2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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module Gitlab
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module Checks
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class ChangeAccess
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2017-03-13 07:31:27 -04:00
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# protocol is currently used only in EE
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attr_reader :user_access, :project, :skip_authorization, :protocol
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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2016-11-17 14:48:23 -05:00
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def initialize(
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2017-03-13 07:31:27 -04:00
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change, user_access:, project:, env: {}, skip_authorization: false,
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protocol:
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)
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2016-07-28 00:04:57 -04:00
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@oldrev, @newrev, @ref = change.values_at(:oldrev, :newrev, :ref)
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@branch_name = Gitlab::Git.branch_name(@ref)
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2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
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@tag_name = Gitlab::Git.tag_name(@ref)
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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@user_access = user_access
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@project = project
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Accept environment variables from the `pre-receive` script.
1. Starting version 2.11, git changed the way the pre-receive flow works.
- Previously, the new potential objects would be added to the main repo. If the
pre-receive passes, the new objects stay in the repo but are linked up. If
the pre-receive fails, the new objects stay orphaned in the repo, and are
cleaned up during the next `git gc`.
- In 2.11, the new potential objects are added to a temporary "alternate object
directory", that git creates for this purpose. If the pre-receive passes, the
objects from the alternate object directory are migrated to the main repo. If
the pre-receive fails the alternate object directory is simply deleted.
2. In our workflow, the pre-recieve script (in `gitlab-shell) calls the
`/allowed` endpoint, which calls out directly to git to perform
various checks. These direct calls to git do _not_ have the necessary
environment variables set which allow access to the "alternate object
directory" (explained above). Therefore these calls to git are not able to
access any of the new potential objects to be added during this push.
3. We fix this by accepting the relevant environment variables
(GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES, GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY) on the
`/allowed` endpoint, and then include these environment variables while
calling out to git.
4. This commit includes (whitelisted) these environment variables while making
the "force push" check. A `Gitlab::Git::RevList` module is extracted to
prevent `ForcePush` from being littered with these checks.
2016-12-07 02:55:49 -05:00
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@env = env
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2016-11-17 14:48:23 -05:00
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@skip_authorization = skip_authorization
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2017-03-13 07:31:27 -04:00
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@protocol = protocol
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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end
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def exec
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2016-08-12 18:27:42 -04:00
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error = push_checks || tag_checks || protected_branch_checks
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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if error
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GitAccessStatus.new(false, error)
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else
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GitAccessStatus.new(true)
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end
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end
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protected
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def protected_branch_checks
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2016-11-17 14:48:23 -05:00
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return if skip_authorization
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2016-09-13 05:43:41 -04:00
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return unless @branch_name
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2017-04-03 13:59:58 -04:00
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return unless ProtectedBranch.protected?(project, @branch_name)
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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2017-01-12 17:37:14 -05:00
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if forced_push?
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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return "You are not allowed to force push code to a protected branch on this project."
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2017-04-03 19:05:51 -04:00
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elsif deletion?
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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return "You are not allowed to delete protected branches from this project."
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end
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if matching_merge_request?
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if user_access.can_merge_to_branch?(@branch_name) || user_access.can_push_to_branch?(@branch_name)
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return
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else
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"You are not allowed to merge code into protected branches on this project."
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end
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else
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if user_access.can_push_to_branch?(@branch_name)
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return
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else
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"You are not allowed to push code to protected branches on this project."
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end
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end
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end
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def tag_checks
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2016-11-17 14:48:23 -05:00
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return if skip_authorization
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2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
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return unless @tag_name
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
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if tag_exists? && user_access.cannot_do_action?(:admin_project)
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2017-04-03 19:05:51 -04:00
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return "You are not allowed to change existing tags on this project."
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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end
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2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
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protected_tag_checks
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end
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def protected_tag_checks
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return unless tag_protected?
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2017-04-03 19:05:51 -04:00
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if update?
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2017-04-03 15:06:06 -04:00
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return "Protected tags cannot be updated."
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2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
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end
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2017-04-03 19:05:51 -04:00
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if deletion?
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2017-04-03 15:06:06 -04:00
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return "Protected tags cannot be deleted."
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2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
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end
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2017-04-03 15:06:06 -04:00
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unless user_access.can_push_tag?(@tag_name)
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2017-03-31 14:30:33 -04:00
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return "You are not allowed to create this tag as it is protected."
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2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
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end
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end
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def tag_protected?
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2017-04-03 13:59:58 -04:00
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ProtectedTag.protected?(project, @tag_name)
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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end
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def push_checks
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2016-11-17 14:48:23 -05:00
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return if skip_authorization
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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if user_access.cannot_do_action?(:push_code)
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"You are not allowed to push code to this project."
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end
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end
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private
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2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
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def tag_exists?
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project.repository.tag_exists?(@tag_name)
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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end
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def forced_push?
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Accept environment variables from the `pre-receive` script.
1. Starting version 2.11, git changed the way the pre-receive flow works.
- Previously, the new potential objects would be added to the main repo. If the
pre-receive passes, the new objects stay in the repo but are linked up. If
the pre-receive fails, the new objects stay orphaned in the repo, and are
cleaned up during the next `git gc`.
- In 2.11, the new potential objects are added to a temporary "alternate object
directory", that git creates for this purpose. If the pre-receive passes, the
objects from the alternate object directory are migrated to the main repo. If
the pre-receive fails the alternate object directory is simply deleted.
2. In our workflow, the pre-recieve script (in `gitlab-shell) calls the
`/allowed` endpoint, which calls out directly to git to perform
various checks. These direct calls to git do _not_ have the necessary
environment variables set which allow access to the "alternate object
directory" (explained above). Therefore these calls to git are not able to
access any of the new potential objects to be added during this push.
3. We fix this by accepting the relevant environment variables
(GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES, GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY) on the
`/allowed` endpoint, and then include these environment variables while
calling out to git.
4. This commit includes (whitelisted) these environment variables while making
the "force push" check. A `Gitlab::Git::RevList` module is extracted to
prevent `ForcePush` from being littered with these checks.
2016-12-07 02:55:49 -05:00
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Gitlab::Checks::ForcePush.force_push?(@project, @oldrev, @newrev, env: @env)
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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end
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2017-04-03 19:05:51 -04:00
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def update?
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!Gitlab::Git.blank_ref?(@oldrev) && !deletion?
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end
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def deletion?
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2017-03-31 12:57:29 -04:00
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Gitlab::Git.blank_ref?(@newrev)
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end
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2016-07-18 04:16:56 -04:00
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def matching_merge_request?
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Checks::MatchingMergeRequest.new(@newrev, @branch_name, @project).match?
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end
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end
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end
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end
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