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sortix--sortix/sysinstall/fileops.c

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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2015, 2016, 2017, 2020 Jonas 'Sortie' Termansen.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*
* fileops.c
* File operation utility functions.
*/
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
Seed kernel entropy with randomness from the previous boot. The bootloader will now load the /boot/random.seed file if it exists, in which case the kernel will use it as the initial kernel entropy. The kernel warns if no random seed was loaded, unless the --no-random-seed option was given. This option is used for live environments that inherently have no prior secret state. The kernel initializes its entropy pool from the random seed as of the first things, so randomness is available very early on. init(8) will emit a fresh /boot/random.seed file on boot to avoid the same entropy being used twice. init(8) also writes out /boot/random.seed on system shutdown where the system has the most entropy. init(8) will warn if writing the file fails, except if /boot is a real-only filesystem, and keeping such state is impossible. The system administrator is then responsible for ensuring the bootloader somehow passes a fresh random seed on the next boot. /boot/random.seed must be owned by the root user and root group and must have file permissions 600 to avoid unprivileged users can read it. The file is passed to the kernel by the bootloader as a multiboot module with the command line --random-seed. If no random seed is loaded, the kernel attempts a poor quality fallback where it seeds the kernel arc4random(3) continuously with the current time. The timing variance may provide some effective entropy. There is no real kernel entropy gathering yet. The read of the CMOS real time clock is moved to an early point in the kernel boot, so the current time is available as fallback entropy. The kernel access of the random seed module is supposed to be infallible and happens before the kernel log is set up, but there is not yet a failsafe API for mapping single pages in the early kernel. sysupgrade(8) creates /boot/random.seed if it's absent as a temporary compatibility measure for people upgrading from the 1.0 release. The GRUB port will need to be upgraded with support for /boot/random.seed in the 10_sortix script. Installation with manual bootloader configuration will need to load the random seed with the --random-seed command line. With GRUB, this can be done with: module /boot/random.seed --random-seed
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#include <ioleast.h>
#include <libgen.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "fileops.h"
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#include "string_array.h"
char* join_paths(const char* a, const char* b)
{
size_t a_len = strlen(a);
bool has_slash = (a_len && a[a_len-1] == '/') || b[0] == '/';
char* result;
if ( (has_slash && asprintf(&result, "%s%s", a, b) < 0) ||
(!has_slash && asprintf(&result, "%s/%s", a, b) < 0) )
return NULL;
return result;
}
int mkdir_p(const char* path, mode_t mode)
{
int saved_errno = errno;
if ( !mkdir(path, mode) )
return 0;
if ( errno == ENOENT )
{
char* prev = strdup(path);
if ( !prev )
return -1;
int status = mkdir_p(dirname(prev), mode | 0500);
free(prev);
if ( status < 0 )
return -1;
errno = saved_errno;
if ( !mkdir(path, mode) )
return 0;
}
if ( errno == EEXIST )
return errno = saved_errno, 0;
return -1;
}
int access_or_die(const char* path, int mode)
{
if ( access(path, mode) < 0 )
{
if ( errno == EACCES ||
errno == ENOENT ||
errno == ELOOP ||
errno == ENAMETOOLONG ||
errno == ENOTDIR )
return -1;
warn("%s", path);
_exit(2);
}
return 0;
}
void mkdir_or_chmod_or_die(const char* path, mode_t mode)
{
if ( mkdir(path, mode) == 0 )
return;
if ( errno == EEXIST )
{
if ( chmod(path, mode) == 0 )
return;
err(2, "chmod: %s", path);
}
err(2, "mkdir: %s", path);
}
Seed kernel entropy with randomness from the previous boot. The bootloader will now load the /boot/random.seed file if it exists, in which case the kernel will use it as the initial kernel entropy. The kernel warns if no random seed was loaded, unless the --no-random-seed option was given. This option is used for live environments that inherently have no prior secret state. The kernel initializes its entropy pool from the random seed as of the first things, so randomness is available very early on. init(8) will emit a fresh /boot/random.seed file on boot to avoid the same entropy being used twice. init(8) also writes out /boot/random.seed on system shutdown where the system has the most entropy. init(8) will warn if writing the file fails, except if /boot is a real-only filesystem, and keeping such state is impossible. The system administrator is then responsible for ensuring the bootloader somehow passes a fresh random seed on the next boot. /boot/random.seed must be owned by the root user and root group and must have file permissions 600 to avoid unprivileged users can read it. The file is passed to the kernel by the bootloader as a multiboot module with the command line --random-seed. If no random seed is loaded, the kernel attempts a poor quality fallback where it seeds the kernel arc4random(3) continuously with the current time. The timing variance may provide some effective entropy. There is no real kernel entropy gathering yet. The read of the CMOS real time clock is moved to an early point in the kernel boot, so the current time is available as fallback entropy. The kernel access of the random seed module is supposed to be infallible and happens before the kernel log is set up, but there is not yet a failsafe API for mapping single pages in the early kernel. sysupgrade(8) creates /boot/random.seed if it's absent as a temporary compatibility measure for people upgrading from the 1.0 release. The GRUB port will need to be upgraded with support for /boot/random.seed in the 10_sortix script. Installation with manual bootloader configuration will need to load the random seed with the --random-seed command line. With GRUB, this can be done with: module /boot/random.seed --random-seed
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void write_random_seed(const char* path)
{
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW, 0600);
if ( fd < 0 )
{
warn("%s", path);
_exit(2);
}
if ( fchown(fd, 0, 0) < 0 )
{
warn("chown: %s", path);
_exit(2);
}
if ( fchmod(fd, 0600) < 0 )
{
warn("chmod: %s", path);
_exit(2);
}
// Write out randomness, but mix in some fresh kernel randomness in case the
// randomness used to seed arc4random didn't have enough entropy, there may
// be more now.
Seed kernel entropy with randomness from the previous boot. The bootloader will now load the /boot/random.seed file if it exists, in which case the kernel will use it as the initial kernel entropy. The kernel warns if no random seed was loaded, unless the --no-random-seed option was given. This option is used for live environments that inherently have no prior secret state. The kernel initializes its entropy pool from the random seed as of the first things, so randomness is available very early on. init(8) will emit a fresh /boot/random.seed file on boot to avoid the same entropy being used twice. init(8) also writes out /boot/random.seed on system shutdown where the system has the most entropy. init(8) will warn if writing the file fails, except if /boot is a real-only filesystem, and keeping such state is impossible. The system administrator is then responsible for ensuring the bootloader somehow passes a fresh random seed on the next boot. /boot/random.seed must be owned by the root user and root group and must have file permissions 600 to avoid unprivileged users can read it. The file is passed to the kernel by the bootloader as a multiboot module with the command line --random-seed. If no random seed is loaded, the kernel attempts a poor quality fallback where it seeds the kernel arc4random(3) continuously with the current time. The timing variance may provide some effective entropy. There is no real kernel entropy gathering yet. The read of the CMOS real time clock is moved to an early point in the kernel boot, so the current time is available as fallback entropy. The kernel access of the random seed module is supposed to be infallible and happens before the kernel log is set up, but there is not yet a failsafe API for mapping single pages in the early kernel. sysupgrade(8) creates /boot/random.seed if it's absent as a temporary compatibility measure for people upgrading from the 1.0 release. The GRUB port will need to be upgraded with support for /boot/random.seed in the 10_sortix script. Installation with manual bootloader configuration will need to load the random seed with the --random-seed command line. With GRUB, this can be done with: module /boot/random.seed --random-seed
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unsigned char buf[256];
arc4random_buf(buf, sizeof(buf));
unsigned char newbuf[256];
getentropy(newbuf, sizeof(newbuf));
Seed kernel entropy with randomness from the previous boot. The bootloader will now load the /boot/random.seed file if it exists, in which case the kernel will use it as the initial kernel entropy. The kernel warns if no random seed was loaded, unless the --no-random-seed option was given. This option is used for live environments that inherently have no prior secret state. The kernel initializes its entropy pool from the random seed as of the first things, so randomness is available very early on. init(8) will emit a fresh /boot/random.seed file on boot to avoid the same entropy being used twice. init(8) also writes out /boot/random.seed on system shutdown where the system has the most entropy. init(8) will warn if writing the file fails, except if /boot is a real-only filesystem, and keeping such state is impossible. The system administrator is then responsible for ensuring the bootloader somehow passes a fresh random seed on the next boot. /boot/random.seed must be owned by the root user and root group and must have file permissions 600 to avoid unprivileged users can read it. The file is passed to the kernel by the bootloader as a multiboot module with the command line --random-seed. If no random seed is loaded, the kernel attempts a poor quality fallback where it seeds the kernel arc4random(3) continuously with the current time. The timing variance may provide some effective entropy. There is no real kernel entropy gathering yet. The read of the CMOS real time clock is moved to an early point in the kernel boot, so the current time is available as fallback entropy. The kernel access of the random seed module is supposed to be infallible and happens before the kernel log is set up, but there is not yet a failsafe API for mapping single pages in the early kernel. sysupgrade(8) creates /boot/random.seed if it's absent as a temporary compatibility measure for people upgrading from the 1.0 release. The GRUB port will need to be upgraded with support for /boot/random.seed in the 10_sortix script. Installation with manual bootloader configuration will need to load the random seed with the --random-seed command line. With GRUB, this can be done with: module /boot/random.seed --random-seed
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size_t done = writeall(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
for ( size_t i = 0; i < 256; i++ )
buf[i] ^= newbuf[i];
Seed kernel entropy with randomness from the previous boot. The bootloader will now load the /boot/random.seed file if it exists, in which case the kernel will use it as the initial kernel entropy. The kernel warns if no random seed was loaded, unless the --no-random-seed option was given. This option is used for live environments that inherently have no prior secret state. The kernel initializes its entropy pool from the random seed as of the first things, so randomness is available very early on. init(8) will emit a fresh /boot/random.seed file on boot to avoid the same entropy being used twice. init(8) also writes out /boot/random.seed on system shutdown where the system has the most entropy. init(8) will warn if writing the file fails, except if /boot is a real-only filesystem, and keeping such state is impossible. The system administrator is then responsible for ensuring the bootloader somehow passes a fresh random seed on the next boot. /boot/random.seed must be owned by the root user and root group and must have file permissions 600 to avoid unprivileged users can read it. The file is passed to the kernel by the bootloader as a multiboot module with the command line --random-seed. If no random seed is loaded, the kernel attempts a poor quality fallback where it seeds the kernel arc4random(3) continuously with the current time. The timing variance may provide some effective entropy. There is no real kernel entropy gathering yet. The read of the CMOS real time clock is moved to an early point in the kernel boot, so the current time is available as fallback entropy. The kernel access of the random seed module is supposed to be infallible and happens before the kernel log is set up, but there is not yet a failsafe API for mapping single pages in the early kernel. sysupgrade(8) creates /boot/random.seed if it's absent as a temporary compatibility measure for people upgrading from the 1.0 release. The GRUB port will need to be upgraded with support for /boot/random.seed in the 10_sortix script. Installation with manual bootloader configuration will need to load the random seed with the --random-seed command line. With GRUB, this can be done with: module /boot/random.seed --random-seed
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if ( done < sizeof(buf) )
{
warn("write: %s", path);
_exit(2);
}
if ( ftruncate(fd, sizeof(buf)) < 0 )
{
warn("truncate: %s", path);
_exit(2);
}
close(fd);
}
char* read_string_file(const char* path)
{
FILE* fp = fopen(path, "r");
if ( !fp )
return NULL;
struct stat st;
if ( fstat(fileno(fp), &st) < 0 )
{
fclose(fp);
return NULL;
}
size_t content_length;
if ( __builtin_add_overflow(1, st.st_size, &content_length) )
{
fclose(fp);
errno = EOVERFLOW;
return NULL;
}
char* content = malloc(content_length);
if ( !content )
{
fclose(fp);
return NULL;
}
size_t amount = fread(content, 1, content_length - 1, fp);
if ( ferror(fp) )
{
fclose(fp);
free(content);
return NULL;
}
fclose(fp);
if ( 0 < amount && content[amount - 1] == '\n' )
content[amount - 1] = '\0';
else
content[amount] = '\0';
return content;
}
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char** read_lines_file(const char* path, size_t* out_count)
{
FILE* fp = fopen(path, "r");
if ( !fp )
return NULL;
size_t count;
size_t length;
char** lines;
if ( !string_array_init(&lines, &count, &length) )
{
fclose(fp);
return NULL;
}
char* line = NULL;
size_t line_size = 0;
ssize_t line_length;
while ( 0 < (errno = 0, line_length = getline(&line, &line_size, fp)) )
{
if ( line[line_length-1] == '\n' )
line[--line_length] = '\0';
if ( !string_array_append_nodup(&lines, &count, &length, line) )
{
free(line);
string_array_free(&lines, &count, &length);
fclose(fp);
return false;
}
line = NULL;
line_size = 0;
}
free(line);
if ( ferror(fp) )
{
string_array_free(&lines, &count, &length);
fclose(fp);
return NULL;
}
fclose(fp);
*out_count = count;
return lines;
}