2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
module Gitlab
module Checks
class ChangeAccess
2017-03-13 07:31:27 -04:00
# protocol is currently used only in EE
attr_reader :user_access , :project , :skip_authorization , :protocol
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
2016-11-17 14:48:23 -05:00
def initialize (
2017-03-13 07:31:27 -04:00
change , user_access : , project : , env : { } , skip_authorization : false ,
protocol :
)
2016-07-28 00:04:57 -04:00
@oldrev , @newrev , @ref = change . values_at ( :oldrev , :newrev , :ref )
@branch_name = Gitlab :: Git . branch_name ( @ref )
2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
@tag_name = Gitlab :: Git . tag_name ( @ref )
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
@user_access = user_access
@project = project
Accept environment variables from the `pre-receive` script.
1. Starting version 2.11, git changed the way the pre-receive flow works.
- Previously, the new potential objects would be added to the main repo. If the
pre-receive passes, the new objects stay in the repo but are linked up. If
the pre-receive fails, the new objects stay orphaned in the repo, and are
cleaned up during the next `git gc`.
- In 2.11, the new potential objects are added to a temporary "alternate object
directory", that git creates for this purpose. If the pre-receive passes, the
objects from the alternate object directory are migrated to the main repo. If
the pre-receive fails the alternate object directory is simply deleted.
2. In our workflow, the pre-recieve script (in `gitlab-shell) calls the
`/allowed` endpoint, which calls out directly to git to perform
various checks. These direct calls to git do _not_ have the necessary
environment variables set which allow access to the "alternate object
directory" (explained above). Therefore these calls to git are not able to
access any of the new potential objects to be added during this push.
3. We fix this by accepting the relevant environment variables
(GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES, GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY) on the
`/allowed` endpoint, and then include these environment variables while
calling out to git.
4. This commit includes (whitelisted) these environment variables while making
the "force push" check. A `Gitlab::Git::RevList` module is extracted to
prevent `ForcePush` from being littered with these checks.
2016-12-07 02:55:49 -05:00
@env = env
2016-11-17 14:48:23 -05:00
@skip_authorization = skip_authorization
2017-03-13 07:31:27 -04:00
@protocol = protocol
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
end
def exec
2016-08-12 18:27:42 -04:00
error = push_checks || tag_checks || protected_branch_checks
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
if error
GitAccessStatus . new ( false , error )
else
GitAccessStatus . new ( true )
end
end
protected
def protected_branch_checks
2016-11-17 14:48:23 -05:00
return if skip_authorization
2016-09-13 05:43:41 -04:00
return unless @branch_name
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
return unless project . protected_branch? ( @branch_name )
2017-01-12 17:37:14 -05:00
if forced_push?
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
return " You are not allowed to force push code to a protected branch on this project. "
2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
elsif blank_ref?
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
return " You are not allowed to delete protected branches from this project. "
end
if matching_merge_request?
if user_access . can_merge_to_branch? ( @branch_name ) || user_access . can_push_to_branch? ( @branch_name )
return
else
" You are not allowed to merge code into protected branches on this project. "
end
else
if user_access . can_push_to_branch? ( @branch_name )
return
else
" You are not allowed to push code to protected branches on this project. "
end
end
end
def tag_checks
2016-11-17 14:48:23 -05:00
return if skip_authorization
2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
return unless @tag_name
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
if tag_exists? && user_access . cannot_do_action? ( :admin_project )
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
" You are not allowed to change existing tags on this project. "
end
2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
protected_tag_checks
end
def protected_tag_checks
return unless tag_protected?
if forced_push?
return " You are not allowed to force push protected tags. " #TODO: Wording, 'not allowed to update proteted tags'?
end
if Gitlab :: Git . blank_ref? ( @newrev )
return " You are not allowed to delete protected tags. " #TODO: Wording, do these need to mention 'you' if the rule applies to everyone
end
if ! user_access . can_push_tag? ( @tag_name )
return " You are not allowed to create protected tags on this project. " #TODO: Wording, it is a specific tag which you don't have access too, not all protected tags which might have different levels
end
end
def tag_protected?
project . protected_tag? ( @tag_name )
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
end
def push_checks
2016-11-17 14:48:23 -05:00
return if skip_authorization
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
if user_access . cannot_do_action? ( :push_code )
" You are not allowed to push code to this project. "
end
end
private
2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
def tag_exists?
project . repository . tag_exists? ( @tag_name )
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
end
def forced_push?
Accept environment variables from the `pre-receive` script.
1. Starting version 2.11, git changed the way the pre-receive flow works.
- Previously, the new potential objects would be added to the main repo. If the
pre-receive passes, the new objects stay in the repo but are linked up. If
the pre-receive fails, the new objects stay orphaned in the repo, and are
cleaned up during the next `git gc`.
- In 2.11, the new potential objects are added to a temporary "alternate object
directory", that git creates for this purpose. If the pre-receive passes, the
objects from the alternate object directory are migrated to the main repo. If
the pre-receive fails the alternate object directory is simply deleted.
2. In our workflow, the pre-recieve script (in `gitlab-shell) calls the
`/allowed` endpoint, which calls out directly to git to perform
various checks. These direct calls to git do _not_ have the necessary
environment variables set which allow access to the "alternate object
directory" (explained above). Therefore these calls to git are not able to
access any of the new potential objects to be added during this push.
3. We fix this by accepting the relevant environment variables
(GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES, GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY) on the
`/allowed` endpoint, and then include these environment variables while
calling out to git.
4. This commit includes (whitelisted) these environment variables while making
the "force push" check. A `Gitlab::Git::RevList` module is extracted to
prevent `ForcePush` from being littered with these checks.
2016-12-07 02:55:49 -05:00
Gitlab :: Checks :: ForcePush . force_push? ( @project , @oldrev , @newrev , env : @env )
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
end
2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
def blank_ref?
Gitlab :: Git . blank_ref? ( @newrev )
end
2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
def matching_merge_request?
Checks :: MatchingMergeRequest . new ( @newrev , @branch_name , @project ) . match?
end
end
end
end