gitlab-org--gitlab-foss/app/policies/project_policy.rb

731 lines
22 KiB
Ruby

# frozen_string_literal: true
class ProjectPolicy < BasePolicy
include CrudPolicyHelpers
include ReadonlyAbilities
desc "User is a project owner"
condition :owner do
(project.owner.present? && project.owner == @user) ||
project.group&.has_owner?(@user)
end
desc "Project has public builds enabled"
condition(:public_builds, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.public_builds? }
# For guest access we use #team_member? so we can use
# project.members, which gets cached in subject scope.
# This is safe because team_access_level is guaranteed
# by ProjectAuthorization's validation to be at minimum
# GUEST
desc "User has guest access"
condition(:guest) { team_member? }
desc "User has reporter access"
condition(:reporter) { team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::REPORTER }
desc "User has developer access"
condition(:developer) { team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::DEVELOPER }
desc "User has maintainer access"
condition(:maintainer) { team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::MAINTAINER }
desc "User is a project bot"
condition(:project_bot) { user.project_bot? && team_member? }
desc "Project is public"
condition(:public_project, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.public? }
desc "Project is visible to internal users"
condition(:internal_access) do
project.internal? && !user.external?
end
desc "User is a member of the group"
condition(:group_member, scope: :subject) { project_group_member? }
desc "Project is archived"
condition(:archived, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.archived? }
condition(:default_issues_tracker, scope: :subject) { project.default_issues_tracker? }
desc "Container registry is disabled"
condition(:container_registry_disabled, scope: :subject) do
!project.container_registry_enabled
end
desc "Project has an external wiki"
condition(:has_external_wiki, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.has_external_wiki? }
desc "Project has request access enabled"
condition(:request_access_enabled, scope: :subject, score: 0) { project.request_access_enabled }
desc "Has merge requests allowing pushes to user"
condition(:has_merge_requests_allowing_pushes) do
project.merge_requests_allowing_push_to_user(user).any?
end
desc "Deploy token with read_package_registry scope"
condition(:read_package_registry_deploy_token) do
user.is_a?(DeployToken) && user.has_access_to?(project) && user.read_package_registry
end
desc "Deploy token with write_package_registry scope"
condition(:write_package_registry_deploy_token) do
user.is_a?(DeployToken) && user.has_access_to?(project) && user.write_package_registry
end
with_scope :subject
condition(:forking_allowed) do
@subject.feature_available?(:forking, @user)
end
with_scope :subject
condition(:metrics_dashboard_allowed) do
access_allowed_to?(:metrics_dashboard)
end
with_scope :global
condition(:mirror_available, score: 0) do
::Gitlab::CurrentSettings.current_application_settings.mirror_available
end
with_scope :subject
condition(:classification_label_authorized, score: 32) do
::Gitlab::ExternalAuthorization.access_allowed?(
@user,
@subject.external_authorization_classification_label,
@subject.full_path
)
end
with_scope :subject
condition(:design_management_disabled) do
!@subject.design_management_enabled?
end
with_scope :subject
condition(:service_desk_enabled) { @subject.service_desk_enabled? }
with_scope :subject
condition(:resource_access_token_available) { resource_access_token_available? }
# We aren't checking `:read_issue` or `:read_merge_request` in this case
# because it could be possible for a user to see an issuable-iid
# (`:read_issue_iid` or `:read_merge_request_iid`) but then wouldn't be
# allowed to read the actual issue after a more expensive `:read_issue`
# check. These checks are intended to be used alongside
# `:read_project_for_iids`.
#
# `:read_issue` & `:read_issue_iid` could diverge in gitlab-ee.
condition(:issues_visible_to_user, score: 4) do
@subject.feature_available?(:issues, @user)
end
condition(:merge_requests_visible_to_user, score: 4) do
@subject.feature_available?(:merge_requests, @user)
end
condition(:internal_builds_disabled) do
!@subject.builds_enabled?
end
condition(:user_confirmed?) do
@user && @user.confirmed?
end
condition(:build_service_proxy_enabled) do
::Feature.enabled?(:build_service_proxy, @subject)
end
condition(:user_defined_variables_allowed) do
!@subject.restrict_user_defined_variables?
end
with_scope :subject
condition(:packages_disabled) { !@subject.packages_enabled }
features = %w[
merge_requests
issues
repository
snippets
wiki
builds
pages
metrics_dashboard
analytics
operations
security_and_compliance
]
features.each do |f|
# these are scored high because they are unlikely
desc "Project has #{f} disabled"
condition(:"#{f}_disabled", score: 32) { !access_allowed_to?(f.to_sym) }
end
# `:read_project` may be prevented in EE, but `:read_project_for_iids` should
# not.
rule { guest | admin }.enable :read_project_for_iids
rule { admin }.enable :update_max_artifacts_size
rule { can?(:read_all_resources) }.enable :read_confidential_issues
rule { guest }.enable :guest_access
rule { reporter }.enable :reporter_access
rule { developer }.enable :developer_access
rule { maintainer }.enable :maintainer_access
rule { owner | admin }.enable :owner_access
rule { can?(:owner_access) }.policy do
enable :guest_access
enable :reporter_access
enable :developer_access
enable :maintainer_access
enable :change_namespace
enable :change_visibility_level
enable :rename_project
enable :remove_project
enable :archive_project
enable :remove_fork_project
enable :destroy_merge_request
enable :destroy_issue
enable :set_issue_iid
enable :set_issue_created_at
enable :set_issue_updated_at
enable :set_note_created_at
enable :set_emails_disabled
enable :set_show_default_award_emojis
end
rule { can?(:guest_access) }.policy do
enable :read_project
enable :create_merge_request_in
enable :read_board
enable :read_list
enable :read_wiki
enable :read_issue
enable :read_label
enable :read_milestone
enable :read_snippet
enable :read_project_member
enable :read_note
enable :create_project
enable :create_issue
enable :create_note
enable :upload_file
enable :read_cycle_analytics
enable :award_emoji
enable :read_pages_content
enable :read_release
enable :read_analytics
enable :read_insights
end
# These abilities are not allowed to admins that are not members of the project,
# that's why they are defined separately.
rule { guest & can?(:download_code) }.enable :build_download_code
rule { guest & can?(:read_container_image) }.enable :build_read_container_image
rule { can?(:reporter_access) }.policy do
enable :admin_board
enable :download_code
enable :read_statistics
enable :download_wiki_code
enable :create_snippet
enable :update_issue
enable :reopen_issue
enable :admin_issue
enable :admin_label
enable :admin_list
enable :admin_issue_link
enable :read_commit_status
enable :read_build
enable :read_container_image
enable :read_deploy_board
enable :read_pipeline
enable :read_pipeline_schedule
enable :read_environment
enable :read_deployment
enable :read_merge_request
enable :read_sentry_issue
enable :update_sentry_issue
enable :read_prometheus
enable :read_metrics_dashboard_annotation
enable :metrics_dashboard
enable :read_confidential_issues
enable :read_package
enable :read_product_analytics
end
# We define `:public_user_access` separately because there are cases in gitlab-ee
# where we enable or prevent it based on other coditions.
rule { (~anonymous & public_project) | internal_access }.policy do
enable :public_user_access
enable :read_project_for_iids
end
rule { can?(:public_user_access) }.policy do
enable :public_access
enable :guest_access
enable :build_download_code
enable :build_read_container_image
enable :request_access
end
rule { (can?(:public_user_access) | can?(:reporter_access)) & forking_allowed }.policy do
enable :fork_project
end
rule { metrics_dashboard_disabled }.policy do
prevent(:metrics_dashboard)
end
rule { operations_disabled }.policy do
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:feature_flag))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:environment))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:sentry_issue))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:alert_management_alert))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:cluster))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:terraform_state))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:deployment))
prevent(:metrics_dashboard)
prevent(:read_pod_logs)
prevent(:read_prometheus)
end
rule { can?(:metrics_dashboard) }.policy do
enable :read_prometheus
enable :read_deployment
end
rule { ~anonymous & can?(:metrics_dashboard) }.policy do
enable :create_metrics_user_starred_dashboard
enable :read_metrics_user_starred_dashboard
end
rule { packages_disabled | repository_disabled }.policy do
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:package))
end
rule { owner | admin | guest | group_member }.prevent :request_access
rule { ~request_access_enabled }.prevent :request_access
rule { can?(:developer_access) & can?(:create_issue) }.enable :import_issues
rule { can?(:developer_access) }.policy do
enable :create_package
enable :admin_board
enable :admin_merge_request
enable :admin_milestone
enable :update_merge_request
enable :reopen_merge_request
enable :create_commit_status
enable :update_commit_status
enable :create_build
enable :update_build
enable :create_merge_request_from
enable :create_wiki
enable :push_code
enable :resolve_note
enable :create_container_image
enable :update_container_image
enable :destroy_container_image
enable :create_environment
enable :update_environment
enable :destroy_environment
enable :create_deployment
enable :update_deployment
enable :create_release
enable :update_release
enable :daily_statistics
enable :create_metrics_dashboard_annotation
enable :delete_metrics_dashboard_annotation
enable :update_metrics_dashboard_annotation
enable :read_alert_management_alert
enable :update_alert_management_alert
enable :create_design
enable :move_design
enable :destroy_design
enable :read_terraform_state
enable :read_pod_logs
enable :read_feature_flag
enable :create_feature_flag
enable :update_feature_flag
enable :destroy_feature_flag
enable :admin_feature_flag
enable :admin_feature_flags_user_lists
end
rule { can?(:developer_access) & user_confirmed? }.policy do
enable :create_pipeline
enable :update_pipeline
enable :create_pipeline_schedule
end
rule { can?(:maintainer_access) }.policy do
enable :destroy_package
enable :admin_board
enable :push_to_delete_protected_branch
enable :update_snippet
enable :admin_snippet
enable :admin_project_member
enable :admin_note
enable :admin_wiki
enable :admin_project
enable :admin_commit_status
enable :admin_build
enable :admin_container_image
enable :admin_pipeline
enable :admin_environment
enable :admin_deployment
enable :admin_pages
enable :read_pages
enable :update_pages
enable :remove_pages
enable :read_cluster
enable :add_cluster
enable :create_cluster
enable :update_cluster
enable :admin_cluster
enable :create_environment_terminal
enable :destroy_release
enable :destroy_artifacts
enable :admin_operations
enable :read_deploy_token
enable :create_deploy_token
enable :destroy_deploy_token
enable :read_prometheus_alerts
enable :admin_terraform_state
enable :create_freeze_period
enable :read_freeze_period
enable :update_freeze_period
enable :destroy_freeze_period
enable :admin_feature_flags_client
end
rule { public_project & metrics_dashboard_allowed }.policy do
enable :metrics_dashboard
end
rule { internal_access & metrics_dashboard_allowed }.policy do
enable :metrics_dashboard
end
rule { (mirror_available & can?(:admin_project)) | admin }.enable :admin_remote_mirror
rule { can?(:push_code) }.enable :admin_tag
rule { archived }.policy do
prevent(*readonly_abilities)
readonly_features.each do |feature|
prevent(*create_update_admin_destroy(feature))
end
end
rule { issues_disabled }.policy do
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:issue))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:board))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:list))
end
rule { merge_requests_disabled | repository_disabled }.policy do
prevent :create_merge_request_in
prevent :create_merge_request_from
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:merge_request))
end
rule { pages_disabled }.prevent :read_pages_content
rule { issues_disabled & merge_requests_disabled }.policy do
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:label))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:milestone))
end
rule { snippets_disabled }.policy do
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:snippet))
end
rule { analytics_disabled }.policy do
prevent(:read_analytics)
prevent(:read_insights)
prevent(:read_cycle_analytics)
prevent(:read_repository_graphs)
end
rule { wiki_disabled }.policy do
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:wiki))
prevent(:download_wiki_code)
end
rule { builds_disabled | repository_disabled }.policy do
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:build))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:pipeline_schedule))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:environment))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:cluster))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:deployment))
end
# There's two separate cases when builds_disabled is true:
# 1. When internal CI is disabled - builds_disabled && internal_builds_disabled
# - We do not prevent the user from accessing Pipelines to allow them to access external CI
# 2. When the user is not allowed to access CI - builds_disabled && ~internal_builds_disabled
# - We prevent the user from accessing Pipelines
rule { (builds_disabled & ~internal_builds_disabled) | repository_disabled }.policy do
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:pipeline))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:commit_status))
end
rule { repository_disabled }.policy do
prevent :push_code
prevent :download_code
prevent :build_download_code
prevent :fork_project
prevent :read_commit_status
prevent :read_pipeline
prevent :read_pipeline_schedule
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:release))
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:feature_flag))
prevent(:admin_feature_flags_user_lists)
end
rule { container_registry_disabled }.policy do
prevent(*create_read_update_admin_destroy(:container_image))
end
rule { anonymous & ~public_project }.prevent_all
rule { public_project }.policy do
enable :public_access
enable :read_project_for_iids
end
rule { can?(:public_access) }.policy do
enable :read_package
enable :read_project
enable :read_board
enable :read_list
enable :read_wiki
enable :read_label
enable :read_milestone
enable :read_snippet
enable :read_project_member
enable :read_merge_request
enable :read_note
enable :read_pipeline
enable :read_pipeline_schedule
enable :read_environment
enable :read_deployment
enable :read_commit_status
enable :read_container_image
enable :download_code
enable :read_release
enable :download_wiki_code
enable :read_cycle_analytics
enable :read_pages_content
enable :read_analytics
enable :read_insights
# NOTE: may be overridden by IssuePolicy
enable :read_issue
end
rule { public_builds }.policy do
enable :read_build
end
rule { public_builds & can?(:guest_access) }.policy do
enable :read_pipeline
enable :read_pipeline_schedule
end
# These rules are included to allow maintainers of projects to push to certain
# to run pipelines for the branches they have access to.
rule { can?(:public_access) & has_merge_requests_allowing_pushes & user_confirmed? }.policy do
enable :create_build
enable :create_pipeline
end
rule do
(can?(:read_project_for_iids) & issues_visible_to_user) | can?(:read_issue)
end.enable :read_issue_iid
rule do
(~guest & can?(:read_project_for_iids) & merge_requests_visible_to_user) | can?(:read_merge_request)
end.enable :read_merge_request_iid
rule { ~can?(:read_cross_project) & ~classification_label_authorized }.policy do
# Preventing access here still allows the projects to be listed. Listing
# projects doesn't check the `:read_project` ability. But instead counts
# on the `project_authorizations` table.
#
# All other actions should explicitly check read project, which would
# trigger the `classification_label_authorized` condition.
#
# `:read_project_for_iids` is not prevented by this condition, as it is
# used for cross-project reference checks.
prevent :guest_access
prevent :public_access
prevent :public_user_access
prevent :reporter_access
prevent :developer_access
prevent :maintainer_access
prevent :owner_access
end
rule { blocked }.policy do
prevent :create_pipeline
end
rule { can?(:read_issue) }.policy do
enable :read_design
enable :read_design_activity
enable :read_issue_link
end
rule { can?(:developer_access) }.policy do
enable :read_security_configuration
end
# Design abilities could also be prevented in the issue policy.
rule { design_management_disabled }.policy do
prevent :read_design
prevent :read_design_activity
prevent :create_design
prevent :destroy_design
prevent :move_design
end
rule { read_package_registry_deploy_token }.policy do
enable :read_package
enable :read_project
end
rule { write_package_registry_deploy_token }.policy do
enable :create_package
enable :read_package
enable :read_project
end
rule { can?(:create_pipeline) & can?(:maintainer_access) }.enable :create_web_ide_terminal
rule { build_service_proxy_enabled }.enable :build_service_proxy_enabled
rule { can?(:download_code) }.policy do
enable :read_repository_graphs
end
rule { can?(:read_build) & can?(:read_pipeline) }.policy do
enable :read_build_report_results
end
rule { support_bot }.enable :guest_access
rule { support_bot & ~service_desk_enabled }.policy do
prevent :create_note
prevent :read_project
end
rule { project_bot }.enable :project_bot_access
rule { resource_access_token_available & can?(:admin_project) }.policy do
enable :admin_resource_access_tokens
end
rule { can?(:project_bot_access) }.prevent :admin_resource_access_tokens
rule { user_defined_variables_allowed | can?(:maintainer_access) }.policy do
enable :set_pipeline_variables
end
rule { ~security_and_compliance_disabled & can?(:developer_access) }.policy do
enable :access_security_and_compliance
end
private
def user_is_user?
user.is_a?(User)
end
def team_member?
return false if @user.nil?
return false unless user_is_user?
greedy_load_subject = false
# when scoping by subject, we want to be greedy
# and load *all* the members with one query.
greedy_load_subject ||= DeclarativePolicy.preferred_scope == :subject
# in this case we're likely to have loaded #members already
# anyways, and #member? would fail with an error
greedy_load_subject ||= !@user.persisted?
if greedy_load_subject
# We want to load all the members with one query. Calling #include? on
# project.team.members will perform a separate query for each user, unless
# project.team.members was loaded before somewhere else. Calling #to_a
# ensures it's always loaded before checking for membership.
project.team.members.to_a.include?(user)
else
# otherwise we just make a specific query for
# this particular user.
team_access_level >= Gitlab::Access::GUEST
end
end
# rubocop: disable CodeReuse/ActiveRecord
def project_group_member?
return false if @user.nil?
return false unless user_is_user?
project.group &&
(
project.group.members_with_parents.exists?(user_id: @user.id) ||
project.group.requesters.exists?(user_id: @user.id)
)
end
# rubocop: enable CodeReuse/ActiveRecord
def team_access_level
return -1 if @user.nil?
return -1 unless user_is_user?
lookup_access_level!
end
def lookup_access_level!
return ::Gitlab::Access::REPORTER if alert_bot?
return ::Gitlab::Access::REPORTER if support_bot? && service_desk_enabled?
# NOTE: max_member_access has its own cache
project.team.max_member_access(@user.id)
end
def access_allowed_to?(feature)
return false unless project.project_feature
case project.project_feature.access_level(feature)
when ProjectFeature::DISABLED
false
when ProjectFeature::PRIVATE
can?(:read_all_resources) || team_access_level >= ProjectFeature.required_minimum_access_level(feature)
else
true
end
end
def resource_access_token_available?
true
end
def project
@subject
end
end
ProjectPolicy.prepend_if_ee('EE::ProjectPolicy')