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We require explicit consent to distribute identity information. Identities that aren't e-mail addresses, such as pictures or addresses, offer no simple way for us to acquire this consent.
Note: Some OpenPGP software creates keys with incorrectly formatted e-mail addresses. These addresses might not be recognized correctly on keys.openpgp.org.
When an OpenPGP key marks one of its identities as revoked, this identity should no longer be considered valid for the key. And this information should ideally be distributed to all OpenPGP clients that already know about the newly revoked identity.
Unfortunately, there is currently no good way to distribute revocations, that doesn't also reveal the revoked identity itself. We don't want to distribute revoked identities, so we can't distribute the identity at all.
There are proposed solutions to this issue, that allow the distribution of revocations without also revealing the identity itself. But so far there is no final specification, or support in any OpenPGP software. We hope that a solution will be established in the near future, and will add support on keys.openpgp.org as soon as we can.
Of course!
If you have Tor installed,
you can reach keys.openpgp.org anonymously
as an
onion service:
zkaan2xfbuxia2wpf7ofnkbz6r5zdbbvxbunvp5g2iebopbfc4iqmbad.onion
No. The "append-only" federation model of the SKS pool leads to various problems, that make both operation and use of those servers very difficult. There is also no simple way to store information about e-mail verification in a federated way.
We do plan to explore options for a distributed service in the future, so users can choose between different service operators again.