6eb3fc69f6
This should prevent any malicious server from responding with a location that will redirect us and expose internal services, as kubeclient's rest-client will no longer follow redirects.
37 lines
1.3 KiB
Ruby
37 lines
1.3 KiB
Ruby
class Kubeclient::Client
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# We need to monkey patch this method until
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# https://github.com/abonas/kubeclient/pull/323 is merged
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def proxy_url(kind, name, port, namespace = '')
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discover unless @discovered
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entity_name_plural =
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if %w[services pods nodes].include?(kind.to_s)
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kind.to_s
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else
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@entities[kind.to_s].resource_name
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end
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ns_prefix = build_namespace_prefix(namespace)
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rest_client["#{ns_prefix}#{entity_name_plural}/#{name}:#{port}/proxy"].url
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end
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# Monkey patch to set `max_redirects: 0`, so that kubeclient
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# does not follow redirects and expose internal services.
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# See https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce/issues/53158
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def create_rest_client(path = nil)
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path ||= @api_endpoint.path
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options = {
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ssl_ca_file: @ssl_options[:ca_file],
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ssl_cert_store: @ssl_options[:cert_store],
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verify_ssl: @ssl_options[:verify_ssl],
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ssl_client_cert: @ssl_options[:client_cert],
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ssl_client_key: @ssl_options[:client_key],
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proxy: @http_proxy_uri,
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user: @auth_options[:username],
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password: @auth_options[:password],
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open_timeout: @timeouts[:open],
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read_timeout: @timeouts[:read],
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max_redirects: 0
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}
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RestClient::Resource.new(@api_endpoint.merge(path).to_s, options)
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end
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end
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