gitlab-org--gitlab-foss/lib/gitlab/checks/change_access.rb

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module Gitlab
module Checks
class ChangeAccess
# protocol is currently used only in EE
attr_reader :user_access, :project, :skip_authorization, :protocol
def initialize(
change, user_access:, project:, env: {}, skip_authorization: false,
protocol:
)
@oldrev, @newrev, @ref = change.values_at(:oldrev, :newrev, :ref)
@branch_name = Gitlab::Git.branch_name(@ref)
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@tag_name = Gitlab::Git.tag_name(@ref)
@user_access = user_access
@project = project
Accept environment variables from the `pre-receive` script. 1. Starting version 2.11, git changed the way the pre-receive flow works. - Previously, the new potential objects would be added to the main repo. If the pre-receive passes, the new objects stay in the repo but are linked up. If the pre-receive fails, the new objects stay orphaned in the repo, and are cleaned up during the next `git gc`. - In 2.11, the new potential objects are added to a temporary "alternate object directory", that git creates for this purpose. If the pre-receive passes, the objects from the alternate object directory are migrated to the main repo. If the pre-receive fails the alternate object directory is simply deleted. 2. In our workflow, the pre-recieve script (in `gitlab-shell) calls the `/allowed` endpoint, which calls out directly to git to perform various checks. These direct calls to git do _not_ have the necessary environment variables set which allow access to the "alternate object directory" (explained above). Therefore these calls to git are not able to access any of the new potential objects to be added during this push. 3. We fix this by accepting the relevant environment variables (GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES, GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY) on the `/allowed` endpoint, and then include these environment variables while calling out to git. 4. This commit includes (whitelisted) these environment variables while making the "force push" check. A `Gitlab::Git::RevList` module is extracted to prevent `ForcePush` from being littered with these checks.
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@env = env
@skip_authorization = skip_authorization
@protocol = protocol
end
def exec
error = push_checks || tag_checks || protected_branch_checks
if error
GitAccessStatus.new(false, error)
else
GitAccessStatus.new(true)
end
end
protected
def protected_branch_checks
return if skip_authorization
return unless @branch_name
return unless ProtectedBranch.protected?(project, @branch_name)
if forced_push?
return "You are not allowed to force push code to a protected branch on this project."
elsif deletion?
return "You are not allowed to delete protected branches from this project."
end
if matching_merge_request?
if user_access.can_merge_to_branch?(@branch_name) || user_access.can_push_to_branch?(@branch_name)
return
else
"You are not allowed to merge code into protected branches on this project."
end
else
if user_access.can_push_to_branch?(@branch_name)
return
else
"You are not allowed to push code to protected branches on this project."
end
end
end
def tag_checks
return if skip_authorization
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return unless @tag_name
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if tag_exists? && user_access.cannot_do_action?(:admin_project)
return "You are not allowed to change existing tags on this project."
end
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protected_tag_checks
end
def protected_tag_checks
return unless tag_protected?
if update?
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return "Protected tags cannot be updated."
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end
if deletion?
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return "Protected tags cannot be deleted."
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end
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unless user_access.can_push_tag?(@tag_name)
return "You are not allowed to create this tag as it is protected."
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end
end
def tag_protected?
ProtectedTag.protected?(project, @tag_name)
end
def push_checks
return if skip_authorization
if user_access.cannot_do_action?(:push_code)
"You are not allowed to push code to this project."
end
end
private
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def tag_exists?
project.repository.tag_exists?(@tag_name)
end
def forced_push?
Accept environment variables from the `pre-receive` script. 1. Starting version 2.11, git changed the way the pre-receive flow works. - Previously, the new potential objects would be added to the main repo. If the pre-receive passes, the new objects stay in the repo but are linked up. If the pre-receive fails, the new objects stay orphaned in the repo, and are cleaned up during the next `git gc`. - In 2.11, the new potential objects are added to a temporary "alternate object directory", that git creates for this purpose. If the pre-receive passes, the objects from the alternate object directory are migrated to the main repo. If the pre-receive fails the alternate object directory is simply deleted. 2. In our workflow, the pre-recieve script (in `gitlab-shell) calls the `/allowed` endpoint, which calls out directly to git to perform various checks. These direct calls to git do _not_ have the necessary environment variables set which allow access to the "alternate object directory" (explained above). Therefore these calls to git are not able to access any of the new potential objects to be added during this push. 3. We fix this by accepting the relevant environment variables (GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES, GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY) on the `/allowed` endpoint, and then include these environment variables while calling out to git. 4. This commit includes (whitelisted) these environment variables while making the "force push" check. A `Gitlab::Git::RevList` module is extracted to prevent `ForcePush` from being littered with these checks.
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Gitlab::Checks::ForcePush.force_push?(@project, @oldrev, @newrev, env: @env)
end
def update?
!Gitlab::Git.blank_ref?(@oldrev) && !deletion?
end
def deletion?
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Gitlab::Git.blank_ref?(@newrev)
end
def matching_merge_request?
Checks::MatchingMergeRequest.new(@newrev, @branch_name, @project).match?
end
end
end
end