Merge branch 'user-argument-2/upstream' into 'master'

Add support for ssh certificates (internal API)

Closes #34572

See merge request gitlab-org/gitlab-ce!19911
This commit is contained in:
Nick Thomas 2018-08-01 11:12:13 +00:00
commit 79405774b2
7 changed files with 280 additions and 24 deletions

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@ -1 +1 @@
7.2.0
8.0.0

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---
title: Add support for SSH certificate authentication
merge_request: 19911
author: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
type: added

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@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
# Consider using SSH certificates instead of, or in addition to this
This document describes a drop-in replacement for the
`authorized_keys` file for normal (non-deploy key) users. Consider
using [ssh certificates](ssh_certificates.md), they are even faster,
but are not is not a drop-in replacement.
# Fast lookup of authorized SSH keys in the database
> [Introduced](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ee/issues/1631) in

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@ -14,4 +14,7 @@ that to prioritize important jobs.
- [Sidekiq MemoryKiller](sidekiq_memory_killer.md): Configure Sidekiq MemoryKiller
to restart Sidekiq.
- [Unicorn](unicorn.md): Understand Unicorn and unicorn-worker-killer.
- [Speed up SSH operations](fast_ssh_key_lookup.md): Authorize SSH users via a fast, indexed lookup to the GitLab database.
- Speed up SSH operations by [Authorizing SSH users via a fast,
indexed lookup to the GitLab database](fast_ssh_key_lookup.md), and/or
by [doing away with user SSH keys stored on GitLab entirely in favor
of SSH certificates](ssh_certificates.md).

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@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
# User lookup via OpenSSH's AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
> [Available in](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce/merge_requests/19911) GitLab
> Community Edition 11.2.
GitLab's default SSH authentication requires users to upload their ssh
public keys before they can use the SSH transport.
In centralized (e.g. corporate) environments this can be a hassle
operationally, particularly if the SSH keys are temporary keys issued
to the user, e.g. ones that expire 24 hours after issuing.
In such setups some external automated process is needed to constantly
upload the new keys to GitLab.
> **Warning:** OpenSSH version 6.9+ is required because that version
introduced the `AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand` configuration option. If
using CentOS 6, you can [follow these
instructions](fast_ssh_key_lookup.html#compiling-a-custom-version-of-openssh-for-centos-6)
to compile an up-to-date version.
## Why use OpenSSH certificates?
By using OpenSSH certificates all the information about what user on
GitLab owns the key is encoded in the key itself, and OpenSSH itself
guarantees that users can't fake this, since they'd need to have
access to the private CA signing key.
When correctly set up, this does away with the requirement of
uploading user SSH keys to GitLab entirely.
## Setting up SSH certificate lookup via GitLab Shell
How to fully setup SSH certificates is outside the scope of this
document. See [OpenSSH's
PROTOCOL.certkeys](https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys?annotate=HEAD)
for how it works, and e.g. [RedHat's documentation about
it](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/deployment_guide/sec-using_openssh_certificate_authentication).
We assume that you already have SSH certificates set up, and have
added the `TrustedUserCAKeys` of your CA to your `sshd_config`, e.g.:
```
TrustedUserCAKeys /etc/security/mycompany_user_ca.pub
```
Usually `TrustedUserCAKeys` would not be scoped under a `Match User
git` in such a setup, since it would also be used for system logins to
the GitLab server itself, but your setup may vary. If the CA is only
used for GitLab consider putting this in the `Match User git` section
(described below).
The SSH certificates being issued by that CA **MUST** have a "key id"
corresponding to that user's username on GitLab, e.g. (some output
omitted for brevity):
```
$ ssh-add -L | grep cert | ssh-keygen -L -f -
(stdin):1:
Type: ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com user certificate
Public key: RSA-CERT SHA256:[...]
Signing CA: RSA SHA256:[...]
Key ID: "aearnfjord"
Serial: 8289829611021396489
Valid: from 2018-07-18T09:49:00 to 2018-07-19T09:50:34
Principals:
sshUsers
[...]
[...]
```
Technically that's not strictly true, e.g. it could be
`prod-aearnfjord` if it's a SSH certificate you'd normally log in to
servers as the `prod-aearnfjord` user, but then you must specify your
own `AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand` to do that mapping instead of using
our provided default.
The important part is that the `AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand` must be
able to map from the "key id" to a GitLab username in some way, the
default command we ship assumes there's a 1=1 mapping between the two,
since the whole point of this is to allow us to extract a GitLab
username from the key itself, instead of relying on something like the
default public key to username mapping.
Then, in your `sshd_config` set up `AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand` for
the `git` user. Hopefully you can use the default one shipped with
GitLab:
```
Match User git
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser root
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell/bin/gitlab-shell-authorized-principals-check %i sshUsers
```
This command will emit output that looks something like:
```
command="/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell/bin/gitlab-shell username-{KEY_ID}",no-port-forwarding,no-X11-forwarding,no-agent-forwarding,no-pty {PRINCIPAL}
```
Where `{KEY_ID}` is the `%i` argument passed to the script
(e.g. `aeanfjord`), and `{PRINCIPAL}` is the principal passed to it
(e.g. `sshUsers`).
You will need to customize the `sshUsers` part of that. It should be
some principal that's guaranteed to be part of the key for all users
who can log in to GitLab, or you must provide a list of principals,
one of which is going to be present for the user, e.g.:
```
[...]
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell/bin/gitlab-shell-authorized-principals-check %i sshUsers windowsUsers
```
## Principals and security
You can supply as many principals as you want, these will be turned
into multiple lines of `authorized_keys` output, as described in the
`AuthorizedPrincipalsFile` documentation in `sshd_config(5)`.
Normally when using the `AuthorizedKeysCommand` with OpenSSH the
principal is some "group" that's allowed to log into that
server. However with GitLab it's only used to appease OpenSSH's
requirement for it, we effectively only care about the "key id" being
correct. Once that's extracted GitLab will enforce its own ACLs for
that user (e.g. what projects the user can access).
So it's OK to e.g. be overly generous in what you accept, since if the
user e.g. has no access to GitLab at all it'll just error out with a
message about this being an invalid user.
## Interaction with the `authorized_keys` file
SSH certificates can be used in conjunction with the `authorized_keys`
file, and if setup as configured above the `authorized_keys` file will
still serve as a fallback.
This is because if the `AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand` can't
authenticate the user, OpenSSH will fall back on
`~/.ssh/authorized_keys` (or the `AuthorizedKeysCommand`).
Therefore there may still be a reason to use the ["Fast lookup of
authorized SSH keys in the database"](fast_ssh_key_lookup.html) method
in conjunction with this. Since you'll be using SSH certificates for
all your normal users, and relying on the `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`
fallback for deploy keys, if you make use of those.
But you may find that there's no reason to do that, since all your
normal users will use the fast `AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand` path, and
only automated deployment key access will fall back on
`~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, or that you have a lot more keys for normal
users (especially if they're renewed) than you have deploy keys.
## Other security caveats
Users can still bypass SSH certificate authentication by manually
uploading an SSH public key to their profile, relying on the
`~/.ssh/authorized_keys` fallback to authenticate it. There's
currently no feature to prevent this, [but there's an open request for
adding it](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce/issues/49218).
Such a restriction can currently be hacked in by e.g. providing a
custom `AuthorizedKeysCommand` which checks if the discovered key-ID
returned from `gitlab-shell-authorized-keys-check` is a deploy key or
not (all non-deploy keys should be refused).

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@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ module API
#
# Params:
# key_id - ssh key id for Git over SSH
# user_id - user id for Git over HTTP
# user_id - user id for Git over HTTP or over SSH in keyless SSH CERT mode
# username - user name for Git over SSH in keyless SSH cert mode
# protocol - Git access protocol being used, e.g. HTTP or SSH
# project - project full_path (not path on disk)
# action - git action (git-upload-pack or git-receive-pack)
@ -28,6 +29,8 @@ module API
Key.find_by(id: params[:key_id])
elsif params[:user_id]
User.find_by(id: params[:user_id])
elsif params[:username]
User.find_by_username(params[:username])
end
protocol = params[:protocol]
@ -58,6 +61,7 @@ module API
{
status: true,
gl_repository: gl_repository,
gl_id: Gitlab::GlId.gl_id(user),
gl_username: user&.username,
# This repository_path is a bogus value but gitlab-shell still requires
@ -71,10 +75,17 @@ module API
post "/lfs_authenticate" do
status 200
key = Key.find(params[:key_id])
key.update_last_used_at
if params[:key_id]
actor = Key.find(params[:key_id])
actor.update_last_used_at
elsif params[:user_id]
actor = User.find_by(id: params[:user_id])
raise ActiveRecord::RecordNotFound.new("No such user id!") unless actor
else
raise ActiveRecord::RecordNotFound.new("No key_id or user_id passed!")
end
token_handler = Gitlab::LfsToken.new(key)
token_handler = Gitlab::LfsToken.new(actor)
{
username: token_handler.actor_name,
@ -100,7 +111,7 @@ module API
end
#
# Discover user by ssh key or user id
# Discover user by ssh key, user id or username
#
get "/discover" do
if params[:key_id]
@ -108,6 +119,8 @@ module API
user = key.user
elsif params[:user_id]
user = User.find_by(id: params[:user_id])
elsif params[:username]
user = User.find_by(username: params[:username])
end
present user, with: Entities::UserSafe
@ -141,22 +154,30 @@ module API
post '/two_factor_recovery_codes' do
status 200
key = Key.find_by(id: params[:key_id])
if params[:key_id]
key = Key.find_by(id: params[:key_id])
if key
key.update_last_used_at
else
break { 'success' => false, 'message' => 'Could not find the given key' }
end
if key
key.update_last_used_at
else
break { 'success' => false, 'message' => 'Could not find the given key' }
end
if key.is_a?(DeployKey)
break { success: false, message: 'Deploy keys cannot be used to retrieve recovery codes' }
end
if key.is_a?(DeployKey)
break { success: false, message: 'Deploy keys cannot be used to retrieve recovery codes' }
end
user = key.user
user = key.user
unless user
break { success: false, message: 'Could not find a user for the given key' }
unless user
break { success: false, message: 'Could not find a user for the given key' }
end
elsif params[:user_id]
user = User.find_by(id: params[:user_id])
unless user
break { success: false, message: 'Could not find the given user' }
end
end
unless user.two_factor_enabled?

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@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ describe API::Internal do
context 'user key' do
it 'returns the correct information about the key' do
lfs_auth(key.id, project)
lfs_auth_key(key.id, project)
expect(response).to have_gitlab_http_status(200)
expect(json_response['username']).to eq(user.username)
@ -161,8 +161,30 @@ describe API::Internal do
expect(json_response['repository_http_path']).to eq(project.http_url_to_repo)
end
it 'returns the correct information about the user' do
lfs_auth_user(user.id, project)
expect(response).to have_gitlab_http_status(200)
expect(json_response['username']).to eq(user.username)
expect(json_response['lfs_token']).to eq(Gitlab::LfsToken.new(user).token)
expect(json_response['repository_http_path']).to eq(project.http_url_to_repo)
end
it 'returns a 404 when no key or user is provided' do
lfs_auth_project(project)
expect(response).to have_gitlab_http_status(404)
end
it 'returns a 404 when the wrong key is provided' do
lfs_auth(nil, project)
lfs_auth_key(key.id + 12345, project)
expect(response).to have_gitlab_http_status(404)
end
it 'returns a 404 when the wrong user is provided' do
lfs_auth_user(user.id + 12345, project)
expect(response).to have_gitlab_http_status(404)
end
@ -172,7 +194,7 @@ describe API::Internal do
let(:key) { create(:deploy_key) }
it 'returns the correct information about the key' do
lfs_auth(key.id, project)
lfs_auth_key(key.id, project)
expect(response).to have_gitlab_http_status(200)
expect(json_response['username']).to eq("lfs+deploy-key-#{key.id}")
@ -183,13 +205,29 @@ describe API::Internal do
end
describe "GET /internal/discover" do
it do
it "finds a user by key id" do
get(api("/internal/discover"), key_id: key.id, secret_token: secret_token)
expect(response).to have_gitlab_http_status(200)
expect(json_response['name']).to eq(user.name)
end
it "finds a user by user id" do
get(api("/internal/discover"), user_id: user.id, secret_token: secret_token)
expect(response).to have_gitlab_http_status(200)
expect(json_response['name']).to eq(user.name)
end
it "finds a user by username" do
get(api("/internal/discover"), username: user.username, secret_token: secret_token)
expect(response).to have_gitlab_http_status(200)
expect(json_response['name']).to eq(user.name)
end
end
describe "GET /internal/authorized_keys" do
@ -871,7 +909,15 @@ describe API::Internal do
)
end
def lfs_auth(key_id, project)
def lfs_auth_project(project)
post(
api("/internal/lfs_authenticate"),
secret_token: secret_token,
project: project.full_path
)
end
def lfs_auth_key(key_id, project)
post(
api("/internal/lfs_authenticate"),
key_id: key_id,
@ -879,4 +925,13 @@ describe API::Internal do
project: project.full_path
)
end
def lfs_auth_user(user_id, project)
post(
api("/internal/lfs_authenticate"),
user_id: user_id,
secret_token: secret_token,
project: project.full_path
)
end
end