMMANDS = %w{ git-receive-pack }
ALL_COMMANDS = DOWNLOAD_COMMANDS + PUSH_COMMANDS
attr_reader :actor, :project, :protocol, :user_access, :authentication_abilities
Accept environment variables from the `pre-receive` script. 1. Starting version 2.11, git changed the way the pre-receive flow works. - Previously, the new potential objects would be added to the main repo. If the pre-receive passes, the new objects stay in the repo but are linked up. If the pre-receive fails, the new objects stay orphaned in the repo, and are cleaned up during the next `git gc`. - In 2.11, the new potential objects are added to a temporary "alternate object directory", that git creates for this purpose. If the pre-receive passes, the objects from the alternate object directory are migrated to the main repo. If the pre-receive fails the alternate object directory is simply deleted. 2. In our workflow, the pre-recieve script (in `gitlab-shell) calls the `/allowed` endpoint, which calls out directly to git to perform various checks. These direct calls to git do _not_ have the necessary environment variables set which allow access to the "alternate object directory" (explained above). Therefore these calls to git are not able to access any of the new potential objects to be added during this push. 3. We fix this by accepting the relevant environment variables (GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES, GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY) on the `/allowed` endpoint, and then include these environment variables while calling out to git. 4. This commit includes (whitelisted) these environment variables while making the "force push" check. A `Gitlab::Git::RevList` module is extracted to prevent `ForcePush` from being littered with these checks.
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def initialize(actor, project, protocol, authentication_abilities:, env: {})
@actor = actor
@project = project
@protocol = protocol
@authentication_abilities = authentication_abilities
@user_access = UserAccess.new(user, project: project)
Accept environment variables from the `pre-receive` script. 1. Starting version 2.11, git changed the way the pre-receive flow works. - Previously, the new potential objects would be added to the main repo. If the pre-receive passes, the new objects stay in the repo but are linked up. If the pre-receive fails, the new objects stay orphaned in the repo, and are cleaned up during the next `git gc`. - In 2.11, the new potential objects are added to a temporary "alternate object directory", that git creates for this purpose. If the pre-receive passes, the objects from the alternate object directory are migrated to the main repo. If the pre-receive fails the alternate object directory is simply deleted. 2. In our workflow, the pre-recieve script (in `gitlab-shell) calls the `/allowed` endpoint, which calls out directly to git to perform various checks. These direct calls to git do _not_ have the necessary environment variables set which allow access to the "alternate object directory" (explained above). Therefore these calls to git are not able to access any of the new potential objects to be added during this push. 3. We fix this by accepting the relevant environment variables (GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES, GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY) on the `/allowed` endpoint, and then include these environment variables while calling out to git. 4. This commit includes (whitelisted) these environment variables while making the "force push" check. A `Gitlab::Git::RevList` module is extracted to prevent `ForcePush` from being littered with these checks.
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@env = env
end
def check(cmd, changes)
check_protocol!
check_active_user!
check_project_accessibility!
check_command_existence!(cmd)
check_repository_existence!
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case cmd
when *DOWNLOAD_COMMANDS
check_download_access!
when *PUSH_COMMANDS
check_push_access!(changes)
end
build_status_object(true)
rescue UnauthorizedError => ex
build_status_object(false, ex.message)
end
def guest_can_download_code?
Guest.can?(:download_code, project)
end
def user_can_download_code?
authentication_abilities.include?(:download_code) && user_access.can_do_action?(:download_code)
end
def build_can_download_code?
authentication_abilities.include?(:build_download_code) && user_access.can_do_action?(:build_download_code)
end
def protocol_allowed?
Gitlab::ProtocolAccess.allowed?(protocol)
end
private
def check_protocol!
unless protocol_allowed?
raise UnauthorizedError, "Git access over #{protocol.upcase} is not allowed"
end
end
def check_active_user!
return if deploy_key?
if user && !user_access.allowed?
raise UnauthorizedError, "Your account has been blocked."
end
end
def check_project_accessibility!
if project.blank? || !can_read_project?
raise UnauthorizedError, 'The project you were looking for could not be found.'
end
end
def check_command_existence!(cmd)
unless ALL_COMMANDS.include?(cmd)
raise UnauthorizedError, "The command you're trying to execute is not allowed."
end
end
def check_repository_existence!
unless project.repository.exists?
raise UnauthorizedError, ERROR_MESSAGES[:no_repo]
end
end
def check_download_access!
return if deploy_key?
passed = user_can_download_code? ||
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build_can_download_code? ||
guest_can_download_code?
unless passed
raise UnauthorizedError, ERROR_MESSAGES[:download]
end
end
def check_push_access!(changes)
if deploy_key
check_deploy_key_push_access!
elsif user
check_user_push_access!
else
raise UnauthorizedError, ERROR_MESSAGES[:upload]
end
return if changes.blank? # Allow access.
check_change_access!(changes)
end
def check_user_push_access!
unless authentication_abilities.include?(:push_code)
raise UnauthorizedError, ERROR_MESSAGES[:upload]
end
end
def check_deploy_key_push_access!
unless deploy_key.can_push_to?(project)
raise UnauthorizedError, ERROR_MESSAGES[:deploy_key_upload]
end
end
def check_change_access!(changes)
changes_list = Gitlab::ChangesList.new(changes)
# Iterate over all changes to find if user allowed all of them to be applied
changes_list.each do |change|
status = check_single_change_access(change)
unless status.allowed?
# If user does not have access to make at least one change - cancel all push
raise UnauthorizedError, status.message
end
end
end
def check_single_change_access(change)
Checks::ChangeAccess.new(
change,
user_access: user_access,
project: project,
env: @env,
skip_authorization: deploy_key?).exec
end
def matching_merge_request?(newrev, branch_name)
Checks::MatchingMergeRequest.new(newrev, branch_name, project).match?
end
def deploy_key
actor if deploy_key?
end
def deploy_key?
actor.is_a?(DeployKey)
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end
def can_read_project?
if deploy_key
deploy_key.has_access_to?(project)
elsif user
user.can?(:read_project, project)
end || Guest.can?(:read_project, project)
end
protected
def user
return @user if defined?(@user)
@user =
case actor
when User
actor
when DeployKey
nil
when Key
actor.user
end
end
def build_status_object(status, message = '')
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Gitlab::GitAccessStatus.new(status, message)
end
end
end